

**Governance at the Margins:  
The challenge of implementing slum housing policy in Maharashtra, India**


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**ARCHIVES**



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## Governance at the margins:

### The challenges of implementing slum housing policy in Maharashtra, India

By

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning  
On May 21<sup>st</sup>, 2015 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of the Master in City Planning

#### ABSTRACT:

Building Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) is an in-situ slum housing up-gradation policy that was initiated in 2005 by the Central Government of India under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). It is one of the few housing policies in the long history of slum housing policies in India where housing provision for the poor is linked to governance reform (i.e., governance building at the city level). Today (2015) the first phase of the program is complete and the second phase more than 50% complete. A study of the BSUP phase-1 projects offers a unique opportunity to understand the impact of governance building on policy implementation, one of the areas of policy analysis that has been relatively less studied in India. This thesis develops a comparative study of two projects recently completed under the BSUP program in Yerwada in Pune city in Maharashtra. The thesis expands the notion of governance from the community (the governed) and the government (the governing) binary to all the co-governance actors involved in the multi-agency implementation system: the private for-profit agents, the civil society agencies, the community, the local political actors, technical consultants and the administrators. The research demonstrates that a governance building process that allows for transparency, efficiency, representation, responsiveness, accountability and equity can support successful policy implementation. To support these values defining the implementation “process” is as important as establishing the “structure”, wherein structure defines the architecture of institutions that support implementation and process defines the mechanism of decision making, the strategy for shaping attitudes and methods of norm creation. In conclusion the case demonstrates that governance building can accomplish successful implementation of public policy in marginal conditions with marginal institutional and stakeholder capacities.

**Thesis committee: Prof. Lawrence Vale (MIT), Lecturer Yu Hung Hong (MIT) & Asst. Prof. Liza Weinstein (NEU)**



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“ A hundred times a day I remind myself that my inner and outer life depends on the labors of other men, living and dead, and that I must exert myself in order to give in the measure as I have received and am still receiving”

-Albert Einstein

I would like to thank all the community members at Mother Teresa Nagar, Nagpur Chawl, Sheila Salve Nagar and Gandhi Nagar who graciously gave me their time, welcomed me to their homes and told me about their experiences and problems. To the Corporators who informed me about the history of their neighborhood and their role in the community and the project. The project teams at the Pune Municipal Corporation ward office, especially the Junior Engineers who talked to me at length about their work and their challenges and helped me understand their perspective. The Zonal head, the Commissioner and the OSD officer who reflected on the BSUP project process and shared their insights with me. To all the NGO partners on the project: CHF, SPARC, Mahila Milan and MASHAL who gave me access to the project documents, time and space in their offices to pour over documents, make copies and understand the day to day workings of the project. These interactions were invaluable in understanding the project and the process from a multi-stakeholder perspective.

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**LIST OF TERMS**

ULB	Urban Local Body
SPARC	Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers
SLNA	State Level Nodal Agency
PUCCA	Structurally stable permanent shelter
PMC	Pune Municipal Corporation
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
OSD	Officer on Special Duty (JNNURM)
NSG	National Steering Group
MoHUPA	Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation
MASHAL	Maharashtra Social Housing and Action League
MAHADA	Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority
KUCCHA	Temporary/unstable shelter
JNNURM	Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
CSMC	Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation International
BSUP	Building Services for the Urban Poor
SSNS	SPARC Samudaya Nirman Sahayak
NSDF	National Slum Dwellers Federation
SRA	Slum Redevelopment Authority

## Chapter-1- Introduction

1. Rationale for research
  - i. Introduction to research
  - ii. Key areas of research
  - iii. Brief context of the key research elements
    - a. Marginalization in slum communities
    - b. Governance in slum communities
    - c. Housing policies in slum communities
    - d. BSUP- integrating housing and governance building
2. Structure of the thesis document

## **Governance at the margins: the challenges of implementing slum housing policy in Maharashtra, India**

Building Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) is an in-situ slum housing up-gradation policy that was initiated in 2005 by the Central Government of India under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). It is one of the few policies in the long history of slum housing policies in India where housing provision for the poor is linked to governance reform (i.e., governance building at the local city level). Today (2015) the first phase of the program is complete and the second phase is under way. A study of the BSUP phase-1 projects offers a unique opportunity to understand the impact of governance building on policy implementation, one of the areas of policy analysis that has been relatively less studied in India. This thesis will develop a comparative study of two projects recently completed under the BSUP program in Pune city in Maharashtra. The rationale for selecting the specific cases and the research methodology will be described in detail in the Chapter 3.

### **Key areas of research**

There are two key questions of policy implementation that this thesis aims to research. These are: “How is governance building linked to implementation?” and “How do marginalities (of providers, residents, enablers) impact governance building?”. This introduction provides the reader a brief background of the key areas of inquiry for this research in the context informal settlements in India. These are the conditions of “marginality” in “governance” in the existing slum settlements and the “Slum housing policies” and “implementation” mechanisms adopted by the state of Maharashtra. The first part of the introduction outlines the kind of marginalization suffered by the informal housing communities. The second part outlines the informal governance structures that exist in these communities and how they are linked or not to the formal governance systems, identifying their vulnerabilities. The third part of the introduction outlines the key instruments of implementation that the current slum policies emphasize. The fourth part outlines the relevance of the BSUP case and its selection as pertinent to this research, in the context of slum housing policies in India.

### **Marginalization in slum communities**


India has a large gap in its housing supply: 26.53 million new homes need to be built to meet this gap and 88% of this shortage is in the Economically Weaker Segment (EWS) and 11% in Lower Income Group (LIG) housing, as identified by the Indian government’s 11<sup>th</sup> Five year Plan. This gap is further exacerbated in urban centers experiencing rapid growth. Cities like Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Bangalore, Pune and

Hyderabad have had high population growth since the 1960s due to high rates of urbanization, high economic growth in the tertiary sector and increasing rural to urban migration. However both the government and the market agents have been unable and unwilling to cater to the housing needs of the poor migrant populations. This has led to the growth of an informal housing market, today 60% of Mumbai's population and 40% of Pune's population lives in informal settlements, settlements designated as slums by the Maharashtra government.

No.	Decades	Total pop	Slum pop	% Slum pop
1	1921	133000	0	0.00%
2	1931	162000	0	0.00%
3	1941	238000	0	0.00%
4	1951	481000	38500	8.00%
5	1961	606777	92101	15.18%
6	1971	856105	239701	28.00%
7	1981	1203363	377000	31.33%
8	1991	1691430	569000	33.64%
9	2001	2538473	1025000	40.38%

*The City Sanitation Plan (CSP 2012, Pune) gives the total number of slums settlements in Pune as 564 with 353 declared and 211 undeclared or not notified slums. It is observed that 40.38% of the total population is residing in slum settlements in Pune today. (Population growth figures as per – revised CDP, Pune city)*

Pune- Slum Population in relation to total population-per CDP



These communities suffer several levels of marginalization. A large majority of the rural migrants belong to lower caste communities that have suffered historic and generational social discrimination and suppression and continue to live in its shadows (Guru & Chakravarty, 2005). According to reports by Guru and Chakravarty, Dalit's constitute three quarters of the poorest in India even though they are only 16% of India's population. Of the total 40 million bonded labor in India majority are Dalit's. Other urban poor continue to suffer economic marginalization as they labor in exploitative unreliable daily wage jobs with low pay and inadequate benefits in the urban informal markets. Still others suffer marginalization from development agendas that neglect the urban poor, depriving them of basic provisions of affordable

shelter and services. Since 1947, roughly about 60 million people have been displaced in India as per the Planning Commission, for development related work (HLRN, 2014). Slum dwellers also often pay much higher prices for substandard water, electricity and other services. According to a study of the homeless in central Mumbai the effective price paid per liter by the pavement dwellers is 20 times the municipal rate other citizens of the city pay (Swaminathan, 1995). Settled often on subserviced, neglected or unmanaged urban lands in poor locations with low values and hazardous conditions, these communities lack legal titles to defend their residential status or claim political enfranchisement, leading to legal and political marginalization. Demolitions in Mumbai were particularly widespread in the past few years. Dec 2004-Feb 2005 saw a spate of demolitions reported by BBC, Economist (Swaminathan, 1995). In Delhi alone 1 million people have been displaced in the last 10 years (1998-2008), and the main evictors have been the state itself, namely Delhi Development Authority (DDA) the largest land owner in Delhi (Ghertner, 2010). Thus removed from the mainstream of social, political, economic and development processes these communities live at the margins of formal governance structures.

### **Governance in slum communities**

It is important to note that these communities while lacking formal governance mechanisms have developed important and vibrant informal governance mechanisms. These alternate forms of governance not only enable self-development but to a large extent enable various levels of collective bargaining power with the formal structures, an ability key to their survival and development. Studies like “governance in the gullies” (Jha, Rao, & Woolcock, 2007) give a snapshot of the alternate governance structures that exist in these marginalized communities, structures that sometimes reinforce traditional caste and community systems and at other instances show modern leadership and political affiliations, and yet others that show the formation of new social leadership structures supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society agents. But, as the study notes, these are tenuous structures that are impacted by extreme marginalization. Under the most desperate circumstances any semblance of cooperation or collective action can break down as people try desperately to secure their individual benefits and resort to self-survival. Despite this tenuousness collective bargaining, political affiliations have to a large extent allowed these communities some level of integration with the city governance through granting of political enfranchisement, service provisions from city utilities, claim to health and educational amenities. However maintaining these gains is often difficult and their linkage to formal governance remains unrecognized, unstable and subject to political

patronage and exploitation, and therefore a constant struggle for communities held captive by these fragmented governance structures. The formal and the informal structures that exist as tenuously linked exploitative models.

### **Housing policies in slum communities**

Governments at the central and state level have instituted many policies for integrating slum communities with the city's development agenda. However these policies have often focused on developing hard infrastructures and housing up-gradation as key goals while neglecting the development of the softer infrastructures of integration. Governance building has never been adopted as a significant part of these housing policies or infrastructure upgrades or as mechanism for implementing these policies. Policy instruments have rather focused on calibrating benefits and incentives for participation, a reflection of the welfare attitude of the state that lacks an attempt to co-create development. Many forms of public private initiatives have been attempted and many modes of redevelopment have been propagated through these instruments from incremental housing, to sites and services, to whole-sale redevelopment, to eviction and relocation.

Over a period of decades the opening up of participation in slum housing to a large circle of stakeholders including- private developers, private contractors and NGOs has enabled the stakeholder base of policy actors to enlarge. However, these multi-party implementation structures with limited government involvement or oversight have led to increased conflicts ending in legal battles, with claims and counter claims between community groups and private developers (Sanyal & Mukhija, 2001). Work by Mukhija and Sanyal in documenting the building of the Markandeya housing redevelopment in Dharavi, gives a detailed description of this contested process. The complexity of these plural institutional implementation frameworks is compounded by the highly unstable policy environment. Contrary to theoretical notions of institutional lethargy and tendency to maintain status quo in policy environments, it seems that the short time horizon of political interests alongside a rapidly urbanizing urban context has made the slum housing policy environment in Maharashtra very dynamic and adaptable (see chapter 2 for context of changing slum housing policies in Maharashtra). Pressures of electoral politics force political parties to curry citizen loyalty by offering higher and higher benefits, almost to the point of economic unviability. Speed is of the essence to maximize popular benefits during the span of political tenures (5 years), therefore policies are often instituted on a trial and error basis. The patience for a studied approach is lost to quick study and review committees set up to provide recommendation reports

catering to political goals. Learning from doing seems to be the mantra. Long term institutional learning or integration is compromised by the approach of setting up a temporary committees and parallel institutions and continuously changing policy instruments while governance building mechanisms remain unresolved.

Reports on the slum redevelopment policy indicate that out of a total of 75,000 approved proposals for slum redevelopment projects only 3,486 homes have been actually constructed as of 2000 (Vinit Mukhija, 2001). While forming of community building organizations (CBOs) has been mandated by the redevelopment policies, there are no training initiatives that help CBOs develop knowledge and capacity to negotiate terms and conditions of real estate contracts with private developers while safeguarding their community interest. The interaction between private agencies and communities has led to many conflicts. CBOs and private developers unable to resolve these conflicts often request the state to act as an arbitrator. Thus, as Mukhija notes, “less government has led to a call for more governance” in these contested territories. There are more than a hundred court cases between private parties and communities in Maharashtra alone and, these conflicts have created increased anxieties and factionalism in slum communities. These policies have also attempted to impose standardized housing policy frameworks on varied and disparate slum communities without allowing space for negotiation and responsiveness to local needs. This has led to implementation challenges as communities contest a one-size-fits-all benefits framework and the inequitable eligibility rules. Most policies do not outline a decision making process that can help navigate this negotiation of claims and counterclaims through equitable dialogue, cooperation and collaboration. Policies continue to tweak packages of benefits and incentives in order to direct beneficiary and implementer behavior. Benefits and incentives are also instruments to claim political mileage with interest groups (beneficiaries, NGOs and private developers). These conflicts and challenges in implementation require mechanisms of coordination, negotiation, conflict resolution, norm setting and institution building to ensure policy fruition and policy adaption in varied local settings i.e. building local governance systems. Many scholars have drawn attention to these governance challenges through their work on slum housing in India (see chapter-4 in literature review on other examples), and recently through the JNNURM mission there has been a thrust on linking local governance building to policy implementation. This thesis will analyze this link further through a case study of the Yerwada case, a Building Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) project initiated under the JNNURM mission.

### **BSUP integrating housing and governance building**

The In-situ slum up-gradation policy initiated as part of the Building Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) program, under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), is a recently initiated slum housing policy in this long trajectory of development of slum housing policies. It offers an important break from this sole focus of developing hard infrastructures (physical development). It ties housing up-gradation for slum communities like Yerwada (the case chosen for this thesis) to a larger urban governance reform agenda. It mandates a transfer of power from the state to the local government as a method of decentralizing power and allowing local accountability. This power although already reconstituted in the constitution as per the 74<sup>th</sup> Amendment in 1992 allowed the state to retain the authority to assign roles to municipalities, thus in effect limiting its application. The JNNURM mandate of requiring the states to assign planning and implementation responsibility to the municipality as a prerequisite for the federal grant helped bring the decentralization into practice. It also reinstates the importance of social mobilization and community consent in the creation of improved housing for the poor. It gives agency to the community as partners co-funding the improvements by their own contributions, and therefore diminishes the notion of dependency and welfare. The policy has been implemented across 11 cities with varied degrees of success. The research (by this thesis) on the Yerwada projects in Pune reveals how a confluence of key policy entrepreneurs, positive engagement of local political representatives, active participation by community and community contractors; and collaboration and cooperation between implementers and local government agencies created a governance mechanism that has both enabled somewhat more successful implementation of the policy and helped build local governance capacity. This thesis analyzes the decision making process during implementation of two projects from the Yerwada case to examine how these governance mechanisms were built and how they impacted implementation. The case study will document how local policy entrepreneurs allowed for innovation, flexibility, negotiation, collaboration and cooperation, while maintaining accountability in order to implement the policy and achieve the objective of housing up-gradation. The research seeks to inform how policy frameworks can enable such governance building especially for communities living at the margins of formal governance and enable both successful implementation of policy goals and capacity building for local governance. This entails having a strategy for investing in hard and soft infrastructures that can achieve long term sustainability of these marginalized communities.

**Structure of the thesis document**

Chapter 2 describes the case study in context of the overall development of public housing policies in Maharashtra since the early 1950s. The main focus is to understand the changing governance structures propagated by each policy framework and the key ideas behind the changes leading up to the BSUP policy. It outlines the key frameworks of the BSUP policy and the current status of the policy. And subsequently introduces the context of the two projects in the Yerwada case that will be developed in the research chapters that follow. The third chapter introduces the research question and states the key hypothesis of the thesis in the context of this research and elaborates on the methodology of the research and the key elements of analysis in the research. Chapter four elaborates on the relevant policy analysis literature that looks at implementation and governance research in public policy in the global and Indian context. It then relates why and where there might be a need for dialogue between the two bodies of literature i.e. “implementation research” and “governance research” and how this thesis attempts to do that. Chapter 5 presents a documentation of the case studies highlighting the decision making process and the governance building mechanism and how this might have impacted the implementation of the policy. The final chapter develops an analysis of the case based on the literature and summarizes the key findings from the two projects and closes with some concluding thoughts on the key research question i.e. does governance building help support implementation and a discussion on the need for additional research to examine this.

## Chapter-2 – Social housing policy context in Maharashtra

1. Housing policy implementation & changing governance structures
  - i. Public led and public funded governance structure- 1950s-60s
  - ii. Internationally aided, Public led governance structure- 1970s-80s
  - iii. Public enabled- Private led governance structure-1980s-90s
  - iv. Public, private, civil society and community led multi-party governance structure- 2000s-Present
2. Basic Services for Urban Poor (BSUP)policy
  - i. Introduction to the policy and statement of objectives
  - ii. key differentiators of the BSUP policy
  - iii. Salience of this research

In the previous chapter the thesis identified the key governance, housing, housing policy and marginalization issues facing slum communities in India. This chapter will trace the evolution of slum housing policy in Maharashtra through the post-independence decades. The focus will be to understand and evaluate the changes in the policy governance structures, the key policy actors involved, the implementing agencies engaged, the roles of the different stakeholders and the changing relationship among the stakeholders involved. The second part will introduce the BSUP policy to be researched by this thesis and introduce the policy actors involved in the making of this policy. It will elaborate the policy goals and objectives and the scope for work initiated under the policy. It will describe the current status of the policy and its impact, the evaluations available and the salience of further research and assessment.

**Public led and public funded governance structure (1950s-60s)**- One of the earliest slum housing policy introduced in Mumbai by the central government was the Slum Clearance Scheme of 1956. The clearance strategy sought to remove slums from the city and resettle slum dwellers in public housing. The Bombay Municipal Corporation was authorized to clear slums on municipal land. The Maharashtra Housing Board supplied public housing of which 75% were Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) and Low Income Groups (LIG). However government agencies could not meet the demand of housing, against the annual housing need of 46,000 and 60,000 in the 60s and 70s the public and private sector together could supply 17,600 and 20,600 houses respectively (Risbud, 2001). The policy reflected the influence of large public housing initiatives undertaken in Great Britain during the same period with the idea of revitalizing and redeveloping congested industrial city centers. This stage of slum housing policy making, funding and implementation was entirely led by federal and state agencies. This strategy proved difficult and costly to implement. Lack of government capacity led to continued increase in slum population in major cities like Mumbai and Pune in Maharashtra. Evictions and demolitions drives were heavily contested and led to civil society and political mobilization demanding inclusive development.

**Internationally aided, public led governance structure (1970s-80s)** - The public and political pressure against clearance and evictions brought about a change in slum housing policy, embracing a more inclusive planning agenda. In 1971, the Maharashtra state government proposed a Slum Improvement Program (SIP). This program, supported by international development agencies like the World Bank, included schemes such as - the Slum Up-gradation Program (SUP), the Bombay Urban Development Project (BUDP) and the Low Income Group Shelter Program (LISP). The main thrust was to provide tenure security by giving property titles to the slum dwellers in their existing location and thereby encourage self-improvement of housing. Some schemes like BUDP, which created funding through cross subsidy and site and services schemes that employed an incremental housing strategy, succeeded in creating some new affordable housing. However with limited government funding and lack of access to financial

institutions for the poor these initiatives were unable to create substantial new housing stock or housing improvements. During this period 1976 to 1983 the slum population in Mumbai grew from 2.4 million to 4.8 million over 7 years (O'Hare, Abbott, & Barke, 1998) and in Pune from 239,701 to 377,000 in the years 1971-81 (Omkar Associates, 2008). It is during this period in 1976 that Maharashtra Housing and Area development Act (MAHADA) was created. The agency was created by merging the Maharashtra Housing Board, the Vidharbha housing board, the Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board and the Maharashtra Slum Improvement board. The main idea of forming MAHADA was to integrate the functions and activities performed by various statutory bodies and focus on the solving the housing problem.

**Public enabled Private led governance structure (1980s-90s)-** During this period there was a thrust from International donor agencies to push governments to achieve a full cost recovery model in public housing production through engaging private equity and private agency (real estate developer) participation. This external pressure coupled by economic liberalization in India led to the making of the first private led public housing development policy in Maharashtra. The slum redevelopment model proposed an incentives structure and land subsidies to motivate private entity participation in building cross subsidized rehabilitation housing for the slum dwellers. The private investment would be supported by profits from a density surplus that would allow development of market rate housing on the same redeveloped parcels. In 1984 the Mumbai Municipal Corporation introduced the first Slum Redevelopment Program (SRD). This program has seen several transformations since (1992 & 1994 SRD amendment, 1995-SRS program) with increasing developer incentives (e.g. higher FSI's), increasing beneficiary incentive (free housing) and lesser government engagement and promotion of direct developer community interaction. Though seen to have some initial traction, this policy has also faced numerous implementation challenges. Mumbai's slum redevelopment schemes have yielded only 19,000 low income apartments instead of the 800,000 that had been promised by Shiv Sena (Burra, 2005). Many low profit projects have been abandoned by developers and there are currently more than a hundred court cases between private developers and communities

**Public, Private, Civil society and Community led multi-party governance structure- 2000's-Present-** Today, to reduce the negative influence of profit motive led coercions and distortions by developers, civil society agencies are being called to participate in the production of social housing. However case studies like the Markandeya Housing project in Dharavi by SPARC indicate that civil society actors engaged in Slum Housing production are unable to cope with this contested high stake real estate environment of

redevelopment that is a manifestation of the program itself. The 100% cross subsidized financing model solely dependent on private investment and profit incentives have turned communities themselves into “developers” (Mukhija’s book “Squatters As Developers” highlights this development) (Vinit Mukhija, 2003). Whether “Institutional pluralism in housing delivery is the cause of unforeseen conflicts” (Sanyal & Mukhija, 2001) or paradoxically “less government means more government” or the implementation challenge is of “Governance without government” (Menkhaus, 2007) this is an active debate in housing policy research in India today.

The new program proposed under the Building Services for Urban Poor marks several new shifts in the governance model defined by changes in the actors, roles and decision making structure in this multi-party system. The program reduces the asymmetric profit motive and private investment structure by creating a distributive investment model combined with a distributive management structure. The program depends on investment from all levels of government (national, state, urban local bodies) including beneficiary contribution supported by a decentralized implementation model. It embraces a democratic governance model which establishes more horizontal structures of governance. In light of the new debates on conflict ridden implementation and the need for “more governance” in public policy administration in India, this thesis investigates this important shift in policy framework and its impact on implementation. The thesis develops an in depth documentation of the implementation process and the decision making framework to understand both the efficacy of the democratic governance model proposed by the policy and the challenges it faced. The learning from the case based research aims to inform the decision making and governance building frameworks used for the analysis and the BSUP policy.

### **The BSUP policy- introduction and objectives**

The Building Services for Urban Poor program (BSUP) is a component of the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). The JNNURM is a central government led urban reform initiative setup in 2005 for a period of seven years (until 2012), though the mission was subsequently granted an extension of 2 years. As stated in the official documents: “The aim is to encourage reforms and fast track planned development of identified cities. Focus is to be on efficiency in urban infrastructure and service delivery mechanism, community participation, and accountability of ULBs (urban local bodies)/Parastatal agencies towards citizens” (JNNURM MHUPA, 2009). In its needs assessment the program document states the importance of Urban Sector Development and outlines that 28% of India’s population is lives in urban

areas per the 2001 census and projected trends suggest further urbanization, estimating 40% urban population by the year 2021. It recognizes India's economic shift from a rural to urban economy with service and tertiary sector jobs in urban areas becoming major contributors to the country's GDP. It then contends that higher productivity of this sector is contingent on the availability of quality infrastructure services in urban areas. It estimates that this would require large investments by the ULBs in basic services like roads, water supply, sanitation, power, telecom, mass transportation, solid waste management and civic infrastructure. The program acknowledges that achieving these development goals is a huge challenge and would require a national level initiative to bring together state governments and enable ULBs to catalyze investment flows in the urban infrastructure sector.

### **Key differentiators of the BSUP policy**

The mission identifies 63 target cities for infrastructure investment under this mission. The cities are categorized based on their population and investment targets are identified based on their needs. The mission stresses that work initiated by this program will continue the urban governance reforms initiated in the 74<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment Act and the Model Municipal Law mandating decentralized governance and increased responsibility to local bodies in both administering and planning development. The program aims to provide reform linked assistance to state governments and ULBs and mandates operations and management becoming a key component of the program in order to ensure sustainable infrastructure development that goes beyond just asset creation. The submission identifies providing Basic Services to the Urban Poor (BSUP) as a key goal. BSUP recognizes that the rising urban population has also given rise to an increasing number of urban poor. As per the 2001 estimates it states that the slum population is estimated to be 61.8 million across India (JNNURM MHUPA, 2009).

The Ministry of Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation (MHUPA) is to administer the submission through the sub-mission directorate. The main thrust of the BSUP submission is to integrate development of slums through projects for providing shelter, basic services and other related civic amenities with a view to providing utilities to the urban poor. Access to funds for the program require the city to meet certain reform requirements, including preparing a city development plan, preparing detailed project reports to identify areas for providing services to poor communities and delineating private sector participation. The central government funds for identified cities would be released to the state nodal agency, which would leverage its own funds and funds from implementing agencies, including any bridge funds required from financial institutions, private sector, capital markets and external aid. For the

Yerwada In-situ slum up gradation project in Pune the funding structure was a 50% Federal contribution, 30% State, 10% ULB and 10% beneficiary contribution. The services to be provided under the program included provision of security of tenure, improved housing, access to basic infrastructure services and convergence with other government services like education, health and social security.

The BSUP In-situ program differs from previous slum up-gradation programs in its commitment to incremental in place up-gradation rather than wholesale redevelopment or relocation programs. It maintains existing social structures and safeguards livelihoods by committing to non-displacement. The policy has high level of acceptance from the community and the local representatives as it maintains social structures and livelihoods, increases value by providing an upgraded living environment, requires limited state and local resources, receives substantial federal funding and maintains the local political constituency. It is for the first time in the history of slum redevelopment policies in India that public policy has acknowledged low income communities as the sole custodians of the land they have developed, and made a proactive commitment to in place up-gradation of their housing needs with substantial federal aid. Competing commercial interests in land development (promoted by the SRA private cross subsidy program) have been kept at abeyance to recognize the interest of the poor people and their right to the city. The policy while headed in a progressive pro-poor direction has several limitations in the way of its instruments, its processes and its outcomes and would benefit from a detailed assessment. Key criticism of the program includes a lack of long term viability due the large public subsidies involved, lost opportunity to use full land development potential for future housing/ other needs and the inability of the program to encourage better civic planning, inadvertently purporting a concretized slum. In the absence of viable alternates alluded to by these arguments my view here is to focus on how this program improved the housing conditions of the people who benefited from them and how this case might elaborate on strategies to improve implementation which has been a perennial challenge in public housing policy implementation in India.

### **Salience of this research**

The BSUP policy is relatively new and still in various stages of implementation; the first phase has been implemented and occupied by beneficiaries since 2014. The policy program has been extended for another 2 years, with many phase-2 projects coming on line. This implies that many more communities will be impacted by its outcomes in the coming years and it would be a good time to learn from research on phase-1 implementation processes and the challenges. Currently there is very little research on

implementation of the phase-1 BSUP projects except the National Technical Advisory Group (NTAG) report from 2012 that presents an 11 city survey of projects in various stages of implementation (SPARC, 2012). Though this report gives a good overview of the current status of the projects, it mostly relies on official records and limited onsite review and community outreach, thus giving only a broad brush understanding of concerns and issues. The report acknowledges the limitation of using official data without having the opportunity to verify it. Even if one considers the likely under reporting of failures in official data, the findings suggest that many cities have had to cancel projects mid-way and almost all projects have been delayed substantially (see chart from report attached in the Appendix-1). Further, the findings (based in stakeholder interviews) state that a majority of project failures happened at the procurement and implementation stage of projects. The report goes on to offer a broad assessment of some key implementation hurdles faced by stakeholders in the 11 city survey, but lacks in depth qualitative assessment. This highlights the need for an in depth case based assessment of the actual implementation process in order to understand the fine grain of the decision making process, the actors involved, their roles, their capacities and how they interacted based on the rules and regulations to produce housing outcomes. In fact I argue below in the brief background of the problem statement that this is precisely where Indian policy makers need to focus. While policy instruments have been abundantly experimented within the social housing sector in India, implementation innovation has neither been researched nor experimented with. There is a vast field of implementation research literature (In the US) which debates forward mapping and backward mapping approach to policy implementation analysis. The failures in policy implementation in the social housing sector in India highlight the need for this research in the Indian context.

Most housing policies in the past have focused on the design of policy instruments. A technocratic approach to planning which is determined to find the right criteria and rules that can be imposed to sort, classify and order the most eligible of the most vulnerable people and communities. The goal has been to derive a perfect formula that can fathom the right benefit, the right cross subsidy, the right incentive to make the policy viable, acceptable and effective. Needless to say, analysts, activist and critics have also been kept busy analyzing these benefits, incentives and subsidies. The most debated topics in social housing policy are the need for an inclusive eligibility criterion, removal of cutoff dates, reconsideration of land reservations, and provision of tenure security, conflation of environmental vulnerability issues, conflicts with development agendas and contested land ownership. These contests are around classifying, categorizing and sorting people and places to determine eligibility for public benefits which has been a

difficult and vexing challenge for all public welfare programs. Who are the people?; Are they the most vulnerable?; What right to the city do they have?; How can that be determined?; How does this right translate to the right to housing and to land?; What is the value of the land?; and What is the most viable and equitable way of redeveloping that land to benefit the poor and the city?. In this environment, most social housing policy analysis has focused on analyzing the evolving policy instruments with their ever changing criteria for classification and eligibility. A focus on analyzing rules, a traditional (top down) policy making approach, has left policy analysis lacking in investigating how governance building tools (a ground up approach) can be used to channel policy innovations and rule changes through the implementation process.

This thesis therefore seeks to analyze the implementation process from the bottom up (a backward mapping approach,(Elmore, 1979)) to understand how interactions between the implementers (front line workers, street level bureaucrats, local politicians, other stake holders), the community (i.e. beneficiaries) and the context throughout the policy implementation process create opportunities for learning and rule negotiation to create policy innovations. Specifically, I will look at whether the channels of communication are open or closed and to what extent the rules allow for adaptation informed by new local knowledge and learning from the process. My focus will be to understand how governance building mechanisms create bargaining spaces that influence policy outcomes and may act as active learning spaces to initiate policy design in the future. The decision making process at the implementation stage will be my key unit of analysis. This analysis will seek to inform and recommend implementation design protocols to ensure consistent and aligned outcomes. The thesis focuses on a recently completed in-situ slum up-gradation case in Pune as the primary case for the analysis to be relevant to current policy context. The analysis will look at two projects – Gandhi Nagar (by MASHAL) and Mother Teresa Nagar (by SPARC), both BSUP In-situ up-gradation projects in the Yerwada site implemented under the same administrative structure by different agencies during the same time period. The aim is to understand how different actors, their motivations and their interactions influence outcomes even under the same rules and policy framework.

## Chapter-3- Research question and methodology

1. Research Question – Is governance building important to implementation, how can housing policy implementation be improved in a multiparty implementation structure and how can governance building be accomplished in marginal conditions with marginal capacities?
  - i. Hypothesis statement
  - ii. Basis in literature
    - a. Backward mapping and forward mapping implementation research
    - b. Governance building literature- horizontal versus hierarchical orders
    - c. Indian policy analysis context- binary and theoretical approach
    - d. Need for grounded theory-relinked to Indian context and literature on participation
2. Research Methodology - The comparative case study will provide a detailed comparative assessment of the implementation process in the two projects within the Yerwada case.
  - i. Research design- comparative case study model & decision making as the unit of analysis. key questions, framework and indicators for analysis.
  - ii. Research method-mixed method- interviews, site observation, document and literature review
  - iii. Case study methodology- comparative & instrumental

**Research Question – Is governance building important to implementation?. If so, how can housing policy implementation be improved in a multiparty implementation structure and how can governance building be accomplished in marginal conditions with marginal capacities?.**

It is my hypothesis that while rules do matter and how rules fit the context is important to achieving policy success, a sole focus on rule design cannot solve implementation challenges, as no one rule or set of rules can fit all conditions. This is especially true when ground conditions in terms of housing and socio-economic conditions are complex and varied as is the case in informal settlements that have grown organically over a period of time. This has been one of the key drawbacks of a slum housing policy that focuses solely on the design of instruments with varied packages of incentives and benefit structures. Further, I contend that in the context of a multiparty policy implementation structure where different organizations with different capacities, organizational culture and interest impact policy reception and implementation decisions, a governance building mechanism might be better suited to achieve decisions that are aligned to policy goals. This governance building mechanism will necessitate careful calibration of the power structures to create interdependencies, align interests and balance between rights and responsibilities to allow for collaboration, coordination, innovations, responsiveness and successful implementation of policies. In the following paragraphs I will describe why this research is relevant to the cases under the BSUP policy.

### **Basis in Literature**


The limited evaluations of the BSUP policy (SPARC, 2012) suggest that the policy outcomes have been varied, with many failures and some successes, and that implementation challenges have been one of the biggest hurdle that the policy faces in achieving successful outcomes. The question this poses is whether policy design can control outcomes and, if so, what kind of policy analysis or research can inform the policy design. Should policy design focus on changing policy structure and or process?. A review of implementation research literature suggests two schools of thought in this field on research: the “forward mapping” and “backward mapping” approach to implementation research (Elmore, 1979). The former contends that rules can indeed control outcomes and the latter argues that rules are never “self-executing” and therefore must maximize discretion and decision making at the lowest rung of implementation. While the former argues for designing instruments with a focus on rules as the key mechanism of control, the latter calls for flexible frameworks and setting processes for negotiation and decision making.

Governance literature argues that decentralized forms of implementation where non-hierarchical horizontal and plural forms of governance have replaced singular hierarchical orders, as is the case in slum housing policy implementation, necessitates new thinking on decision making (Levi-Faur, 2012). Decision making mechanisms are not governed by control and rule making alone but assess cooperation, collaboration, coordination and exchange of information as key ingredients of the decision-making process. It needs decision making processes that require and allow for communication, flexibility, negotiation and responsiveness to particular conditions in order to accommodate change and allow adaptation. Policy analysis and policy design under such an implementation scenario could perhaps gain from “process” design rather than focusing solely on defining “structure”(Levi-Faur, 2012).


In India most policy analysis literature studying implementation in case studies has tended to simplify these complexities of organizational relationships and decision making process into theoretical debates on institutional ideologies. A case study by Sapna Doshi classifies the Mumbai Urban Transportation Project (MUTP) rehabilitation case as the emergence of “civil society agencies” as new state agents complicit in promoting state development agenda under the cloak of progressive community participation, a new enabling model of neoliberal agendas. On the other hand, case literature for the Dharavi study by Vinit Mukhija classifies the implementation problems in that case as a problem of “plurality of institutions in the implementation processes” and the larger problem of “governance without government”. Other case study research suggests the implementation problem is a question of “privatization of public housing”(O’Hare et al., 1998) and the problematic of private engagement in the production of public goods. While this form of policy analysis frames and problematizes the dominant conceptual binaries of public versus private, unitary versus plural, governance versus government, it is also complicit in reinstating the very binaries it questions. The choice of one or the other does not exist today in public administration and policy implementation. Public policy implementation has to rely on complex networks of private organizations (developers, contractors, project managers), technical experts (consultants, advisors, auditors), public agencies and civil society agents and outcomes will rely on decision making processes and the mechanism of coordination and collaboration between these agencies.

The problem with this theoretical approach (contention of binaries) to policy analysis is that it detracts implementation analysis into a choice between market and non-market structures, and trivializes the

important problem: how to use the structure and process of organizations to elaborate, specify and define policies (Elmore, 1979). The problem with the pluralistic contention of failure suggests complicity in accepting complexity as a barrier to implementation of public policy, without challenging how it can be capitalized upon and modified in pursuit of public policy objectives. Similarly, the debate over “governance without government” (Menkhaus, 2007) fails to recognize and elaborate on the channels of self-governance that are an important mechanism of decision making. As Elmore suggests, formal authority travels from top to bottom in organizations, but the informal authority that derives from expertise, skill and proximity to essential tasks travels in the opposite direction. For the purposes of implementation this means that policy outcomes are heavily dependent on specialized problem solving capabilities and delegation of the same further down the chain of authority, a form of self-governance mechanism through the decision making process. This thesis will to step away from the discussion of binaries that is predominant in Indian policy analysis and commit to a more grounded approach to case analysis with the aim of projecting new learnings that reveal the complexities of interactions between multi-party implementing agencies and the community in the implementation of social housing projects in India today.



*A diagrammatic representation (author’s interpretation) – top down and ground up approach (Elmore et al.).*



*A diagrammatic representation (author’s interpretation) - the Governance versus Government binary (Menkhaus et al.).*

There are three reasons why this thesis contends that a bottom up governance building approach through policy implementation might be especially relevant to the slum housing policy context:

- 1) **Negotiating formal rules in Informal settings** - Slums settlements are informal in nature with complex and intricate social, political, physical and economic organization structures. These communities are not homogeneous entities and they represent a wide spectrum of residential and commercial uses/needs and economic means. Imposing formal rules of standardized rigid procedures and uniform benefits is not consistent with their informal structure and has proven to be difficult to implement per the failures reported (SPARC, 2012). The successful negotiation of these varied needs in such dense and complex settings perhaps cannot and should not be solely defined at the policy maker's desk but should be negotiated at the street level where local knowledge of these complex structures is most understood.
- 2) **Multiparty implementation challenges**- Institutional pluralism in policy administration in slum housing has led to increased conflicts that require conflict management agencies. With government taking a limited role in housing development, slum housing production is open to participation by a large circle of stakeholders including NGOs, slum cooperatives, community based organizations, private developers and private contractors. The plurality of institutions exposes the process to competing interests. The interactions and exchanges among these diverse actors with competing interests have lacked proper channels of negotiation (i.e, governance building mechanisms), thus ending in conflicting stalemates, litigation and stalled/delayed projects (Vinit Mukhija, 2001). This condition highlights the need to establish local governance structures that could help negotiate these interests and conflicts. While decentralization has been adopted and mandated under the BSUP policy, the dynamics of the processes it initiates in implementation has not been documented and debated.
- 3) **Structure of governance; the Impact of less government.** As government continues to reduce its role as a housing provider and reduce its own institutional capacities, its ability to enforce and guide policy processes is lessened. This situation is further exacerbated in an environment where the number of actors involved in social housing production have multiplied- needing more governance for conflict resolution and oversight. This situation creates the need for a self-governance structure which can support the implementation process where all stakeholders are engaged and represented. A Self-governance structure that is supported by agencies that are

aligned and entrenched in the community and allowed flexibility and discretion in rule implementation would best benefit and sustain development through local capacity building.

These three reasons resonate with the key criteria outlined as essential indicators for the policy requiring backward mapping research: 1) complexity of on ground conditions 2) multiplicity of stakeholders 3) need for rule flexibility and discretion. Walker and Koroloff's policy research paper (Walker & Koroloff, 2007) on wraparound programs for children's mental health gives a good overview of this argument and will be elaborated in the literature review chapter that follows this section.

This implementation research will be further informed by literature on participatory planning processes (Carmon & Fainstein, 2013) and governance building processes (Fischer, 2012), while linking it to a contextual and cultural understanding of citizen participation in India. Dr B R Ambedkar, the great Indian social reformer and architect of the Indian constitution, proposed radical democratization, opening channels of communication and education to bring equity into Indian society. He insisted that we should pursue the power to educate, agitate and organize. Education would promote informed reasoning, agitation would give voice against marginalization and organization would establish the collective. Three key terms inform, give voice and organize resonate with the participatory planning and governance building literature today. A firm advocate for the rights of the socially and economically marginalized citizens Ambedkar challenged the glorification of the Brahminic corpus of ancient Indian texts that hierarchized human beings (Mukherjee, 2009). For democracy to function and sustain he proposed that there is a need for cooperative intelligence a process of social endosmosis. Channels of communication where many and varied interest can be consciously communicated and freely shared to allow for change and progress. This precisely relates to the debate between forward mapping and backward mapping method of policy analysis in policy implementation research. The forward mapping approach assumes that organizational processes are linked in hierarchical relationships. The backward mapping approach acknowledges that the closer one is to the source of the problem the greater is one's ability to influence it. Many policy analysts have argued that it is a myth that policy implementation can be controlled from the top by explicit directives, greater administrative responsibility and clearer statements of intent (Elmore, 1979). This issue is even more salient in today's policy context which is challenged by managing a multiplicity of implementation agencies/institutions, diverse stakeholders with divergent interests with less government capacity and oversight.

As Sen and Dreze state, cultivating democratic engagement, though harder to achieve than changing policy instruments, will be less vulnerable to the fragility of political changes and pressures (Sen & Dreze, 2013). Taking their point further suggests that processes that enable formation of democratic governance structures have the potential to sustain development beyond singular policy objectives and political changes by becoming self-advocating change agents for future initiatives. This perhaps has even greater significance in the slum housing policy context where constant policy changes motivated by political claims are debilitating the process of learning from past successes and failures, and therefore discounting the possibility of informed and incremental growth for sustained development. The research will seek to understand whether channels of communication created through interaction between stakeholders during the implementation lead to new learnings and better outcomes as outlined by Dr Ambedkar. Could the governance building mechanism established in this process sustain and negotiate successive incremental reforms over a period of time as suggested by Sen and Derez? And could an analysis of this process from the case study better inform policy implementation protocols for governance building in future projects?

### **Research design**

The thesis uses a comparative cases study of two projects in the same policy context implemented by two different agencies. The study develops an in depth documentation and analysis of the implementation process. A detailed comparative assessment allows an understanding of how implementation is impacted by the different implementing agencies, their goals and interest under the same policy design framework. This comparative assessment is likely to illuminate how organizational capacities and culture matter in defining policy decision and outcomes. The main unit of analysis will be the decision making process. The aim is to get a detailed understanding of the day to day interaction of the implementers with the rules, the context, the community and other co-implementers which informed their decisions. While actors matter, the comparative assessment will also help highlight how variations in ground conditions might demand differentiated response and need for flexibility. A study of the social mobilization process mandated in the current policy for community awareness and consensus building will examine how these processes were implemented in the two case studies to understand how varied structures of engagement might impact the outcome and the governance building mechanism. The decision making process will also highlight instances of mismatched rules and context to understand how the mismatches were overcome by creating a negotiation, space and will evaluate whether it was effective in bargaining new directions for the policy implementation through the learning of local knowledge. The comparative

analysis of the cases will offer an illustration of contrasts and congruity in implementation within the same policy subsystem. The analysis from this comparative study will help clarify how the same rules interact with different ground conditions and different stake holders to create different or similar decisions and different or similar outcomes. Both the cases are from the BSUP program implemented in Pune called the Yerwada In-situ slum up-gradation project. The first case is implemented by the Mahila Milan organization in Mother Teresa Nagar and Sheila Salve Nagar. The second case is implemented by MASHAL in Gandhi Nagar and Nagpur Chawl.

Overview of the comparative case study sites-

#### Case-1

- 1) **Mahila Milan & SPARC, In-situ slum up-gradation project, Pune, India (2010-2015).** Mahila Milan is a sister organization of SPARC, a large NGO based in Mumbai that works across India on slum improvement and slum survey projects. Mahila Milan was contracted by the Pune Municipal Corporation with developing, designing and building 1125 homes in Mother Teresa Nagar, Sheila Salve Nagar, Wadar Wasti, Bhatt Nagar, Netaji Nagar, Yashwant Nagar and Shanti Nagar as part of the in-situ slum up-gradation project promoted under the BSUP program by JNNURM. The contract was awarded in the year 2009. Construction began in 2010 and as of January 2015 Mahila Milan has completed the construction of 693 homes and is developing the remaining for completion and handover to the beneficiaries.

#### Case-2-

- 2) **MASHAL, In-situ slum up-gradation project, Pune, India (2010-2015).** MASHAL is an NGO based in Pune which has been working in social housing, GIS mapping of slums and slum surveys in the Pune and Mumbai area. MASHAL was contracted by the Pune Municipal Corporation with developing, design and building 2010 homes in Nagpur Chawl, Gandhi Nagar, Jaijawan Nagar, Laxmi Nagar, Ram Nagar, Balaji Nagar, Ganesh Nagar, Jijamata Nagar, Ashok Nagar, Kamraj Nagar and Manik Nagar in the year 2009. Construction began in the year 2010 and as of January 2015 MASHAL has completed construction of 1775 homes and is developing the remaining 235 houses for completion and handover to the beneficiaries.

There are eight overarching questions in the analysis of the implementation process. This first set of questions focus on understanding the rules and the stakeholder interests, roles and responsibilities-

- Who are the actors?; what are their stated roles?; and what roles do they play?
- What are the rules governing the relations between stakeholders at the implementation stage?
- What are the processes of implementation?
- How are the rules established and by whom? Who was consulted and who was left out?
- How do the rules relate to the context?; Where are the gaps and how will local knowledge influence them?
- What are the procedures to change the rules at the implementation stage?; How flexible is the policy or how rigid?; How does this impact the outcome?
- How are rules enforced and by whom?
- What were the stated outcomes?; What were the actual outcomes?

The research will use the framework outlined in the UNDP framework of Democratic Governance to analyze the decision making process (Scott & Wilde, 2006). The scope of the analysis covers both the process laid out in the policy for this case and the process followed by stakeholders in actual implementation. This analysis stresses on two broad goals for the cases – the tangible outcome or physical manifestation of the policy improvements and the self-development, empowerment of the people. This will help understand of how inclusive participatory processes of governance building may lead to collective decisions that produce better and more sustainable outcomes than coercion by traditional deference or processes dominated by market forces.

The seven key values of a democratic governance building process form the background of the research (Scott & Wilde, 2006). Participation, Accountability, Transparency, Efficiency, Equity, Representation and Responsiveness will be used as the indicators of these values and these will be analyzed through the following key questions in the research design for the case studies-

- Does the process encourage collaborative partnerships between stakeholders?
- Does the process allow inter-institutional dialogue?
- How does the process promote accountability?
- Does the process support transparent exchange of information?
- Does it allow decentralized decision making?
- Does it promote fairer distribution of resources?
- Does it encourage more equal distribution of political power?

- o Is the process responsive to changes on the ground?

These questions are further developed to show links to the actual process of implementation of each case study and emphasize how these values are analyzed in terms of their influences on the immediate outcome - not as abstract notions of governance building. So the key is to understand- collaboration to achieve particular goals. Is information serving a decision?, Is accountability ensuring enforcement? and does inter-institutional dialogues create learning?. These are just a few examples of the method of investigation related to the implementation process. The detailed questionnaire developed for this purpose is included as appendix-3.

The research informs how the implementation process balances the needs, interests and capacities of the different stakeholders: the community, the private players, the public institutions, political factions and civil society actors. The analysis aims to establish how interactions among frontline workers, street bureaucrats and community members shape their motivations and how policy champions emerge from this process. A key to understanding the process is to identify the role that different stakeholders play, how the process and policy rules channel their interdependencies, enabling them to learn from each other and build a governance structure that guides the development. Opportunities for improvement are assessed by evaluating how the implementation guidelines within the policy document differed from the actual implementation process and how this impacted the outcome. This can show how a more inclusive, productive process, can allow for a balance between rights and responsibilities, dealing with contestations and lead to new learnings for a better policy outcome.

#### **Research method-**

The research includes site visits, observations, documents review, literature review and semi-structured interviews with representatives of key stakeholders (community members, beneficiaries, front line workers, public officials, private developers, civil society players and financial institutions). This study involves interviews designed to gain information about the policy implementation process with a view of understanding the stakeholder interactions and beneficiary participation in the implementation process. An outline of the type questions used in the interviews are included as appendix-3.

The list with names of stakeholders interviewed is included in Appendix-5. The Interviews were conducted in January (2015) in Mumbai and Pune. An outline of the stakeholders covered is described

here. A broad range of public agency officials from the Urban Local Body were interviewed. These included the Junior Engineers (JE) who worked on the project on a day to day basis and Deputy Engineers (DE) who supervised their work and Executive Engineers (EE) who were in charge of the project implementation. The heads of the department were also interviewed to understand their engagement in the project. The team members from the JNNURM cell-2 at the city level that were the technical and accounting lead on the BSUP project were also interviewed for their work and role. This included their department head the Officer of Special Duty (OSD), the Executive and Deputy Engineers on the project. Interviewees included the consultant who prepared the DPR and the Municipal commissioner himself who heads the Urban Local Body.

Project teams and heads of both implementing agencies were interviewed. The interviewees included architects, engineers, surveyors, project manager and proprietor from the MASHAL team. The team from SPARC included their accounting team in Mumbai, their contracting and project management team from Pune and their design and engineering consultants based in Pune. The interviewed teams also included the CHF team who was involved in the developing the community participation strategy for the SPARC project. The head of SPARC at Mumbai was also interviewed for the project. Community members from both SPARC and MASHAL's project sites were interviewed. Interviewees included homeowners from Mother Teresa Nagar, Sheila Salve Nagar and Nagpur Chawl and Gandhi Nagar. Most meetings were held at people's homes. The corporators of the communities were also interviewed separately, both for the role they played on the project and to understand their ongoing role in the communities they live in.


### **Case Study Methodology**

The research uses a comparative case study model of research. Both case studies are considered as primary cases and the research has collected in depth and detailed data about the implementation process for each case. The case analysis provides an in-depth understanding of the processes, organizations and connections. It helps develop a nuanced understanding of the complex organizational process and the role of human agency in overcoming institutional and structural barriers. The choice of a multiple case study method allows for diversity and a broader understanding of the subject matter (V. Mukhija, 2010). The multiple cases are also intended to allow one to generalize the findings with adequate robustness. The cases are comparable by virtue of being in the same policy context (BSUP In-situ housing), are administered by the same government agencies, fall under the same regulatory framework, have similar scopes of implementation and are being implemented by Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The distinction between them is that they are being implemented by different

NGOs, encounter varied ground conditions (e.g., different community actors and different local political actors) and face different housing conditions and needs. The cross unit comparison will focus on how the decision making in this context is influenced by the interaction between the different implementers, the community actors, the political influencers, the varied ground conditions and the control variables the policy and government apparatus. The dependent variable is the policy outcome and the independent variables include these differentiator variables. Thus the case will aim to understand the multiple stakeholder perspective within each singular case.

Due to the organizational complexity of the case and the limitations of time and access to information, the research documentation does not provide a detailed descriptive chronological documentation of the case data. Rather, it uses the case material as supportive material to understand and deliberate the larger theoretical questions of interest akin to the Instrumental case study model outlined by Bruce L Berg (Berg, 2008). Detailed case data is incorporated as supportive evidence as required. The choice of cases for this study is made not to claim them as typical cases, but because they incorporate a participatory planning approach which is key to understanding the theoretical question of interest. The case study is thus viewed to play a supportive role in understanding a theoretical framework. The theoretical framework is attempting to understand the link between “backward mapping implementation research” and “governance building research” both of which focus on process rather than solely on outcome. This link will be established by using the “decision making process” as the unit of analysis to understand how it supports both implementation and governance building and leads to policy outcomes. The aim would be let the case inform the theoretical frame and develop it further with new insights from the case research. The aim is to both test the theoretical frames in the specific context but also develop them anew for the context. It is an inductive process that builds on the existing theory but also rejects, accepts and generates new grounded theory specific to the context of redevelopment of marginalized communities in India.

The main thrust of the case research is to use a map the decision making process from bottom up to understand the relationship between the outcomes and the on ground decisions. Linking this mapping to the governance framework will help understand how organizations and institutional structures, rules and regulations and policy design impact the decisions of the street level bureaucrats and implementers. The links between these two frameworks will be understood by the common values they share in a democratic governance structure.



The implementation process for the Yerwada projects can be broadly divided into 15 steps as outlined in the policy documents (JNNURM MHUPA, 2009). These steps can be further categorized under 3 broad categories -pre-tender, post-tender and construction stage. The analysis will focus on the key learnings from the implementation of these three broad sections of the implementation process.

### 1) Pre-tender stage

- a. Preparing City Development Plan
- b. Selection of the projects for funding from the BSUP program
- c. Socio-economic survey
- d. Detailed project report
- e. Appraisal of proposal

### 2) Post-tender stage

- a. Procurement of work
- b. Negotiate and award contract

### 3) Construction stage

- a. Community outreach
- b. Identification of eligible households
- c. Preparation of biometric cards for eligible households
- d. Provision of transit housing
- e. Finances and community contribution
- f. Construction
- g. Occupation and maintenance
- h. Granting of tenure documents

## Chapter-4- Literature review

1. Slum housing policy in Maharashtra a literature review
  - i. Sapna Doshi- The new governance of eviction
  - ii. Roma Chatterji- Self-governance produced by policy
  - iii. Vandana Desai- Co-option of Self-governance
  - iv. Vinit Mukhija – Distributive governance and chances of conflict
  - v. Sunaree Marshall- Central schemes and decentralized governance
2. BSUP policy a literature review
  - i. NTAG report- 11 city survey of projects and implementation challenges
3. Implementation Research literature review
  - i. Richard F Elmore - Instruments/rulemaking cannot solve all implementation problems
  - ii. Paul Sabatier, Daniel Mazmanian- Collaboration between implementation agencies is important. One needs incentives, motives & mandates
4. Governance literature review
  - i. Scott, Christopher & Wilde, Alexandria-UNDP framework- Measuring democratic governance , framework for selecting pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators
  - ii. David Levi-Faur-Oxford handbook-Need for building governance structures between varied groups, neither hierarchy nor markets
5. Group Theory of Decision-Making & Innovation
  - i. Mancur Olson - Small groups and better at addressing individual interests as opposed to large groups. Small groups more action oriented than large groups. Decision-making is higher.
  - ii. Charles Sabel–Culture vs Institutional Capacity. Institutional innovation and experimentation
6. Conclusion and theory of action

## **Introduction**

This literature review section is divided into four parts. The first part looks at slum housing policy literature from India to discuss the key policy governance and implementation challenges identified by scholars. It follows by reviewing the main takeaways from this research. The second part reviews available literature on BSUP policy implementation evaluation and summarizes the key challenges highlighted in this literature. The concluding section of this part identifies how this thesis will contribute to research in slum housing policy in India by developing an understanding of governance building as a tool to support policy implementation. The third part of this chapter draws on the international policy analysis literature focused on implementation research that helps identify the different frameworks for implementation analysis. The aim of this part of the literature review is to help select a framework for implementation analysis most suitable for studying slum housing policy in Maharashtra. This section will discuss the different methods of implementation analysis proposed by various scholars ranging from top down methods like “forward mapping”, to bottom up methods like “backward mapping”, the “role of front line workers”, and “community participation”. The fourth part will review literature on governance building as a tool for understanding policy implementation. This section will focus on literature that evaluates governance structures and decision making mechanism as a way to implement public policy. The literature will look at the works of scholars like David Levi-Faur, Amit Ron, Frank Fischer, Chris Ansell, Charles Sabel and Marcus Olson. The final section of literature review will build a theory of action to setup a methodology that combines the implementation mapping with the governance building framework to review the BSUP policy as implemented in the Yerwada case.

### **Part-1 – What does the Policy analysis literature on Slum housing policy Implementation in Maharashtra tell us about the governance challenges?**

Many scholars from India and abroad have studied the evolution of slum redevelopment policies in India in the past decades. These studies have evaluated the impact of redevelopment policies on the slum communities, the design of the policy, the nature of the community participation in policy design and implementation, and the effectiveness in delivering housing and infrastructure improvements. To understand what this literature tell us about the link between governance building and Implementation, we will explore research from several case studies from Maharashtra. These case studies document how new forms of self- governance are being created as a result of the slum housing policy, how often this local self-governance is coopted by policy agents, and how local governance is challenged by central government policies and the manner in which civil society is increasingly involved in the act of co-

governance. The research will present an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of local policy actors, implementing agencies, state policy makers, private developers, communities, civil society actors and community representatives in this act of governance in slum housing policy implementation. The review is presented in the form of key themes identified in this literature and the author's characterization of the same as important governance challenges to slum housing policy implementation.

### **The Governance of Eviction and Relocation**

Sapna Doshi talks about the new political power structure that has emerged through a seeming realignment of state and civil society organizations to enable mass evictions. Her research is based on three case study projects in Mumbai (Doshi, 2011). She analyzes the role played by powerful local NGOs in simultaneously countering and enabling the process of forced eviction, by projecting a pro-progress stance. While the state had disbursed housing production powers to private developers in the early 80's it is now disbursing public management processes to NGOs. This role transition from the government as the enabler to the NGO as the enabler has created an interesting power alignment structure which is blurring the lines between the governed and the government. The paper contends that these new structures continue to propagate the politics of difference. She presents a carefully detailed study of the MUTP project where SPARC a leading NGO enabled peaceful mass relocation of poor people for the government through a women enabling infrastructure. "The gender politics operationalized by the NGO projected a morality that propagates a politics of patience that further stereotyped the female role, while projecting the woman as a key enabler". The thesis brings to light this new form of non-confrontational community organization that supports development while negotiating for meager benefits. The research brings to light the new politics of the NGO – Government relationship in slum redevelopment policy implementation.

### **Self-governance produced by policy**

While the co-opting women's groups in Sapna's research forms a subtext of the main criticism (i.e, the nature of this organizing as a form of differentiation and enabling framework), Roma Chatterji in her work describes how government policies for housing development have led to the production of community organizations in slum settlements (Chatterji, 2005). She discusses how enumeration and mapping that were initially propagated by the government as a way to understand the populaces of these settlements are now being co-opted by communities and NGOs for self-enumeration and community mapping. These are then used as information and advocacy tools to demand services and infrastructure improvements. A

new form of governance structure from below is emerging just as governance structures from above are engaging in informal settlement housing policies. Chatterji's work is based on research in Dharavi in Mumbai, one of the largest informal settlements in Mumbai.

### **Co-option of Self-governance**

Vandana Desai writes about the power and politics of community organization. Her work describes how local political representatives reinforce paternalistic power dynamics, a form of client patron relationship which enables service provision for political mileage(Desai, 1994). Through her case study she outlines how democratic institutions create multiple principal-agent or client-patron relationships. While local representatives coopt community interest for their political gains, these representatives are in turn coopted by government agencies and political patrons for alignment to their agency/party interests. Her research contends that policy outcomes are not dependent exclusively on community participation. The process and structure of policy implementation matter and not enough documentation and research is done in this area.

### **Distributive governance and space for conflict**

In their work in studying the Markandeya housing redevelopment in Dharavi Vinit Mukhija and Bish Sanyal document the implementation of a housing project under the Prime Ministers Grant Program (PMGP) in Mumbai. The case study details the complexity of a mutli-party policy implementation structure(Sanyal & Mukhija, 2001). The documentation reveals that the implementation process is fraught with conflicts over interests, authority, ideas, motivations, policy legitimacy, solidarity and monetary gains. It reveals that the tenuous relationship between the actors is often disrupted for narrow gains; the interdependencies are not strengthened by the implementation process or the policy's structural framework. The case describes conflicts between the community and its representatives, the NGO and the government agency, the private developer and the NGO, and ultimately the community and the NGO. It projects that decentralization may not always reduce transaction costs or uncertainty. The paper proposes that abrupt policy changes destabilize implementation processes & that NGOs are equally prone to conflict as are private developers. The research also finds that community representatives are not always benign and looking out for community interest. Thus in fact conflicts are a reality of a multi-agency implementation process and should be acknowledged as such by policy makers. Conflicts are opportunities to learn and institutional mechanism should be developed for conflict resolution and the learning from these conflicts should inform policy amendments for future work.

### **Central policy and localized governance**

Many researchers have documented the failures of a generalist approach to slum housing policy design in India, where policies are applied uniformly across different context and conditions resulting in a mismatch of rules and ground conditions. The Slum Networking Project (SNP) in Ahmedabad calls for bringing slum upgrading to scale, but it does not consider housing poor versus income poor communities. Not all housing poor living in dense old settlements in these cities are income poor. The Dharavi redevelopment plan in Maharashtra faced a similar challenge due to undifferentiated and uniform housing benefits offered across different income segments which do not meet the needs and aspirations of some of the well-established Koli communities and or the industrial establishments in the settlement (Weinstein, 2014). Due to these concerns researchers have questioned the issue of appropriate scale in housing policy formulation- the city, state or national level. Most have advocated for a project based approach, especially since housing is necessarily a place and people based initiative. The recent decentralization of the governance structures (JNNURM urban reform mandate), to implement such place based policy is perhaps the right direction for the future. But decentralization today poses further challenges in housing policy implementation due to the lack of technical capacity at the local level. So while the JNNURM policies have called for decentralization of urban governance across India and mandate reforms to allow for local municipalities to issue bonds without state guarantee & develop planning projects and implement housing policy a hitherto fore state government responsibility, these capacities are still in the process of being formed and challenge current projects. Sunaree Marshall documents how the SNP project implementation faced challenges due to the lack of technical capacity with NGOs, the slow pace of up-gradation which caused the backing out of private partners resulting in heavy subsidization of the project by the local municipality (Marshall, 2010).

### **Part-2 – What does literature on BSUP tell us about implementation challenges in policy administration?**

#### **BSUP implementation evaluation based on available literature**

The BSUP policy is a recent policy and there has been very little evaluation of it. Still, the 11 cities review of BSUP projects presented in the NTAG report from 2012 offers a overview of some of the key challenges faced by cities in implementing BSUP projects (SPARC, 2012). The report findings suggest that there were many procedural, structural and regulatory flaws in its implementation that led to project failures. Below is a description of some of the key challenges experienced by all 11 cities:

**Politicization-** In most cities DPRs were prepared in great hurry and lacked adequate information on project implementation processes, eligibility criteria and standards for project development. Selection of slums was a highly politicized process determined mainly by the local ward councilors/corporators and approved by the mayor. The report indicates to irregularities in allotment and bribery issues in some cities. The DPR's were almost never done with community consent and most selected slums and beneficiaries were only informed about the project once planning and designs were developed and tenders had been awarded for the project.

**Community concerns-** Most city agencies or implementing agencies did not develop a community engagement process during implementation. Often the community was not aware of the project phasing or timeline or requirements for their financial contribution. Communities were not offered any support to develop a financial management plan or access formal finance. Only some cities had partnerships developed with state banks to help people get bank accounts and bank loans for payments of beneficiary contribution. Projects which did not support access to financial institutions are suffering due to low-collection of beneficiary payments. There was no transit (transitional) housing provided to people, nor was financial support provided to cover expenses during transit. There was no livelihood support scheme to ensure that economic status was not compromised by the temporary relocation or additional expenses during the transit period. Similarly there was no education support scheme offered to children of participating families who had to commute from far away locations during the project implementation. There is no provision to accommodate or protect renter interest in BSUP projects thus negatively impacting the lowest income group's ability to retain housing in such settlements. Tenure security is a big concern for residents some city agencies have given pattas (long lease titles) for 30-90-99 years to rehabilitate communities but most have neither given titles to the individual owners and or de-notified the slum settlement. Most agencies do not have a process in place for de-notification of slums. Thus a lot of people still live with the anxiety of lack of adequate documentation for legal ownership of the property. There are no adequate plans to maintain assets created through BSUP, cooperative societies have not be formed most community members assume that the municipality will help pay for maintenance of their new houses, while most municipal agencies interviewed in the report have no budgets set aside for the same.

**Institutional issues-** Most Urban Local Bodies (ULB) did not have project implementation units established, some established these units after the project had started and most of these units were poorly staffed. Due to constant transfer of officials at the ULB there was a loss of institutional memory and knowledge which further delayed project processes which already suffered due to reduced capacity. Most

municipalities were extremely inflexible in allowing for rule changes or change in contract terms, this delayed implementation of projects. In some cases poorly studied unit design shown in the DPR were implemented even though they did not meet the requirements of the beneficiaries. In some cases land disputes arose after the project was sanctioned as the DPR did not do due diligence to check all land records. The land record system in most cities is very complicated with multiple agencies holding land registrations. Land transfer between government agencies is extremely difficult to accomplish unless a mandate is given to ULB's for land acquisition for approved BSUP projects. No projects were executed on central government land or other state agency land as these agencies resist relinquishing land control this continues to be an issue for the local municipalities in initiating projects for slum up-gradation in all cities. The report indicates approval delays and fund release delays on projects were caused by a lack of capacity both technical and non-technical at the ULB's resulting in backlogs. Many instances reveal a lack of coordination between agencies at the local and state level to resolve land disputes and other legal matters. Most government agencies maintained very little involvement after awarding the contract to the contractors. This resulted in lack of oversight and often poor quality work. Though the policy states that legal titles will be given to the households, many states including Maharashtra do not have a process for de-notification of slum settlements.

**Financial issues-** Financial issues loomed large in most implementations failures across cities. Most implementing agencies report the no escalation clause as a big economic burden on implementers leading to project abandonment in some cases. Other cases point to delays in payment disbursement and inadequate collection of beneficiary contributions as other financial challenges. Most implementers also complain of the additional cost of doing updated socio-economic and plane tables surveys once projects were started. Many people took loans to meet contribution requirements and other expenses during transit from local lenders who charge high interest rate imposing a severe economic burden on these families. Most projects relied on beneficiary contribution to sustain the initial stage of the project as negotiating, signing and release of project funds took much longer.

**Quality issues-** In many cities houses were built but there was no service provision or only partial service provision. Most redeveloped settlements did not have electricity and water supply for months after occupancy. Many did not have adequate supply of water to reach upper floor units and many were still tapping electricity illegally. Often the cost of electric meters and water pumps was additional cost and had to be borne by beneficiaries over and above their contribution. People were not made aware of these extra costs at the beginning of the project. Most settlements did not have adequate or improved storm water drainage system or sewage collection systems in spite of up-gradation. Quality of construction is

very poor in a majority of projects. Many settlements have toilets built in houses with no connection to the main sewer lines. Many have windows with no glass. Most cities gave out contracts for construction to large private builders very few contracts were given to local contractors from the neighborhood.

**Contracts-** Many local agencies had to do multiple tenders to seek bids for the BSUP projects. Most private agencies expressed reluctance to bid due to complexity of the projects, lack of adequate information on project procedures and regulatory requirements in the DPRs. The contract terms had many unfavorable restrictions like restriction on subcontracting, restriction on partnerships between private developers and NGOs and also a number of financial requirements like mandate for a security deposit, an earnest money deposit in addition to a no escalation clause. Most municipalities did not try to address these contract concerns as there was reluctance from state agencies in supporting amendments and the ULB's did not have direct access to central agencies to seek amendments. Some local municipalities made exceptions like opening bids to NGOs thus allowing a more diverse pool of organizations to bid for the project. Any relaxation on these financial terms if negotiated and accepted by the ULB's came out of the city's municipal budget & only few municipalities were willing to take this decision.

**Self-construction:** Many municipalities promoted self-construction schemes where people could seek program funds and build improvements on their own. Although the self-built housing was of better quality in most cases than the contractor built housing, this was not very well coordinated. Most people did not connect homes to electric lines with meter, or water lines remain unmetered and in some cases people built an additional room adjacent to their existing house adding to the ground floor density of the settlement. And in most cases where this approach has been taken there are no site improvement provided in terms of storm water drains and or pucca roads. Lack of coordinated planning and technical guidance in such projects is a big problem, leading to long term viability issues and overall concerns for durability. Further most self-built buildings have been built as loadbearing structures & not RCC frames; their sustainability in case of environmental stresses like earthquake is questionable. Most projects also suffer low acceptance rates as a majority of households in tier-2 city slums have houses averaging 300sft - 400sft in area and are not ready to accept smaller houses at 225-270 sft area offered by BSUP.

### **Summary and way forward for BSUP research**

In summary this literature review suggests that most slum housing outcomes in India have been compromised due two kinds of governance challenges. The **institutional challenges** have been due to lack of technical & non-technical capacity at all levels, the complexity of multi-party implementation

structures, lack of coordination mechanisms, transition problems from hierarchical to decentralized structures, inadequate measures for conflict resolution and formation of a power nexus between key stakeholders often leading to co-optation of community interests. These are further complicated by **policy framing challenges** that includes a inflexible rule framework, a top down policy design lacking local knowledge, an unstable policy environment, inadequate funding and resources and standardized solutions in varied on ground conditions. This thesis will aim to shed light on these two key challenges identified by slum housing policy literature in India, namely “**Institutional challenges**” and “**policy framing challenges**”. The policy framing challenges are studied by using a method of “backward mapping” in implementation analysis to understand the ground conditions, the actors and their interaction with the policy framework. The institutional challenges are studied through the lens of the “governance building” literature to understand the organizational structures and mechanisms of governance that impact policy implementation. These together will help understand the right policy framing and how is it instituted as two key questions for implementation analysis. There has not been much literature from India that has systematically documented the on ground implementation using backward mapping method of analysis nor has there been constructive policy analysis using the governance building frame, this thesis will aim to do so. This thesis will develop case study research on the Yerwada case and the two projects implemented by NGOs MASHAL and SPARC in Yerwada within this case to analyze the implementation challenges in the BSUP policy on a detailed case basis. These two projects were selected for the study as the initial review of literature on these projects suggests that they might offer a unique view of how highly collaborative involvement by the multi-agency implementation team resulted in problem solving and innovation to achieve a high degree of success, this in spite of some of the similar institutional and systemic problems that the other BSUP projects faced.

### **Part-3 – What does literature on public policy implementation tell us about a way forward in solving implementation challenges?**

#### **Implementation research- Backward mapping**

This next section will present a summary of key learnings from implementation research literature on public policy to understand the key frameworks of analysis proposed and the framework that this thesis proposes to use. A reading of Richard Elmore’s work on implementation analysis suggests that Implementation cannot be controlled from the top. The notion that somehow explicit directives and greater attention to administrative responsibilities can improve implementation outcomes is a myth.

Through his research on analyzing the children's mental health program delivery system (Portland, Oregon) Elmore proposes "backward mapping" as an alternate mode of policy analysis, different from the traditional top down "forward mapping" analysis. In this approach he suggests that implementation analysis should start from the bottom most rung of the implementation process, where the administrative action intersects private choice. At every stage of analysis he suggests asking two questions- how will the agency involved affect behavior that is the goal of the policy and whether the agency has the resources to have that effect. This approach assumes that the closer one is to the source of the problem the greater is one's ability to influence it, and the problem solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate(Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979).

The research emphasizes that policy design should support:

1. Dispersal of control through delegation and decentralization
2. Discretion to implementers in order to gain from local knowledge
3. Incentive structures that are facilitated through strategic funding
4. Rule frameworks that allow flexibility and negotiation
5. Implementation that stresses on process not structure
6. Implementation that encourages competence not compliance

It suggests that the more centralized and hierarchical the structure of implementation, the more the number of checks and decision points required for decision making, the more opportunities for diversion and delay. While reliance on rules and superiors for guidance might breed compliance it might be at the cost of competence. The research suggests that a process that allows fixing of a problem through skillful intervention at various points in the implementation without relying on hierarchical structures is a good fixer. The research suggests that distrust of discretion is deeply rooted in conventional theories of administration and government and need to be reexamined in light of the need to build governance capacity. I would suggest this is even more critical in resource constrained conditions where institutions are already struggling. However it is also critical to note that Elmore's research points out that overloading and performance pressures often lead to street level bureaucrats developing coping mechanisms to simplify and distort policy aims. Here compliance takes the place of competence when resources are in stress. So there is a fine balance between allowing competence and decision making to

make the best use of one's resources while still providing enough resources to be able to avoid negative impacts of coping mechanism.

The research also points out that standardized solutions developed without local knowledge often are difficult to adapt and highly unreliable under different conditions that policy makers fail to anticipate. And under such circumstance if policy aims to fix street behavior into compliance then adaptation has to rely on subversive behavior which challenges policy legitimacy. Therefore, for federal policies to be implemented at the city level, it is important for the local government to have bargaining power to change rules and make the policy effective in their context. This was especially stressed by one of the key implementers in the Yerwada case a senior Officer on Special Duty for the JNNURM cell-2 who suggested (in the interview with the author) that for "BSUP to be really effective he hopes that government sets up only the clear broad goals and gives discretionary powers and flexibility to the civil servants to implement the policy in the manner they see best suited and responsive to the context", exactly what Sabatier and Mazmanian's research suggests (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979).

Understanding the Inter-dependencies between stakeholders is another key aspect this research brings to light for improving the possibilities for cooperation and collaboration. Elmore suggests that if stakeholder interdependencies are poorly understood, policy implementation might never be fully affected even if policy choices are well studied and laid out, as decisions are never self-executing. This acknowledges that challenges and resistance to policy messages are rational and implementation is the process of mediation between competing interest, in a manner that involves bargaining to resolve conflicts and play on the inter-dependencies of the implementers, the beneficiaries and the benefactors.

### **Relevance of backward mapping literature to the Indian context**

Research work by Ganapathy suggests that in developing countries policy making is seen as more prestigious than implementation (Ganapathy, 1985). Verspoor's work cites a review of 19 developing countries and finds that there is an "almost universal neglect of implementation issues" (Verspoor, 1992). And yet developing countries cannot afford to waste precious resources and funds in adhoc unmanaged implementation which creates poor and faulty outcomes. Lack of attention to implementation causes a loss of cumulative and comparative knowledge of successful and less successful implementation experiences that could be used in the design of a new innovation (London, 1993). Caroline Dyer in her work documents that while policy making in India is a prestigious occupation carried out by elites at the

top, implementation is a routine follow-on carried out by bureaucrats within the administrative structures of the government or through private contracts.

Dyer studied Implementation research using backward mapping for an education program called Blackboard Nation (1995) for primary school education in India (Dyer, 1999). The research highlights several discrepancies across sites where the program was implemented. The one size fits all system resulted in waste of resources in many sites and there was a different level of acceptance of the program between urban, rural and tribal area schools where the motivations, experience of the teachers and the existing facility infrastructure was very varied. The program's lack of consultation with and training of teachers and local officials led to information gaps and capacity issues that compromised program implementation. The backward mapping research helped reveal the complexity of the implementation environment to be considered for policy implementation. It also brought to light the lack of flexibility and discretion in responding to these complexities resulted in a loss of physical resources and a lack of engagement and innovation in policy implementation. While Dyer's work shows how backward mapping can serve as an important learning for policy evaluation in an Indian context it also reveals a larger need for such work in all spheres of policy research in India. This thesis aims to fill the gap in implementation research in Slum Housing policy in Maharashtra, India, using the backward mapping approach.

#### **Part-4 – How does governance impact implementation challenges?**

##### **Need to supplement backward mapping with Governance research**

One of the key challenges of only using backward mapping analysis for implementation research in today's policy context is that it does not recognize the politics and organizational dynamics of multi-agency implementation processes. It focuses on the on-ground actors' capacity, conditions and needs without substantially recognizing the modes of negotiation that are channeled from the structural level through these actors. So while the values of decision making that backward mapping promotes present a useful mechanism to understand on ground complexity, there is still a need to connect these back to the governance structures that order and channel the implementation process. This is especially important in the slum housing policy where research already indicates challenges of governance leading to conflicts (Sanyal & Mukhija, 2001) and the context of less government calling for more governance (Vinit Mukhija, 2001). This is where I turn to literature on governance building to understand the governance context of

the current implementation environment, the values it espouses and the mechanism of how governance is built and what are the structures of its operation.

The relevance of governance building in a multiparty policy implementation context is discussed in depth by David Levi-Faur (2014) in his paper "Big Government to Big Governance". Levi-Faur's writings highlight the reduced role of government in public administration and public service delivery as the new reality of the less government framework today (Levi-Faur, 2012). Governments today act more and more as enablers of public policy, relegating their traditional role of public housing or other public goods delivery and production to a network of private and non-profit agencies. This is true in slum housing policy in Maharashtra as highlighted in Chapter 2 (changing governance structure in slum housing policy in Maharashtra). Levi-Faur argues that since delivery of public services and goods is no longer solely the purview of the state actors, decision making in policy is influenced by these other networks of interest and actors. This plurality and hybridized modes of production, he argues, creates fragmented and multi-dimensional orders that are prone to conflict. These new orders require new forms of decision making that are more democratic and experimental, where the decision making is no longer a problem of power but a problem of steering, no longer hierarchical but horizontal. This gap between formal constitutional order (laws or policy as written) and the manner in which order is produced and reproduced in everyday life (laws are enforced and acted on) requires new mechanisms of control and ordering. This is neither government based, nor market based order, but a network of orders: a form that is not necessarily less government but differently organized government.

This new governance order has three significant shifts happening at the same time: the upward shift to the regional, transnational, the intergovernmental and the global order; the downward shift to the local and metropolitan; and the horizontal shift to the private, citizen and the civil spheres of interaction.

The new governance structure in this context would entail the process of institutionalizing and naturalizing the procedures of decision making of these complex multi-stakeholder environments. For a society centered on pluralistic governance where governance is enacted primarily through non state actors, governance has to rely on developing closer relations to non-state actors and developing a framework for understanding how to deal with these different divisions of power (Ansell, 2012). To respond to this new order of reorganized government the study of new forms of governance building becomes critical and relevant for public policy implementation. But before we get into frameworks for analyzing governance building it would be essential to understand the governance values proposed or

espoused by the BSUP policy and what normative values framework they represent to analyze the governance system.

The BSUP policy proposes to provide services for the urban poor and supposes an institutional mechanism which involves decentralization (through the JNNURM urban governance reform), private stakeholder participation and community consensus building as key methods of policy implementation. These policy aims stress non-hierarchical democratic governance building for implementing a pro-poor policy. To evaluate the policy I will therefore use the UNDP research (Scott & Wilde, 2006) that identifies 7 key indicators for democratic governance which support pro-poor policies; these are based on the International Democracy Assessment Framework (IDEAS) (Beetham, Carvalho, & Weir, 2008). These indicators were developed to assist policy makers monitor democratic governance. I will use these indicators as the primary normative values of democratic governance to be evaluated in the decision making process of the case study and its implementation mechanism. The IDEAS indicators are based on two fundamental democratic principles 1) popular control over decision makers and 2) the political equality of those who exercise that control. The main aim is to remove elite monopoly over decision making and its benefits and ensuring people can overcome obstacles over equal rights. The framework derives seven mediating values from these two democratic principles. I will apply these mediating values to understanding stakeholder participation in policy implementation. The key values are described below:

- 1) **Participation**- implies that all stakeholders have a right to participate and have the capacity and resources to participate.
- 2) **Representation**- that there is a representation of all stakeholders in the decision making process and there is equal distribution of political power amongst all stakeholders.
- 3) **Accountability**- there is a clear and effective line of accountability - legal, financial, administrative and political to ensure honest performance in service delivery to the poor.
- 4) **Transparency**- the process of decision making is transparent and information on the decision making process is accessible to all.
- 5) **Efficiency**- decision making is efficient and delivers goods and services at the least cost in appropriate quality and quantity.
- 6) **Equity**- fairer distribution of resources that considers solidarity and a progressive systems of social welfare.
- 7) **Responsiveness**- means and methods of engagement and influencing decisions that encourage both systemic and open process for review and redress.

However, to evaluate these normative values within governance building one would need to understand the mechanism and structures through which governance operates. Here I return to the literature by David Levi-Faur on governance building. Levi-Faur argues that in a new multi-party framework authority can be institutionalized in different spheres and these can compete and bargain to coordinate among themselves. He suggests that there are 4 key elements of governance analysis- structure, process, mechanism and strategy. Structure is the architecture of the formal and informal institutions that are engaged in governing. Structure establishes the power relations between institutions and regulations, between horizontal and hierarchical orders. Process is the dynamics and steering function involved in policy making. It relates to the coordination and negotiation necessary to establish regulations and institutions, in other words the “norm” creating practices. Mechanism is the institutional procedures of decision making, of compliance and control. Strategy is the actor’s efforts to govern and manipulate the design of institutions and mechanism in order to shape choice and preferences. The literature suggests that there are 5 key mechanism of decision making which operate in policy implementation. Decision making via monetized exchanges that is based on transactions costs and non-monetized exchanges where the transaction costs cannot be monetized but are nevertheless based on a form of exchange. A command mode of decision making that enforces decisions based on rule making and compliance, an authoritative and hierarchical structure. The fourth mode of decision making is based on persuasion and exchange of ideas that elaborate on values and deliberation. And the fifth mode of decision making is based on solidarity, association and loyalty, rather than interest, focusing on group identity rather than individualism. Strategy is the fourth element of governance. It is defined as the act of governing and interacting with actors to adapt institutions and mechanisms in order to shape the choice and preference of actors.

I would contend that for governance building to be orchestrated these structures of organization and mechanisms of decision making need to be carefully analyzed to plan policy implementation in the new horizontal order, where reliance on command mode is reduced and dependence on negotiation and collaboration is advanced. Levi-Faur’s research also suggests that the challenges of these horizontal forms perhaps need to be governed through process rather than structure, processes that are perhaps more horizontal rather than hierarchical. In this new world order he argues that different systems of regulatory control need to evolve, where statist regulation co-evolves with civil regulation, private regulation co-evolves with public regulation and business regulation coevolves with social regulation and

market is itself used to mobilized as a regulatory mechanism. This is very relevant to the Indian policy context today as the transition from government dominated modes to multi-agency modes of governance continue to expose new challenges in public administration. Here governance today truly refers to “all processes of governing, whether undertaken by the government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization or territory and whether through laws, norms, power or language” (Bevir, 2013).

It is this governance formation that will be analyzed through the values of democratic governance to understand the decision making process that was adopted by the street level bureaucrats in the implementation of the BSUP. Several other supportive theories are used to understand different aspects of decision making in greater depth. Solidarity and Experimental form of decision making defined in the governance literature is expanded by reviewing group theory in decision making through literature by Mancur Olson (Olson, 1971) and experimental decision making by Charles Sabel (Sabel, 2010) in his work on rethinking street level bureaucrats.

Olson talks about the choice between large and small groups in decision making. His research highlights that small groups function better for responding to individual interest and large groups for common good (Olson, 1971). Larger groups are not good at taking action therefore smaller groups or subcommittees are created to reach decisions and take action. Larger groups are good for building and gathering opinions, but smaller groups take action. Olson argues that obstacles in group action are not only due to lack of consensus but also due to lack of incentives. He argues that these need not be just economic incentives but could be social incentives like status, respect, leadership, friendship, vote or status. Large organizations that are federations of smaller organizations work better in acting collectively. Social incentives are mainly important only in small groups and play a role in larger groups only when they are federations of smaller groups. Small groups therefore are doubly blessed if they have the economic incentive as well as the social incentive already built in to the policy to motivate them to act. This group theory is important in understanding the dynamics of interdependencies in decision making and as a mode of understanding community participation to build consensus and take action.

Rachel Bratt and Kenneth Reardon's (Carmon & Fainstein, 2013) work on “beyond the ladder: new ideas about resident roles in contemporary community development in the United States” tries to describe a potential new form of community organizing in a pluralist policy-actor landscape. They identify 3 key

criticisms to Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation. They argue that new modes of citizen participation should not only evaluate process or strategy but also outcome (Carmon & Fainstein, 2013). Arnstein's ladder focused on outcomes at the lower rung of the ladder and strategies on the upper rung of the ladder. There needs to be a balanced approach to understand whether good strategies could lead to bad outcomes. It is important to understand how context influences outcomes, same strategies might work in one environment and be disruptive in another. How can participation help encourage better outcomes, improved programs and can it be proactive and not only reactive to policy propositions. Should citizens get involved in proactive planning, learning from examples like Porto Alegre and Kerala community budgeting?. Can formal channels of communication undermine existing informal channels of communication and or how can informal channels support and build capacity through participation. The paper argues that the question of participation should perhaps change from how to organize people to how to encourage different groups to participate in recognition of these preexisting informal channels. New research should consider how participative modes change when different actors and often multiple agencies are involved in policy implementation? Perhaps this is an era of direct grass roots development where collaborative planning can happen between a different set of actors. Citizens and residents could develop plans independent of the government in collaboration with universities and other advocacy organizations. Community and supporting organizations could enter into negotiations with key power holding stakeholders to develop mutually beneficial community benefits agreements, as are already being promoted now. Residents could work with citizen organization and public interest coalitions to create a nurturing environment. Or form oppositional campaigns of protest and activism that disrupt business as usual and help communities influence local development policies. Mary Kennedy (Carmon & Fainstein, 2013) argues that it is important that genuine development combines "material development" with "development of people". All forms of capital: social, physical, intellectual, financial and political should be evaluated as potential outcomes of community development. A good planning project should not only leave the community with better products but increased capacity to meet future needs.

Just as Bratt and Reardon have attempted to redefine the citizen participation ladder with new considerations for the contemporary policy context, Charles Sabel in his work refines the idea of discretion in the work of street level bureaucrats (Sabel, 2010). The values of discretion promoted by Sabatier (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979), Lipsky (Lipsky, 2010) and Elmore (Elmore, 1979) he argues need to be rethought, based on an understanding of tacit and deliberate methods of discretion. He argues that the exercise of discretion varies in street level bureaucrats based on the ethos and culture of the agency

they work for. Sabel argues that there are indeed organizations that are setup as horizontal and non-hierarchical structures that promote and encourage discretion. Many such organizations he researches have internal mechanisms at various levels that regularly assess the utility of current practices and revise them when necessary. He argues that for consistency in good outcomes there needs to be consistency in decision making which can balance between formal rules and discretion. In other words there need to be formal mechanisms for explicit learning to be incorporated in bureaucracies. Thus tacit and explicit adjustment and formal and informal revisions of norms should be fully integrated into a form of organized learning. Sabel argues for a new culture of organizations that are “pragmatist” and “experimentalist”, that encourage a dynamic form of accountability rather than complying with rules. It allows the case worker or street level bureaucrat the opportunity to improve their decisions and reconsider the current rules and routines in light of their success and failure. He however underlines that as illustrated by his case comparison between the Finnish School and Danish School model informal learning without attention to systemic design can become a barrier to strategy and organization. The Finnish model is based on purposeful & effective exercise of local discretion that systematically tailors pedagogy to the needs to individual students; it is a model of institutionally coordinated front line intervention. The entire system of interventions is subject to periodic peer reviews and institutionalized collaboration between special-ed teachers and classroom teachers. The Danes on the other hand tried a completely bottom up approach relying on innovation and initiative of teachers with no models of systemic integration and or review, which led to low success in education integration and learning improvements.

### **Conclusion and theory of action**

Sable’s research ties together the literature on street level bureaucracy that supports bottom up governance model with the institutional governance model elaborated in the work of Levi-Faur by highlighting the need for interaction and integration between these models. His research identifies the significance of integrating innovations and learnings from informal discretionary mechanisms of decision making into the formal mechanism to help ensure longevity, sustainability and consistency of learning from the ground. To take his research forward and create a theory of action (Patton, 2001, (Berg, 2008)) for my research I will link the literature of Governance building by David Levi-Faur to the literature on backward mapping by Elmore and Sabatier to create a theory of action for my analysis. Through this research the thesis aims to address the challenges identified in slum housing policy implementation.

To create this theory of action I will map the indicators for the values of democratic governance with the decision making mechanisms that most relate to the values of the democratic structure of governance. Here the values of transparency, accountability, representation, equity, participation, efficiency and responsiveness outlined in the democratic governance literature (Scott & Wilde, 2006) are mapped to the decision making mechanisms identified in the backward mapping literature on public policy implementation research (Elmore, 1979). The high degree of correlation between these “decision making mechanisms” promoted by the backward mapping approach and the “values of democratic governance” (see figure 6.1) are indicative of the compatibility of the two approaches. In fact as the literature suggests, both theoretical frames are based on the ideas of promoting decentralized non-hierarchical decision making that encourage local representation, distributive management and participatory governance, so perhaps this is the reason for the high degree of correlation. This theory of action linking decision making methods to democratic governance building is then used to analyze the decision making in the case with reference to the building of governance and its impact on implementation.




Figure 6.1- Mapping the theory of action

## Chapter-5- Case study

### Single case and two projects- The Yerwada in-situ case and the SPARC and MASHAL projects

The case study introduction will highlight how the case will be documented and why and what are the key elements in the study. The introduction will then situate the two projects within the case and describe how they have been documented as well.

1. The Yerwada In-situ case
  - I. The story behind the development of the In-situ case at Yerwada
  - II. The hurried preparation of the DPR
  - III. Floating an EOI- the limited response and reaching out to the NGOs
  - IV. Organization structure for policy implementation of the Yerwada case
  - V. The Yerwada context a brief background and community profile
  - VI. Selection of SPARC and MASHAL to implement the projects within Yerwada
2. Project A- SPARC -In-situ
  - I. SPARC project organizational structure
  - II. Chronology of SPARC's case
3. Project B- MASHAL-In-situ
  - I. MASHAL- project organizational structure
  - II. Chronology of MASHAL's case

### **Single case and two projects – an introduction**

This case study is a study of two projects within one case. The case is the Yerwada- In-situ development implemented as part of the BSUP policy in Pune city. The two projects documented by this research are the projects implemented by SPARC and MASHAL under the “Yerwada-In-situ development case”. The first part of this study will document the evolution of the In-situ case at Yerwada. The second stage will document how the In-situ project was operationalized, who were the key players and how their roles were defined. This is divided into two sections: the preparation of the DPR to apply for the central government funding and the floating of the bid to solicit implementers for the projects under the Yerwada case. Once the bids are selected the case splits into 8 projects (developed by 4 agencies), SPARC and MASHAL being two of the 4 agencies awarded the contracts. Before developing the two projects individually, the study first identifies the overall structure under which the policy is to be implemented. The final stage of the study then documents the two projects separately based on their individual organizational structures, implementation processes and scope of work.

The governance of the case can be described in terms of the following key units of implementation - 1) Structure- architecture of institutions, 2) Process- the steering functions, 3) Mechanism- decision making process and 4) Strategy- act of shaping choice. These elements are further subdivided into the following components as indicated in the diagram (Figure 6.2) below:




Figure 6.2 illustrates the elements of governance analysis proposed by literature published in the Oxford Handbook on Governance, 2012.

#### The story behind the development of the In-situ case at Yerwada

In the year 2007 JNNURM sanctioned Rs 300 crores (1 crore is 1 million Rupees) to Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) for housing the urban poor under the Building Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) project. Upon the sanction of funds the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) appointed an experienced architectural consultant to develop G+8 story apartment buildings with lifts on land owned by PMC. Over 6000 such tenements were built in the outskirts of Pune with a standardized unit size of 25 sqm. The buildings were constructed as affordable housing units developed for slum dwellers from across the city. The intention of the PMC was to move slum dwellers who were settled on land that was considered untenable to these subsidized housing apartments offered under the BSUP program. As officially defined “Untenable settlements” are settlements considered ineligible for in-place up-gradation as they are assessed as “health and safety risk to the users” and or represent a “conflict with public interest”. These settlements selected for relocation in Pune, were located on land that comes under non-buildable reservations, hill tops, slopes, near water bodies etc.

The resettlement apartments cost Rs 4.5 lakh per unit to build and it was stipulated that the beneficiaries were to contribute Rs 50,000 to move to these apartments. However many early attempts by PMC to move people to these locations met with little success. The PMC then engaged 2 city NGOs to convince the slum community members to move to these new locations. This effort is still ongoing and, to date, only some people have moved to the new locations. Having found low acceptance to the relocation model the then Pune Municipal commissioner Mr Praveensingh Pardesi reworked the idea and sought to get a new BSUP grant for Pune for an in-situ up-gradation model. The commissioner had seen a presentation regarding such a model made at Yashwantrao Chavan Academy for Development Administration (Yashda) by Global Communities International (known as CHF previously) a NGO based in Pune. This led to the preparation of another DPR to seek funding for an In-situ BSUP project.

#### **The hurried making of the “Detailed Project Report (DPR)” with a focus on securing federal funds**

The Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) submitted an application for funding for the BSUP In-situ project at Yerwada under JNNURM to the central government in 2008. The application sought approval from JNNURM for another Rs 120 crore for an in-situ model of development for 4000 houses in Pune city. The DPR for this application was prepared by Omkar Associates a consultant appointed by the PMC. Since there was not much of a precedent or guidelines for in-situ up-gradation approach under BSUP at that time the DPR consultant was requested to formulate an approach based on discussions with a few leading NGOs in the city including Global Communities International, Shelter Associates, Mahila Milan and MASHAL. These NGOs had done substantial socio-economic and GIS survey work in Pune slums for the government and were familiar with the slum community and settlement conditions in Pune. They discussed slum selection criteria and developed basic project guidelines along with Omkar Associates. This consultation led to the formulation of the project criteria as defined in the DPR (Omkar Associates, 2008). A three part criteria was established for defining settlement eligibility—one: slums should be on

government land, second: they should be located in residential land use zone as per the development plan and third: they should be in substantially developed conditions to be eligible for in-situ up-gradation. The good development conditions were defined as slums which had good infrastructure of roads and pavement (as concrete and bituminous surfaces), had good social infrastructure and amenities and had a majority (70%) pucca (well developed) housing stock warranting in-place preservation of existing building stock and up gradation of remaining residential stock through a BSUP In-situ up-gradation program. The 8 slums identified for program benefits as per the DPR were- Bhatt Nagar, Yeshwant Nagar, Wadarwadi, Netajinagar, Mother Teresa Nagar, Nagpur Chawl, Shelar Chawl, Sheela Nagar. The DPR stated that while the category wise beneficiary information was not available as the biometric surveys for these slums were ongoing the DPR estimation of the total number of households was based on the cadastral data that was available. The final estimation submitted for funding approval per the DPR was to secure benefits for 4000 households to be upgraded in the 8 settlements identified by the list below.

*See chart below reproduced from BSUP-DPR by Omkar Associates:*

Name of slum	Land area	Total slum families	Vambay- houses	Kaccha houses
Bhatt Nagar	7305.6	421	186	235
Yashwant Nagar	25129.24	940	343	597
Wadarwadi	15531.24	584	170	414
Netajinagar	5481.46	215	144	71
Mother Teresa Nagar	14051.88	513	197	316
Nagpur Chawl	68480.74	1554	1200	354
Shelar Chawl	2351.08	-	-	-

This broad based estimation without detailed beneficiary information and the lack of community outreach did cause considerable readjustment in the final list of beneficiaries as the project progressed and will be discussed in later sections of this chapter. To give an indication of how much this list changed

take the instance of the 354 kaccha houses identified in Nagpur Chawl that were allotted to NGO MASHAL for the BSUP project, the final redevelopment for Nagpur Chawl done by MASHAL as per 2015 project progress list is 477 HH.

As per the accounts of all parties involved in these early stage consultations it is clear that local knowledge of the NGOs was important in establishing a sound base for the project. Mr Praveen Pardesi the then Pune Municipal Commissioner is seen as the champion of the project at this formulation stage and was key to initiating this consultative process. In fact based on the accounts of Mr Sandeep Mahajan the proprietor of Omkar Associates, it is clear that Mr Pardesi took personal interest in the project and insisted that a DPR be prepared quickly to ensure that he could personally take it to the capital (i.e. Delhi, where the central government sanctioning authority for BSUP program is located) for approval. Mr Pardesi, an IAS official known for his innovative approach on projects, had done a one night stay in the Gandhi Nagar slum and walked extensively in the neighborhoods and was convinced that an in-situ up-gradation approach would be the best approach to sustain the unique social capital and physical character of these settlements.

The DPR document (Omkar Associates, 2008) when reviewed shows a lack of detailed analysis of the project scope. A substantial portion of the document is dedicated to showcasing the history of Pune and its social housing policy history. There are discrepancies in the guidelines for housing type to be provided as per BSUP - the document calls out for two standardized size units 36 sqm and 25 sqm housing unit (the implemented unit size is 25 sqm) to be built as a G+1 structure in RCC frame at a cost of Rs 3,00,123 per unit. The unit design standards state that a multipurpose hall with a kitchen, bathroom and WC need to be provided on the ground floor along with an additional room and balcony on the first floor. As will be seen in the later stage of implementation all these design standards had to be changed substantially as

they were not grounded in an understanding of the dense and tight site conditions and small plot sizes in these settlements.

The DPR does not provide details of the building regulations under which the project is to be built or the kind of beneficiary consultative process the project should undergo and or define the sanctioning authority which will give building approvals. In fact there are several discrepancies even in the costing structure as presented in the DPR. On page 11 the document states that the project scope will include provision of “water and sewerage connectivity to the municipal network from the unit and the total cost of the dwelling unit would be (cost of construction of the home + infrastructure) Rs 3,31,884 + Rs 19,917= Rs 3,51,801 instead of the earlier figure of Rs 3,00,123 per unit. The DPR recommends that project sustainability and operations and maintenance expenses be met by levying property tax and water charge as per the PMC norms. It also states that income generated from renting of community halls will be used to support maintenance costs. On page 21, however, the DPR contends that beneficiary contribution might be a challenge due to competition from free housing offered by SRA. It further states that the no-escalation clause by JNNURM puts the financial feasibility of the project at risk and requires the PMC to put in gap funding of 55 crores to support the project. Why these questions were not addressed at this stage is not explained except by the fact that this was submitted in a hurry. All consultants interviewed acknowledged this unresolved funding gap is a big flaw in the program. Further there is conflicting information on the project implementing agency, one paragraph states PMC as the implementing agency and at another location the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA, DPR page 13) is called out as the implementer. In fact one of the consultants interviewed confirmed that SRA was considered for project implementation but did not show any interest in developing the In-situ project and therefore the commissioner assigned the role to the PMC. Though inadequate and inconsistent as a professional document the DPR was approved by the central government, this brings into question the quality controls

in place in the fund granting process at JNNURM. This analysis is however beyond the scope of this thesis as this thesis aims to focus studying the implementation process at the design and construction level. It is stated in the interviews with consultants that Mr Pardesi personally relayed the DPR document and application to the center for approval and was instrumental in securing funding for the Yerwada in-situ case. Once funding was granted, the PMC floated a tender to seek bids from private contractors and NGOs to implement the projects under the Yerwada case.

### **The floating of the EOI & the limited response which led to the reaching out to NGOs**

On Feb 7<sup>th</sup> 2009 an Expression of Interest notice ( Pune Municipal Corporation, 2009) was posted inviting interested “private contractors” and “NGOs” with sound financial strength and technical expertise in construction of buildings and social mobilization to bid for the project. The due date for the bid was 17<sup>th</sup> of February 2009, so the bidders had 10 days to respond. The EOI while reinstating the project requirements from the DPR introduced new elements like- “developing units in different packages with individual or cluster wise wholesome approach”, “stress on social mobilization and beneficiary participation and consent” and “that the 4000 houses will be developed by multiple parties each selected to construct 250 to 500 tenements”. These decisions to break up the projects into smaller packages were key strategic decisions that aimed to support local contractors and NGOs. The EOI further recognized that support should be provided to slum families to avail loan against beneficiary contribution. And detailed requirements of eligibility and other terms and conditions of bid were laid out.

The EOI like the DPR however continued to state that the buildings would be built as per DCR and NBC regulations. We will review how this imposition of new construction building standards on an in-place up-gradation project with constrained site conditions proved impractical when we discuss the two projects. The document also put the burden of vacating the individual houses, clearing the site and paying for

alternate accommodation during the project construction on the beneficiary. The EOI stated that the PMC shall not arrange or allot any transit accommodation. When interviewed the PMC officials confirmed that the lack of funding, land and man power to manage transit housing and the concerns for misuse of transit housing were the reasons for not providing transit housing.

The EOI continued to state the time limit for completion of the project as 15 months but did not give any guidelines on the schedule for different stages of the project, in doing so the document tends to suggest the reading of the Yerwada case as a simple green field construction project. Even though one section states that work shall be carried out through social mobilization, participation and bio-metric consent of the beneficiary family, the project time line does not show accommodation for this process. Later in this section we review the individual projects to assess how these project schedules and timelines unfolded and what would have been realistic project timelines.

It is interesting to note that despite being a co-signatory of the tripartite agreement between the bidder, the NGO and the beneficiary the EOI states that the bidder shall indemnify the PMC of any non-recovery of the 10%/ 12% beneficiary contribution. And that the bidder shall guide the beneficiary to obtain loan in case the beneficiary is unable to raise the amount towards the project. The EOI also shows several inconsistencies, certain sections note that infrastructure works like external water supply, external drainage, roads, compound wall, and external electrification are part of the scope of work under consideration and other instances note that only connections of supplies from houses to the main infrastructure network is part of the scope of the bid.

The EOI does stipulate past experience in slum improvement as a necessary qualification for the bid however it does not demand proof of necessary skilled professionals that can be dedicated for the project


as is typically demanded to assure competency and capacity of the bidder. The EOI does extend financial concessions to NGOs by making bid security of Rs 7.5 lakh applicable to private contractors only not to NGOs, giving a key indicator to provide a fair opportunity to NGOs. However it is inconsistent in extending these financial considerations as it demands earnest money deposit and performance guarantee bond from NGOs and private contractors alike. Later we shall see how this strained the financial capacity of the NGOs to implement the project. The EOI also restricted joint ventures between private contractors and NGOs all these conditions limited the bidders substantially. On the one hand the fixed tender cost of Rs 3 lakh/unit and the splitting of the contract into smaller components reduced the profit incentives for private contractors, hence no private contractor bid for the job. On the other hand the financial burdens of the contract terms limited the number of NGOs bidding for the project. In the end the PMC had to actively solicit additional bids to cover the entire scope of the project. Considerable project time was spent in renegotiating and clarifying various contract terms during this phase due to the lack of thoroughness and thought in preparing the EOI document. In the end 4 NGOs were selected to build the Yerwada projects and the following scopes were allotted to each NGO, SPARC- 750 houses, MASHAL -943 Houses, VRP 394 houses, SEWA 750 houses. It should be noted here that these allocation of units were based on broad assessment at the cluster level and undergo considerable reallocation and changes in scope as the NGOs start working on the project and seek individual consent from beneficiaries for the redevelopment. In the final section this case study will describe the projects implemented by SPARC and MASHAL as a comparative case study model within the Yerwada case. But before the individual projects are discussed, the next section provides an overview of how the Yerwada case was operationalized in terms of the overall institutional framework and organizational structure for policy implementation.

#### **Organizational structure for policy implementation of the Yerwada in-situ case**

The Building Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) is a policy initiated by the central government, under the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (MoHUPA). There is a mission directorate established under the MoHUPA, which is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the policy between the ministries, the state and central level agencies through the Mission Director and the National technical Advisor. The National Steering Group (NSG) makes recommendations for addition and deletion of cities and towns to the submission under JNNURM. The Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee (CSMC) is responsible for reviewing all projects implemented under the BSUP submission and the disbursing of all central funds for the projects. A State Level Nodal Agency (SLNA) is setup to manage all grants, appraise projects, obtain sanctions from the state steering committee, release funds to the ULB's and manage the revolving funds. It is also responsible for monitoring implementation of reforms and financial progress. The Urban Local Body (ULB) is the main government agency responsible for project implementation and monitoring of projects on the ground. These are typically the municipal corporations of the city where the project is being implemented, in Yerwada's case it is the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) headed by the Pune Municipal Commissioner.

Since the case research is focused on implementation research from bottom up it will focus on the lowest rung of this implementation structure indicated in the chart below i.e., the interactions between the city and the private implementing agency and all the actors involved in that process. This would include the community members, the local corporators, the contractors, the NGOs and all the consultants retained by the NGOs. The consultants include the architects, the surveyors, the RCC consultants and the project management consultants. From the city side this would include the entire project implementation team at the ward office which includes the deputy commissioner in charge of implementation, Mr Molak, the Executive Engineer (EE), the Deputy Engineer (DE), the two Junior Engineers (JE's). This would also include

the JNNURM cell-2 technical and accounts head for the Yerwada case as part of the BSUP. This team is headed by the Officer on Special Duty Mr Bonala and his team of EE, DE and JE's.




*BSUP policy implementation structure diagram created by the author based on reading of the Policy*


### Yerwada the site and the context

Yerwada is a ward located to the north east of the city just across the banks of the Mula-Mutha river connected to the city by the Ahmednagar highway and the Airport road. It has a number of hospitals, schools and a few public parks in close proximity. It is one of the most densely populated areas in Pune city with a large informal settlement. The Yerwada ward has a total slum population of 87,373 people (Omkar Associates, 2008). The Pune airport lies just north of the project area and the ward is marked by two important city landmarks, the Aga Khan Palace located just east of the project area and the Yerwada Jail located just north of the project site. Yerwada jail is one of the oldest prison compounds in the country, built in the nineteenth century. The Aga Khan palace was built in 1892 and is now dedicated as a Gandhi National Memorial. The area is a low lying land mass next to the river and is prone to water

logging (Chatterjee, 2013) and flooding from river overflows. The communities living in the area suffered extreme flooding in the 1961 Pune floods with high loss of property and lives.



Plan courtesy Prasanna Desai Associates




A-Mother Teresa Nagar, B- Sheela Salve Nagar, C- Wadarwasti, D-Bhatt Nagar, E-Netaji Nagar, F-Yashwant Nagar, G- Gandhi Nagar, (Plan courtesy Prasanna Desai Associates)

### A community profile- social, economic and physical conditions pre-development

The BSUP program selected 8 settlements in the Yerwada ward for the housing benefits to be granted as in-situ housing up-gradation projects. The above map shows that most of these communities live in close proximity to each other. Previewing the history of the area suggests that the communities are very old: most people have lived in the area for over 50 years. This section presents a profile of two communities from this neighborhood to show, how while there are many similarities, these communities differ widely both in their social composition, their organization capacity and their economic capacity. These variations are manifest in the physical infrastructure and planning of the settlements and level of amenities and assets they have been able to build up over the time period of their existence. Some of these factors play an important role in how communities and individual members react to social programs. They also impact how standardized plans need to be adapted to varying physical conditions and social requirements. These are important factors that will impact development efforts initiated under the BSUP program and we will discuss and analyze their impacts as we discuss the projects in detail in the concluding chapters of this thesis.

Gandhi Nagar (a MASHAL site) began to settle in the 1970's (Chatterjee, 2013) and has been improving actively due to the efforts of the local corporators. Since 1997 the infrastructure improvements have included closed drainage systems, underground electricity network,




underground water supply and telephone connections network. Residents working with corporators have also been involved in development decisions to make sure roads remain organized and drains are not encroached on. In fact it is one of the most organized settlements where the main roads are 9m wide and the secondary roads are 6m wide and only some roads are 3m wide. The settlement has piped water supply at the household level with the tap ratio 1:1 and electricity to 95% homes. The sanitation condition however is lacking. The person to toilet ratio is 55:1. There are 6 toilet blocks and 72 stalls in them. The community has a community hall and holds a number of events and classes for the children including karate and computer classes, sewing classes for women. The settlement has a senior center, a library and a primary health center. The residents also have access to two government hospitals, a private hospital. There is one aanganwadi (daycare) in the settlement where supplementary nutrition to the kids is provided by residents. There is a government school right next to Gandhi Nagar where instruction is imparted in both English and Marathi. There are 3 private schools in 1000m radius from Gandhinagar. The government schools are free for children and provide them with free books, uniforms and midday meals.

A 2000 Shelter Associates socio economic survey gives a profile of the community(Chatterjee, 2013). At Gandhinagar most men are employed as skilled or unskilled construction workers or have small businesses, some run food stalls others work as fruit hawkers and still others as rickshaw drivers. Most women work as house maids. The community is majority Maharashtrian Hindu families where religion and rituals play an important part of community life. There is a small Ganesh temple where regular prayers are offered and is an important meeting point for the women and children of the community. Many popular festivals like Ganesh puja and Dandiya are celebrated at a community level. While the community is very well knit domestic abuse and alcoholism are rampant and reduces the mobility of women and girls and compromises their safety.

Women and girls spend a lot of time collecting water from the public standing post and identify these areas as potential target spots for eve teasing and cat calls. The public toilets though well used are not well maintained. Gandhinagar has a door to door garbage collection system where people contribute Rs 25/month for collection services. People who cannot afford the service use the municipal bin on the main road to dump their garbage. Residents have access to public transportation and use the city bus systems for their commute. Most streets are well laid out and provide access to emergency vehicles like ambulances but are not adequately sized for fire suppression vehicles. Most streets have overhead lighting, but residents report that lighting is not adequate in some spots. The water pressure in the supply lines is low and people report water shortage problems.

It is important to note that these settlements are very varied in nature while Gandhi Nagar seems well established and organized Mother Teresa Nagar (SPARC site) seems like a more marginalized mixed community. The average monthly income is Rs 5078 and

*Mother Teresa Nagar Settlement Plan (Plan courtesy Prasanna Desai Associates)*




ranges from Rs 3000 – Rs 22,000. The community composition is mixed with Hindus, Muslims, and Christians living together for the past 60 years. There are temples, mosques and churches in the settlement. Hindu festivals like Diwali, Dahi Handi and Navratri are commonly celebrated. There is more mobility afforded to girls as alcohol abuse and related violence is not rampant as in Gandhinagar. The roads are much narrower than Gandhi Nagar and very irregular, most streets are 3m wide, while many

are just 2m wide and at times tertiary streets are only 1m wide. Emergency access is a problem in the settlement. There are open drains throughout the slum and they are prone to flooding during the monsoons. The Pune Municipal Corporation supplies water to the community and 98% houses have electrical connections and there are 14 stand posts for community water supply. But the sanitation facilities are lacking, there was only one public toilet block as of 2000 (before the BSUP project) which indicates that open defecation might have been common. The settlement has a community hall and an aanganwadi, but they are in poor condition and there is no primary health center in the neighborhood. The girls and boys both have separate youth organizations called Mitra Mandals (friend circles). Overall, the housing stock is very varied: 37% of the houses are Kuccha and settlement generally lack paved roads and an organized street network.

### Project -1 - SPARC

#### SPARC– project organization structure



The BSUP project contract was signed by SPARC Samudaya Nirman Sahayak (SSNS) a not-for-profit construction company setup by SPARC to take up development of projects. SSNS provided contractual

support and administrative support to Mahila Milan to implement the project. Mahila Milan (MM) is a network of women's collectives that partner with SPARC and National Slum Dwellers Federal (NSDF) to do work in urban poor communities. The three partners are termed by the agency as "The Alliance". MM started as an organization working with communities to manage credit and savings activities. It now takes up sanitation and housing construction projects contracted to SPARC through the SSNS arm. NSDF is a federation of slum dwellers from across the country and works on larger planning and advocacy issues relating to meeting the water, sanitation, infrastructure and service needs of communities. Federations have been forming based on the needs of communities, today there are pavement dwellers federations, railways dweller federations etc. Federation members are active at the state level, whereas MM members work with the local municipalities. MM and the federation members are mostly volunteers but also have some full time employees who are paid expenses by SPARC. SPARC has established area resource centers in most poor communities it is through these centers that the savings schemes are run. MM volunteers also have their own construction companies which SPARC has helped them register. MM contractors have been trained on the job, in the past SPARC retained professional contractors for projects and required hiring of MM contractors as subcontractors for doing plumbing, wiring and other kinds of work. Now MM contractors mostly subcontract work and manage labor, material and construction processes. Administrative support to MM is given by SSNS for company taxes, registration, billing and payments. On this project while MM managed and coordinated the construction process for the whole project and its members also took contracts to build houses.

#### **Gates foundation grant and CHF involvement**


Mahila Milan was contracted by the Pune Municipal Corporation to develop, design and build 1125 homes in Mother Teresa Nagar, Sheila Salve Nagar, Wadar Wasti, Bhatt Nagar, Netaji Nagar, Yashwant Nagar and Shanti Nagar as part of the in-situ slum up-gradation project promoted under the BSUP program by JNNURM. The contract was awarded early in the year 2009. Construction began in 2010 and

as of January 2015 Mahila Milan has completed the construction of 693 homes and is developing the remaining for completion and handover to the beneficiaries. The next few sections give a detailed account of the implementation process and the challenges encounter by the implementation team.

In late 2008 SPARC started early exploration of the community outreach design for BSUP with CHF through the Gates foundation grant. It retained architect Prasanna Desai and Filepe & Sara who were paid through the Gates grant for the project, this gave SPARC a head start on the project compared to other NGOs who were still waiting for funds to be released by the PMC to begin work on the project. Large public meetings were held at the initial stages to get a sense of the community’s preference for individual versus group housing. Many design studies were done to explore options of cluster housing versus individual housing to achieve greater efficiencies in planning. Combining of houses allowed for sharing of walls and structural columns which had the potential to reduce costs and allow the possibility of improving common spaces through initiatives like street widening and open space creation.

5.4. Sharing Structure

Grouping of houses reduces cost of material and construction.



Design options (Plan courtesy Prasanna Desai Associates)

From January through March 2009, updated plane table surveys were done and then the structures were classified into commercial, residential and institutional uses, the Mahila Milan team numbered and

marked each structure after which a socio-economic survey was done. This survey collected information on the area of the house, the type of structure, the number of members in the family, family income and occupation. Then the houses were classified into kuccha and pucca houses. By April 2009 the first Kuccha/ Pucca list was prepared. Simultaneously site observations and documentation process continued to overlay the plane table survey plan with land use marking, marking of street lights, manhole, open drains, trees, site slopes etc. This information was then overlaid with the individual household level information to prepare a summary of Wasti housing conditions in July 2009 which contained information about load bearing, RCC and MAHADA structures, number of floors etc.

MOTHER TERESA- FULL STRUCTURE LIST							
SR. No.	Map NO.	NAME OF THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD	AREA IN SQ. MT'S	LANDU SE	NO. OF FLOORS	TYPE OF STRUCTURE	REMARKS
	A	B	C	D	E	F	H
85	85	LAXMI DATTU KADAM	22.53	RESI	G+1	PUCCKA	G- PUCCKA.1ST - KUCCHA
86	86	AASHA SHAMMANT JOSHI	11.58	RESI	G+1	PUCCKA	
87	87	MADHU DAMU VAGHELA	23.03	RESI	G+1	PUCCKA	
88	88	PURSHOTAM NARSIGH SOLANKI	7.8	RESI	G+1	P(LOAD BEARING)	G- PUCCKA.1ST - KUCCHA
89	89	PADMA NITIN PATOLE	12.5	RESI	G	KUCCHA	
90	90	BHIM DAMU VAGHELA	10.12	RESI	G+1	PUCCKA	
91	91	GANPAT SUNSUNA	7.69	RESI	G	KUCCHA	
92	92	RAJAN REVHCAND VAGHELA	14.43	RESI	G+1	P(LOAD BEARING)	G- PUCCKA.1ST - KUCCHA. TIN ROOF
93	93	MARUTI DHONDIBA RANPISE	15.41	RESI	G+1	PUCCKA	MAHADA
94	94	RAJESH SHRAVAN KAMBLE	20.53	RESI	G	KUCCHA	
95	95	TUKARAM SAKHARAM KAMBLE	23.44	RESI	G+1	PUCCKA	MAHADA. G- PUCCKA.1ST - KUCCHA
96	96	MEHBOOB MEHMOOD SHAIKH	12.46	RESI	G	KUCCHA	
97	97	KAILASH SADASHIV CHAVAN	12.77	RESI	G+1	P(LOAD BEARING)	
98	98	ANAND YASHWANT BHISE	99.7	RESI	G	PUCCKA	MAHADA
99	99	SARASWATI GUNAJI BHOSLE	12.17	RESI	G	KUCCHA	
100	100	GUNAJI NANA BHOGALE	9.99	RESI	G+1	P(LOAD BEARING)	G- PUCCKA.1ST - KUCCHA. TIN ROOF. JOIST CONSTR.

*Eligibility list for Mother Teresa Nagar (courtesy Prasanna Desai Associates)*

### Community consultation and design innovations

Once initial eligibility lists were prepared, in June- July 2009 several design mass meetings were held at all Wasti locations to inform community members about the design options, for cluster typologies that the architects had created based on their initial assessment of the plan table survey information. Meetings were also held with the PMC to inform them about the design direction recommended by the MM appointed architects. Against design innovations presented ways in which ground floor footprints could be optimized to add to street widths. Three design options were finally offered to people to select from: Plan-A, motivated people to give up the ground floor space to widen the street; Plan A-1 created a stilted



ground floor to allow for future parking needs and act as incremental space; Plan B-alt -1 was fully built on the ground floor; Plan C created a mid-level stilted space to allow for incremental growth.

Unfortunately the architects innovations for creating public space by adjusting individual house plans had no support in the policy (the policy is silent on public space improvements through BSUP). In spite of vigorous efforts at persuasion very few cluster options were selected by people, most people insisted on retaining their original land area.





*Plans and photographs courtesy Prasanna Desai Architects*





**Proposed Second Floor Plan**



**Proposed First Floor Plan**

*Plans and photographs courtesy Prasanna Desai Architects*

### Consensus building and design approvals

After in principle approval was obtained from the beneficiaries in terms of design direction and typology choice, group meetings were held to resolve design of each cluster. Thereafter joint bank accounts were opened in the name of the beneficiary with the NGO as a joint account holder to allow for




*Photographs of The evening community meetings at site - courtesy Prasanna Desai*

beneficiary contributions to be made to the account. Once accounts were opened, final approvals were obtained from the beneficiary on the design. All meetings were held in the evening in the settlements themselves to ensure that it was convenient for people to participate. Each beneficiary or group (in case of cluster plan) was consulted at least 3-4 times to resolve all design issues and get approval for the plan.

A recording from one such cluster meeting on July 2009 at Durga Mandir indicates several issues were raised by the community. The issues ranged from questions about the options available to people for temporary accommodation during construction, construction timing and phasing issues to understand when their house would be taken up for construction and when will it be completed and whether de-notification of the slums was discussed and would be resolved. Other issues included questions about quality assurance & whether balconies would be provided as listed in the DPR and whether people will be able to see a 1:1 scale model of the house. The attendee list from the meeting notes the presence of SPARC, Mahila Milan team, the Architect team and the corporator, however the PMC officials and the third party project manager are absent from this discussion. There is no clear indication whether the policy questions in these queries remained unresolved in the project because there was no process to engage the Municipal Corporation and JNNURM cell and it maybe that their absence from these meetings enabled them to avoid those questions. Once design approvals were obtained a consent letter adopted from a format that was created by MASHAL for their project was used for documenting the beneficiary consent to proceed with construction. The letter contained the following information- 1) Thumb imprint of the owner choosing one of the two house types A or B, 2) Statement of consent with the date, house number, name, wasti name. The letter was signed in the presence of CHF, MM, Corporator, SPARC/Mahila Milan and the architect Prasanna Desai.

In August 2009 the architect produced a full assessment of the status of all kuccha houses. These were color coded into a settlement plan that marked each house based on the outstanding issues. These included houses marked as green for those that were ready for development, those marked yellow with outstanding design approval issues, and still others where contact with owners could not be established at locked homes and or rentals. Further, a number of them marked yellow had financial issues and were unable to pay, and still others had small house footprints that could not be accommodated and or were not interested. As can be seen from the color coded map below the complexity of on ground conditions

and the individual design approval process was still in the process of being resolved 8 months into the development of the project.



On 7<sup>th</sup> Nov 2009 an amended kuccha/pucca list was created that shows further modifications especially in Mother Teresa Nagar where the kuccha list reduced significantly from 330 kuccha houses in July to 292 kuccha houses. By 21<sup>st</sup> Dec 2009 after 12 months of consultation meetings including mass meetings, cluster meetings and individual meetings the number of design consent obtained ranged from 10 to a maximum of 32 as can be seen below in the chart from Dec 2009.

Settlement Name	Final kuccha list	Verbal consent	Plan consent
Mother Teresa Nagar	292	150	10
Sheela Salve Nagar	49+37* (* pvt. land )	11	6
Wadar Wasti	133	83	29
Shani Aali	Not finalized-117	-	-
Bhatt Nagar	Not final- 142	-	-
Neetaji Nagar	100	54	32
Yashwant Nagar	Not final-138	-	-
Chandrama Nagar	174	-	-


*Mahila Milan project status report 21<sup>st</sup> Dec 2009, Courtesy Pasanna Desai Architects*

### Preparing Municipal drawings

During this phase while design approvals were ongoing architects also began the process of preparing municipal drawings for submission and discovered several new coordination issues. For example, as Wasti plans were overlaid with city survey plans for submission



to the PMC, these showed conflicts in Wadar Wasti, Yashwant Nagar and Mother Teresa Nagar where plans showed non-residential uses or conflicts with roads etc. This led to several readjustments in unit allocation. Finally in late December 2009 early January 2010 revised municipal drawings were submitted to Mahila Milan by the architect. The next stage involved converting the design plans to construction drawings. This included revising drawings from polyline formats to triangulation method to allow for greater accuracy in plan layout during construction since most plot sizes are extremely irregular in informal settlements. Final revised plans were then submitted to the municipality on 16<sup>th</sup> January 2010. By 26<sup>th</sup> February 2010- 10months into the project development- many plans were still undergoing changes and verification as some discrepancies in the kaccha/pakka house list were being sorted and methods were evaluated to develop houses on plot sizes that were less than 100sqft.



Toilet size verification drawings by Parsanna Desai for confirmation of building standards with PMC

To complicate matters further the lack of clarity on building regulation to be followed for in-situ development led to a lot of back and forth between PMC staff and architects. On 12<sup>th</sup> February 2010, PMC engineers were still requesting larger size toilets and bathrooms based on the new construction building byelaws and SPARC had to request for reconsideration of special norms for BSUP projects. This was finally resolved by a standing committee decision that allowed for reconsideration of norms on case by case basis while maintaining minimum standards. See plan above.

### Getting commencement certificate and issuing demolition slips

At this stage the architects continued to prepare and submit municipal drawings for those plans which had beneficiary consent and meet with other beneficiaries to resolve unresolved plan issues. In Mother Teresa Nagar there were still 51 such unresolved conditions. In Slave Nagar some houses were discovered to be on private land and had gaathan issues (gaathan land is village land with collective land ownership). In Wadar wasti there were a number of conditions where landowners could not be reached and only renters were accessible and still others conditions where there were absentee landlords with locked houses and there continued to be those who were not interested in the program. Still other houses had issues where people were not deciding what building type they wanted. There also continued to be

households where bank account had not been opened and still others where small footprints were not eligible (as per PMC 100sft requirement) and others where people did not have money to pay their contribution, and still others that had not signed off on cluster plans.




*1:1 model house mockup erected onsite -photographs- courtesy Prasanna Desai*

Many innovative methods were used to get final consent from beneficiaries, including construction of bamboo and cloth 1:1 scale models. Finally after signoff was received on plans, panchayat slips were issued with thumb impressions on the plans from beneficiaries and demolition slips were issued to the beneficiaries to clear out their sites and secure their belongings. MASHAL formulated this procedure for issuing demolition slips in consultation with the PMC, to ensure liability of clearing the site. Securing ones belongings was completely and solely the beneficiary's responsibility, as the project did not provide transit or temporary housing for the beneficiaries for the duration of the construction of the project. Transit housing or transit camp is temporary housing built typically on an alternate parcel of land for providing temporary shelter to project affected people during the period of reconstruction and redevelopment of their originally inhabited property .



*Self-demolition work in progress, Mother Teresa Nagar -photographs- courtesy Prasanna Desai*

However due to ambiguity in procedures some MM contracted houses were demolished without issuing demolition slips. Work on these houses had to be stopped temporarily and due process affected once the process was accepted by PMC before MM could restart construction. Once the sites were cleared the plots were re-measured and the design drawings were revised once again to accommodate for discrepancies in surveys and actual onsite measurements. Some examples below illustrate that these changes were quite significant and needed significant reworking of the design.



*Plot overlays pre and post demolition footprints and design revisions -images- courtesy Prasanna Desai*

*The plot overlays plans on the left (above) indicate the changes in the plot size that were discovered as the land was resurveyed once the houses were demolished. The plans to the right show that as the unit layouts were revised to accommodate the land survey changes the design process unraveled and people demanded other changes, so the plans underwent significant changes.*

### **Beginning of construction and site challenges**

These reworked drawings were resubmitted for municipal approvals while work was carried on to develop working drawings for construction by June- July 2010. This stage involved coordination of drawing work with a structural engineer to develop framing plans, foundation design and electrical and plumbing requirements. Once drawings were complete, contractors were appointed to start construction on the site. Contractors appointed by SPARC for the project included some local women contractors from the Mahila Milan Pune team and other outside contractors known to SPARC from Mumbai. Once construction began MM and the project management consultant were involved in coordination and supervision of contractors work at site to ensure quality control. MM were also tasked with preparing stage wise bills, approval paperwork to be submitted to the PMC for sanctioning construction for each stage. It is believed that an accountant from SSNS's main office in Mumbai used to travel to Pune on regular basis to help MM prepare bills for the project. During this phase there were significant complaints received about MM's work. In interviews with PMC officials the main complaints about MM's work were about lack of documentation in design approval and billing paperwork, which led to several rounds of requests for missing paperwork, causing delays in approvals and bill payment. On the construction front, delays in bill payment caused several contractors from the MM projects sites especially out of city contractors to abandon projects. At a cluster visited at Mother Teresa Nagar, beneficiaries reported two consecutive contractors abandoning their housing projects midway through construction, leading to

further delays in completion. When asked about this issue MM acknowledges some documentation problems at their end but also suggests delays in bill payment as a problem at the PMC 's end.

### **Construction scope and changes on site**

As construction began on several sites simultaneously, several coordination challenges took place. There was inadequate control over the quality of construction. Beneficiaries interviewed at Mother Teresa Nagar reported poor quality of electrical wiring, and plumbing piping. Several steel staircases were noticeably used poor quality steel, inadequate steel bars on the treads and unequal risers. Many people reported having replaced these at their own cost to better quality steel stairs. Many bathroom doors were seen to be poor quality plastic doors. It is not clear whether a construction punch list is prepared for all houses and what would be a follow up for fixing of such construction quality related problems in the future. A construction punch list was seen in the house files in MASHAL's paperwork but not observed in SPARCs paperwork. Several other issues came up during construction like how would the staircase area be calculated in built-up area in a cluster housing plan. These issues were finally resolved through discussion and clarification with the PMC and the beneficiaries.

It is observed on site that a majority of households took additional loans and entered into direct contracts with the contractor to develop additional floors for the housing to meet their family needs. Many of these loans were taken from bachat groups (cooperative savings groups) where MM volunteers are involved in running bachat schemes. It is not clear whether there is collusion on that front in granting money for the building of these additional floors, given the involvement of MM on all fronts. These additional floors have not been supervised by the technical teams (structural or architectural consultant) as they fall outside the scope of the contract approved by BSUP (270sft, G+1 houses) and constitute illegal construction. Many of these additions have extension and balconies that protrude onto the street space.

The structural engineer interviewed for this study acknowledged that these additions should have been restricted as they might compromise the structural stability of the buildings built under the program, and suggested that design innovations like sloping roofs on the top floors could have restricted this problem of over building.


Additionally, people complained that water connection and electric meter connection charges cost them at an average Rs 30,000 more in addition to their mandated contribution and they were not aware of these additional costs. Most people have experience increased cost of living as they now have 6 electrical points in the house. Their electrical bills have gone up to Rs 1200/month which is very high for a family earning low wages. People also complained that the water pressure in the locality is still low and most people had to install water pumps to pump water up to the overhead tanks provided at the roof to meet their requirements, to avoid these additional cost some people continue to wash utensils and clothes in the open under community taps.

#### **Community perspective- Mother Teresa Nagar- Mahila Milan**

One of the common complaints of people from Mother Teresa Nagar (per site interviews with beneficiaries) is that they were not consulted for some of the changes that were made on the plans. One woman complained that 1.5 ft of her house plot area was given for road widening and she never consented to it. Another man complained that while he agreed to give up some plot area on the ground floor for the alignment of the street wall with a neighbor's house wall, he asked to be compensated by allowing that floor area to be consumed by a projection on the upper floor but this was not granted. The interviewed beneficiaries confirmed that their houses were built by a contractor from Mumbai, who left midway through the project and then another contractor from Mumbai was called to complete the houses and then finally some houses were completed by Mahila Milan and other local teams. Most

beneficiaries also confirmed that they have not paid their contribution because they are not satisfied with the quality of the house and want changes to be made. They also feel that they spent so much of their own money for improvements that most are in debt and now cannot afford to pay the contribution. Most people in the second phase seem especially dissatisfied with the quality of the houses. They complain about substandard electric wiring, inadequate lighting points, poor quality steel stairs, low quality plastic doors for bathrooms, and inadequate door frames.

*Below are some of these conditions documented based on site observation:*




*Photographs from site visit by author, Mother Teresa Nagar- showing peeling paint in bathrooms, lightweight plastic PVC doors at bathrooms, people having to put wood planks of steel stairs as they do not have enough steel treads for safety and people having had to build their own doorway steps.*

Most beneficiaries mention that they used to interact with Mahila Milan to request changes to be made to the plans MM would then discuss with the architect to get the changes implemented. They note that there is also a lot of inconsistency in the construction, one row of houses have chajjas (window protection projections) and the other don't have any covering over the windows, most bathrooms have half walls and only some have a slab built over it, some people complain that the Mahila Milan team should have

coordinated this. It was observed that the risers on most stairs have different sizes some are very high and dangerous to climb. Most people confirmed that the second phase houses took 3-4 years (2010-2014) for completion and they have moved in only around mid-2014. People also complained that the corporators have not been very supportive and a new corporator has been elected recently. They also complained that the water supply in their area is at very low pressure and they have been complaining about this for some time but the politics in their neighborhood is very divisive and the corporator doesn't respond to their complaints. Most complained that the additional burden of staying away on rent for such 3-4 years (instead of the promised 15 months) took an economic toll on most families but in addition they are also dissatisfied that they got such poor quality houses in spite of such a long wait. They also have not received any allotment letters and are hoping that they will receive official title documents for the houses. Nobody has conveyed to them what the next step is: Is it the corporator and or Mahila Milan who are supposed to follow up on the final documentation for the house?

### Project-2- MASHAL

#### MASHAL– project organization structure



MASHAL was contracted by the Pune Municipal Corporation to develop, design and build 2010 homes in Nagpur Chawl, Gandhi Nagar, Jaijawan Nagar, Laxmi Nagar, Ram Nagar, Balaji Nagar, Ganesh Nagar, Jijamata Nagar, Ashok Nagar, Kamraj Nagar and Manik Nagar in the year 2009. Construction began in the year 2010 and as of January 2015 MASHAL has completed construction of 1775 homes and is developing the remaining for completion and handover to the beneficiaries. MASHAL is a non-profit Non-governmental organization setup in 1985 under the Maharashtra Societies Registration Act of 1869. MASHAL's staff consists of professionals in the field of architecture, urban and regional planning, engineering, social work and rural development. Its governance is run by a board of trustees- a eleven member board consisting of social activist, an architect, an ex Unicef program officer, the NSDF president, a planner, a hydro geologist, ex-world bank employee, dean from a planning school CEPT and an IT expert. The organization works for improvement in services and housing for the poor communities. It provides professional services in the following areas- socio-economic surveys, health status surveys, community development, poverty alleviation programs, research-documentation and analysis. It does policy research for housing and land development, develops feasibility studies, land use planning and infrastructure development. It has done GIS mapping for slum settlements in Pune. It provides architectural design, engineering design, planning and landscape design and project management services and rural appraisal programs. They have developed housing projects using local materials for earthquake affected communities in Latur, supported flood affected communities with technical expertise in creating appropriate shelter plans that can be self-developed.

#### **Contract signing and contract terms negotiation and inflexibility**

On 12<sup>th</sup> March 2009 standing committee resolution number #2314 awarded the work for In-situ redevelopment at Yerwada to: SPARC- 750 houses, MASHAL 943 Houses, VRP 394 houses and SEWA 750 houses. But as can be seen from the process outlined below negotiation of contract term took almost 6

months after the project was assigned to MASHAL. This was crucial time lost in the early stages of project. This process was prolonged as it needed coordination between three different offices, the PMC office for channeling the information, the OSD office (office of superintending engineer, JNNURM) for taking decisions on any changes in the legal or financial terms of the contract and the standing committee (council of ministers) for taking a decision on finalizing the allotment of units to each settlement. As can be seen from official documents, on 21st March 2009 a letter issued by OSD to MASHAL requested a start of preliminary activities like conducting survey work and design consultation with slum dwellers.

On 11<sup>th</sup> June 2009 another letter was issued from OSD to MASHAL stating that as per resolution # 2314 dated 12/03/2009 standing committee has accepted MASHAL's offer to develop 943 housing units under BSUP. On 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009 MASHAL sent a letter to Mr Molak stating that MASHAL has decided to get involved with the project and pay the required 2% Earnest Money so the agreement between the PMC and MASHAL can be signed. The PMC agreed to deduct 3% from each installment and a total of 5% as security deposit, which would be paid back after the completion of the project. On 17<sup>th</sup> July 2009 MASHAL submitted a draft work agreement to the JNNURM cell at the PMC. They also informed the PMC office that as per the order to start work dated 11/06/2009 for the 943 units, the joint accounts have been opened, architects plans have been made, beneficiary agreements are in the last stage and the socio-economic survey is complete. MASHAL also stated that it is ready to make a 2% security deposit, but work could not be taken further as the contract agreement between PMC and MASHAL had not been signed.

On 13<sup>th</sup> August 2009, MASHAL submitted the following documents towards signing of the agreement: liability insurance, society registration, trust registration, information about organization and resolution of organization. The following additional clarifications were offered in this document-Decision to open joint account to avoid deduction of work contract tax & Request to include a PMC accountability clause for


getting payments released from state and central government on time within 8 days of completion of the stage of work or else pay an interest of 18% .

On 14<sup>th</sup> August 2009, however, a response was received from OSD office stating that payments cannot be made to the joint beneficiary account so payments would be made to MASHAL's account and that no changes could be made to the contract conditions now. On 17<sup>th</sup> August 2009 a response from OSD is also issued to PMC directing that payments cannot be deposited into the beneficiary account as requested.

On 10<sup>th</sup> Sept 2009 MASHAL's contract is finally signed with PMC.

### Beginning of work and establishing priorities

As MASHAL started developing the project it collaborated with the local corporators to setup large peoples meetings (Jan Sabha's) in the individual settlements to explain the program, its benefits, its timeline, the monetary contribution requirements (10-12%) and financial capacity to stay for 8-10 months outside the wasti in rental or other accommodation. It then used the slum survey it had developed in 2004 for the Slum Redevelopment Authority as a base survey to prepare a preliminary list of eligible households. Once the preliminary Kuccha-Pucca list was prepared it was shared with the corporators for verification. This was also cross checked against the list of beneficiaries of the Vambay program to ensure there are no overlaps and the same people don't get benefits again in the new policy.



**JN - NURM**  
In situ Housing with peoples participation in PMC  
**जवाहरलाल नेहरू राष्ट्रीय पुनरुत्थान प्रकल्प**  
शोषकपट्टीमध्ये आहे त्याच जागी लोक सहभागाने घर बांधणी प्रकल्प .

लाभादीचे नाव : सी . आरगोज अरुम शेठ	बांधकामाचे स्पेसीफीकेशन :	अधिक महभाग
घर नं . : १ ए २५ .	• मुख्य दिवेधी RCC फ्ले स्लुब्स .	• कंठ साकारा - ५० %
शोषकपट्टीचे नाव : शालाजी नगर घरायडा .	• आहे त्याच जागी बांधकाम .	• गाळा साकारा - ३० %
माननीय नगरसेवक श्री . राजेंद्र एड्डल	• २६२ चौ . फुट वरुड सेर अध्या अंदाजे	• पुणे मनरा - १० %
घाण्या पुढाकाराने ये विभागीय मनरा आवुक्त	• ३३० चौ . फुट प्राथकस क्षेत्र .	• लाभाधी - १० %
श्री . ज्ञानेश्वर मोल्लक यांच्या मार्गदर्शनाखाली	• होल खयपाक्या इडल्स प्राथमस ये	(SC/ST/OBC गट)
पुणे महानगरपालिकेचा पधेशी प्रकल्प .	• मंडास असलेली भवनिका .	• एकुल - २००%
	• घरातील मॉहनेच्या नाचे भवनिका .	• नोर : तुसा गट(माटी लाभाधी- या सहभाग १२% असले .

सौजन्य : अँक्सिस बँक येरवडा पुणे .

*Image courtesy MASHAL- Area Sabha held at Gandhi Nagar and project banner prepared to give detailed information about the program*

During the shortlisting of beneficiaries MASHAL developed a set of prioritization criteria's to determine which houses could be taken up in the first phase. This was based on these considerations – first preference would be given to those who set up a bank account earliest, showed capacity to pay 10% or 12% contribution and stay offsite for 8-10 months during construction. The policy defines 12% as required contribution from beneficiaries who belong to SC/ST/BC/OBC/PH categories (SC-Schedule caste, ST-Schedule tribe, BC-Backward caste, OBC- Other backward caste, PH-Physically handicapped) and all other weaker sections would contribute 10%. Second preference would be given to people who could provide their residency verification paperwork and vacate the house. Third preference would be given to widows, senior citizens, single women households with Kuccha houses. MASHAL also required that people vacate their houses within 8-10 days after approval is received. Structuring these priorities helped organize the process and people on the MASHAL projects.

#### **Lack of clarity and governance building**

Since the DPR did not offer detailed criteria for classification of Kuchha-Pucca houses, MASHAL prepared a classification system based on the survey conditions it observed on site. The criteria for Kuchha house was determined to include load bearing houses with tin roof, patra (sheet) house, brick work house with sheet roof, load bearing with steel angles and sheet roof. Once this criterion of assessment was approved by PMC they were used as a basis for the house classification for all projects in Yerwada. The sorting of these requirements resulted in the creation of the preliminary beneficiary list. Once this was complete people were required to submit residency proof documents to be eligible for the program. MASHAL prepared a checklist of documents that would serve as proof of residency this list was discussed with PMC and once confirmed was used by all implementers on the project. The list included a copy of the

government issued photopass, ration card (public distribution system in India) showing names of all members of the family, election card address and year, electricity bill with residential address, PMC service charge payment slip, consideration was also given to people who, while lacking possession of other documents, could show hospital receipt with house address as a proof of residence. No cutoff date was considered in defining eligibility all that could provide proof of residency documents were considered eligible ( add note regarding Karne Guruji's initiative on this confirmation).



*Image courtesy MASHAL- house to house survey and identification of Katcha houses*

Once people provided the documents, opened bank accounts and gave consent for participating in the scheme, MASHAL went ahead and demolished the homes to start construction, 150 houses were demolished at this early stage. It was only when the homes were demolished that PMC clarified the need for a statutory approval before demolition. The reason for MASHAL's action was that the tender document did not provide information on any statutory approvals process and only suggested community consent as criteria for project development. Once PMC clarified this, MASHAL sat down with Mr Korad a Junior Engineer from PMC team to set the structure for the approval process. This included developing application templates, defining document and drawings requirements for approval, finalizing whether this

would be a building department approval or a SRA approval. Once this process was setup new socio economic surveys, cadastral surveys and plane table surveys were done to update the preliminary eligibility list based on the new data. Once the survey was finalized paperwork was submitted to PMC for approval. After receiving approvals three professional agencies coordinated the construction process. A RCC consultant did structural work, third party project management agency did quality control of construction work and MASHAL's in-house architect team developed planning and architectural design.




Image courtesy MASHAL: Defining drawing standards and requirements for regulatory approval

### Changing scope of work and housing re-allotments


The project underwent several scope changes as on ground housing conditions; regulatory compliance assessment and beneficiary consent started defining the final scope of housing work in each settlement. While Gandhi Nagar and Nagpur Chawl saw substantial increase in scope indicating high acceptance of the program, other settlements did face challenges in terms of low acceptance, low eligibility and post-

facto land use and ownership conflicts that emerged as documents and land use plans were closely assessed once work began on ground. While the key reason for these changes was that the original allotments (in the DPR) was very broadly defined and loosely interpreted without much due diligence and no community outreach, however the complexity of the consent and eligibility process indicates that some of these changes could not have been anticipated or avoided. This chart below provides the list of houses based on the initial contract (9/7/2009) and finalized list based on ground work (12/01/2015) provided by MASHAL.

S. No	Corporators	Slum Name	9/07/2009	12/01/2015
1	Shri karne Guruji	Gandhi Nagar, Jaiprakash Nagar	120	255
2	Shri Rajendra Endel	Balaji Nagar, Jijamata Nagar, Janta Nagar, Yashwant Nagar, Subhash Nagar, Ganesh Nagar	348	301
3	Dr Siddharth Dhende	Nagpur Chawl	254	477
4	Shri Sanjay Bhosale	Jaijawan Nagar, Ram Nagar, Naik Nagar, Pandu Laman Wasti, Laxmi Nagar	221	200
5	Total		943	1233

*Other than these changes above the following communities were added to MASHAL's scope as SEWA, the organization initially assigned to these settlements, resigned from the project.*

S.No	Corporator	Slum Name	9/07/2009	12/01/2015
5	Ms Shashikala Arde	Laxmi Nagar, Ashok Nagar, Manik Nagar, Kamraj Nagar	0	290
6	Shri Hanif Shaikh, Shri Kishor Vitkar, Shri Sanjay Bhosle	Laxmi Nagar, kamraj Nagar	0	296



*Several resolutions taken up by the standing committee address these re-allotment issues. Below is a list of resolutions and the conditions under which re-allotments for BSUP were issued.*

These changes in scope, continuous additions and deletions of the number of units to be designed impacted the implementing team's capacity for efficient implementation. Projects teams had to be reassigned and staffing changed to address the adjustment of scope of work on an ongoing basis throughout the project duration.

**19/04/2011- Resolution 83-** The Standing committee made the decision that, since SEWA had expressed their inability to continue to work on the project, the houses assigned to SEWA should be reallocated to MASHAL in order to fulfill the obligations to the beneficiaries. This was as per request made by Shri Sunil Tingare and Shri Santosh Aarde dated 19/04/2011

**25/02/2011- Resolution 2755-** The resolution mentions that there is work ongoing in ward 20 under BSUP and yet the DPR doesn't mention Suraksha Nagar (s. no. 10) in ward 20 as included in BSUP. This needed to be rectified and included. Further it states that, because in ward 20 there have been many problems due to land use reservation and land ownership conflicts, there is a need for 250 houses to be reallocated for BSUP.

**23/02/2011- Resolution 543-** The standing committee made recommendation that since 100 houses that were to be built in Adarsh Indira Nagar for BSUP have been discovered to be located in a garden reservation, these 100 houses should be reallocated. The houses were reallocated to ward 19 under corporator Hanif Shaikh in the areas of Kamraj nagar, laxmi nagar and ganesh nagar. This decision was based on the letter submitted by Mr Hanif Shaikh and Mr Sunil Tingare on 23/12/2010 and the standing committee resolution dated 23/12/2010 resolution no. 1990.

**4/01/2011- Resolution 2125-** Resolution states that in ward no 5, s. no. 110 shanti nagar 375 houses were allotted to SEWA to rebuild houses under JNNURM. However in 17 months only 15 houses foundations have been dug and 5 houses are completed upto the plinth level and the organization has expressed an inability to carry the work forward. Further, SPARC has submitted a letter expressing interest in taking up these additional houses. It is therefore determined that per the contract rates agreed by SPARC in its contract these houses should be transferred to their contract.

**17/01/2011- Resolution 462-** A letter by Hanif Shaikh (4/1/2011) states that in his ward Talzai there were 576 houses allotted, but at this stage only 400 houses are likely to be completed. The remaining 176 should be transferred to ward 19 Purnkuti, Laxmi Nagar, Kamraj Nagar, Ganesh Nagar, where also there is a need to redevelop temporary houses. The resolution was passed to redistribute the houses as requested.

**25/01/2011- Resolution 2314-** In response to the letter by Hanif Shaikh and Sunil Bibwe, ward 19 hasn't seen any progress in work by SEWA for the past 1.5 to 2 years. It is therefore requested that the job be granted to MASHAL. The resolution was passed.

**23/12/2010- Resolution 1990-** There is a request to grant 100 houses from Adarsh Nagar which can't be built due to garden reservation to ward number 19 – Laxmi Nagar, Kamraj Nagar, Ganesh Nagar under corporator Shri Hanif Shaikh .

**10/8/2010- Resolution 671-** A request to grant permission to set up a hot mix plant for redevelopment of Kuccha houses in Jayprakash Nagar, Gandhi Nagar and Nagpur Chawl is acknowledged.

**8/6/2010- Resolution 284-** The resolution states that in ward 20 Laxmi Nagar 198 houses were given to VRRP to redevelop. In 11 months, however, only 23 houses have been developed and at this rate it seems likely that the project will not be completed. This resolution mentions that these should be considered for re-allotment.

Multiple work orders were given to accommodate allotment changes in each settlement against the original contractually allotted list per the DPR. MASHAL received 4 such orders through the duration of the project. These included the scope of 943 units, then 108 units and then 576 units and finally an additional 356 units, totaling 2010 houses. While some of these alterations to the scope might have been unavoidable the level and extent of changes were quite substantial and posed considerable challenge for organizations to reassess staffing and mobilization for project execution.

#### **Project payment delays and third party bridge funding**

MASHAL made a list of local contractors from the neighborhood to do the construction work and ensured that beneficiaries could pick the contractor they wanted to work with from this list. Each contractor was given not more than 10 houses and there were a total of 180 contractors retained for the project. A MASHAL team member explained that the strategy was chosen to ensure that scope of work matched the capacity of these local small contractors and this scope capacity balance ensured that the project would be completed. MASHAL's contract with the contractor was based on stage wise payments for the work completed, as was the case with MASHAL's agreement with the State Nodal Agency. These contractors also paid Rs 6000 per house as a security deposit from their side to MASHAL on signing the contract. This payment was then used by MASHAL toward the payment of the security deposit that was due on its

contract with the PMC. This was a key funding innovation which allowed MASHAL to work on the project. MASHAL being run as a non-profit consultancy was cash strapped and would not have been able to make this initial payment to the PMC without the contractor's deposit. In fact, MASHAL was ready to resign from the project when the Gandhi Nagar corporator intervened and suggested this solution. In addition to the Rs 6000 per house security deposit the contractors also contributed Rs 5000 per house of their own money until the plinth level construction. This allowed the project to proceed before the 1<sup>st</sup> installment of payments would be received from the PMC. Mr Karne Guruji, the corporator from Gandhi Nagar, was instrumental in suggesting and negotiating these agreements with the contractor which ensured the financial viability of the project.

During the course of the project MASHAL faced more financial strains (as did other NGOs) due to delayed bill payments from the PMC. In an interview, the MASHAL project head suggested that the delay was a procedural issue. Once work is completed at site MASHAL would submit the necessary documents for PMC bill approval. The JE would then visit each site for inspection to give approval. This would be followed by a site visit by the DE to cross check the signoff given the JE and finally the bill would be sent to the OSD office for approval and payment. The OSD office at its end had to secure funding from the State and the Center for each stage of project. The project payments were divided in 5 stages – Footing, Plinth, RCC frame, Walls and Finishes. MASHAL's team claimed that the minimum time for bill payment was 2-3 months and in some cases 4 months. This caused great difficulty for MASHAL in keeping contractors at work, contractors needed to pay daily wages to construction labor and delayed payments would lead to high labor turnover. MASHAL had to seek external project funding at this stage to support payments both for its own staff and payments to the contractor. MASHAL obtained an interest free bridge loan of Rs 4 crore from Habitat for Humanity to support the project at this stage.

**Manpower and process**

The MASHAL project head suggests that manpower issues at the PMC were quite severe for the BSUP project. Junior Engineers were assigned to the project but no separate cell was created to approve and manage the BSUP project. The JE's received no guidance regarding regulatory procedures and standards to be followed for project supervision and approvals for this in-situ project, and they did not have any precedent to follow. Also, the DE's had other project duties at the ward level other than the BSUP project. Further, only 4 JE's were assigned to handle the entire load of 4000 houses. This was also reported by the JE's to be an excessive workload. The beneficiaries had been informed that construction would take an average of 8-10 months but due to these capacity issues average construction time for houses extended to 2-3 years in most cases.

Several attempts were made to streamline the approval process. The commissioner took meetings every month to solve the key project problems and take decisions. To address the bill payment and approval issues the JE's were asked to pass files within 14 -20 days as per one resolution. This did put some additional pressure on the junior staff to deliver, but due to the excessive workload, lack of adequate staffing and circuitous approvals processes this efficiency was never achieved on the project. The staff with additional external responsibilities had to balance their time based on the project budget among other projects.

**Due diligence and beneficiary payment collection**

In order to avoid further financial problems MASHAL ensured that it did not accept the beneficiary documents until beneficiaries submitted payments. Payments by beneficiaries were made through the joint bank account. The payments were in 3 installments of Rs 10,000 each. Stage-1 of contribution was at submission of documents, stage-2 at plinth completion and stage-3 at the completion of the RCC

frame. MASHAL was very diligent and persistent in its efforts to collect the beneficiary contribution and has received 100% payments for the 1775 completed projects from beneficiaries with very few delays. The initial stage of the project was in fact entirely supported by beneficiary contribution in MASHAL's projects until project money started being disbursed by the PMC. This was not the case for SPARC and other NGOs.

STATUS OF CONTRIBUTION BY BENEFICIARIES TO MASHAL FOR INSITU SLUM HOUSING UNDER BSUP					Date: 20.02.2015
Sr.no	Total Houses (No)	PMC Approvals (No)	Required Contribution (Rs)	Received by Mashal form Beneficaries by Cheque by Cash (Rs)	Balance Contribution to be paid by beneficiaries(Rs)
1	1819	1819 (980+839)	60,444,000	56,802,869	3,720,631
2	191	191 (110+81)	6,330,000	4,389,683	1,940,317
3	177	0	5,871,000	1,386,000	4,485,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>2187</b>	<b>2010 1090+920</b>	<b>72,645,000.00</b>	<b>62,578,552.00</b>	<b>10,145,948.00</b>

Table courtesy MASHAL:

total beneficiary collections

are around 94% for Phase-1


projects and 69% for Phase-

2. Phase-3 has just begun.

### Project processes and creating governance norms

Once the houses were complete, in order not to delay occupancy for the beneficiary until the PMC completion certificates were received, MASHAL in coordination with the PMC agreed to provide an interim allotment letter to beneficiaries for occupancy. This allotment letter was made on a Rs 100 stamp paper as a "no objection certificate" (NOC) issued by MASHAL for use and occupancy of the house by the beneficiary till the official CC documents are issued. This document was then submitted to the PMC as proof of allotment to grant the last 10% of project payment and the completion certificate. All these procedures including creating a RC (running account) billing book and checklist of documents for each file to ensure proper processes are followed were developed by MASHAL during the construction of the project, as the project brief lacked predefinition of these processes. MASHAL took a proactive role in

setting these processes and sought consultation with the PMC to provide consent and approvals in order to ensure that the project could progress smoothly.



Images courtesy MASHAL: governance documents and norms in the form of beneficiary consent form template and house level project application form and checklist.

**Project funding adequacy and request for additional grants.**

MASHAL had missed verifying some key financial terms that were part of the contract document at the time of signing of the contract and these added to the financial issues on the project. MASHAL stated that they continue to suffer financial loss on the project and are actively working with the PMC to seek additional funding or a special grant to meet the financial gap on the project. It is believed that (as stated by MASHAL) the deductions on payments for Value Added Tax (VAT), income tax and surcharge, the security deposit and the bank guarantee all went over and beyond the actual costs of executing the project and the lack of an escalation clause has further added to the burden on the implementers. At the time of this research the PMC and the council of ministers that form the standing committee at the city

level had already taken some proactive measures to respond to these financial viability issues raised by MASHAL. On 12/03/2009- Resolution 2314- stated that the special fund of Rs 15,000 per house will be released when Implementers complete the work and allot the house to the beneficiary and submit all paperwork related to the completion of the project to the PMC. The standing committee Resolution #2671 dated 18/02/2011 (see scan attached in appendix) reconfirms this and states that the project budget needs to be increased by 5% or Rs 15,000 per house. Thus all wards where beneficiary payments hadn't started as of 18/02/2011 should be considered for this added special grant. This includes ward no 126 Talzai, ward 19 Parnakuti, ward 14 Don Bosco high school, ward 15 Nagpur Chawl.

On 26/06/2012- Resolution 420 – raised three points. Collection of beneficiary contributions has proven difficult for NGOs and impacted their ability to develop projects due to inadequate funding. Also, the escalation of building construction costs and the absence of an option in the contract to adjust to new costs has added to the financial burden on implementers. The implementers therefore jointly requested a grant of additional funds. Also mentioned there in is the extension granted by the central government for completion of BSUP by March 2014. Considering the above circumstances, the standing committee made a decision to ask all agencies to discuss and come up with a solution to the funding problem to enable project completion by March 2014. The final solution that was adopted allowed income tax, VAT, surcharge deduction to be eliminated from payments to NGOs by allowing payments to happen through the beneficiary account. The resolution also allowed a 2% earnest deposit and 2% performance guarantee to be deducted from the payments for the project rather than requiring it to be paid in advance. The resolution also allowed for an additional 3% fee to be paid for a third party project management consultancy for the BSUP project. An additional 2.5% fee was added to be paid to the structural engineer from PMC's funds. On 13/09/2014 the committee finally passed Resolution #1899 wherein the standing committee granted a special fund to BSUP implementers against escalation cost to


the amount of Rs 15,000 per house. This came about after many requests in writing by MASHAL , VRP and SPARC to request PMC and the standing committee to compensate the implementers for the additional financial burden caused by the escalations in the construction costs which remained un-adjusted in project payments.

Overall two types of projects were executed by MASHAL the earlier project scope where the payments were made in MASHAL's name in this category of funded projects MASHAL claims to have lost Rs 25,000 to Rs 27,000 per house due to construction and material cost escalation on a year on year basis, as these are not accommodated in the project budget. For the type -2 projects where PMC agreed to make payments to the joint account MASHAL was able to save on the deduction for VAT, income tax, surcharge , but these were only 191 sanctioned units as per the new rule. For this second stage of projects all bills and files were submitted as individual house files for approval.

#### **MASHAL design approach and project coordination approach**

MASHAL did not spend much time on design innovation since all houses were built as individual houses, with internal stair and internal WC/bath. Each house was given a 500 litre overhead water tank. Electrical fittings were done for the whole house and the base connection point was prepared for people to make their own arrangement to install the meters at that location. Further the material testing reports that were required for construction approval were obtained from private/government labs. The RCC designer and the Project management consultant were selected from consultants on the panel of the Pune Municipal Corporation. The MASHAL team established a close working relationship with the junior engineers at the PMC to help set up project standards and documentation processes. They also regularly escalated larger project problems to the senior PMC officials and local corporators to enable tabling of these issues in the standing committee meetings for assessment and resolution. Most coordination for

state level issues was however done through OSD's office at Pune. There was no direct access to state or central government agencies. The central government agencies did a few site visits during the duration of the project.



Images courtesy MASHAL: structural coordination drawings and stability certificates for quality assurance

### Community perspective- trust and familiarity (MASHAL project)

People interviewed in Gandhi Nagar and Nagpur Chawl seem very satisfied with the overall outcome of the project. They feel that the houses constructed are of good quality and good material standards have been maintained. One woman recalled how MASHAL's team on one of their site inspections noticed that the reinforcement on one of the columns in her house was not adequate. They immediately notified the contractor and had it redone and added. Another woman stated that the local contractor also was very helpful and did good work. For example when she noticed that her Kitchen platform was damaged, she complained to the contractor and he immediately got it replaced with a new stone platform. Similarly the contractor also helped her with getting the additional room added at the upper stair level, which is beyond the original budget of the project and she will be paying him back for this in the future. One of the biggest complaints however has been the delay in the completion of the work. Most people seem to

be very aware of the causes of the delays. Their continuous interaction with the local contractor, the corporator and implementation team through the process of construction kept them aware of the challenges, and helped build trust. Most recall the contractor claiming payment delays as a reason for not being able to continue work on many occasions. They are also aware that the delays were due to the corporation's inability to release payments on time. Many claimed that the contractors put their own money for some of the additions and changes that they had requested, and these beneficiaries were very grateful for that. They affirm that they were given a choice from amongst 4-5 local contractors and other outside contractors to choose whom they wanted to work with. Most chose contractors from their immediate neighborhood with whom they had some degree of familiarity or had had previous interactions at a social level. Though most people did not have extensive discussion on their house layout plans before construction began they were able to get changes made during construction and these were accommodated by both the contractor and the implementing team.

For most people the economic burden of paying rent for the 2-3 years while their house was in construction was very hard to bear. Most people are under debt now with loans from relatives and other lenders etc. Most people spent Rs 1 lakh in rental expenses during this period and an additional Rs 50,000 to 1 lakh for changes and additions based on their needs. They were informed earlier on in the project by the implementing agency that they would receive compensation for their rental expense after their houses are complete and they feel it would be helpful if that happens but they don't want to have further expectations as they are happy with what they got. They are hopeful that they will get proper legal titles that will enable them to feel secure in their new homes and ensure that they are safeguarded from evictions and demolitions. They know that their corporator is pursuing the government to get approval of legal titles for the entire settlement now that they have been able to achieve a status of 100% pucca houses.

### Project completion status- SPARC and MASHAL

Today MASHAL has been able to achieve 88% construction completion for Phase-1 and 2 and has received completion certificates for 81% of the houses under their scope of work. This has however not been the case for most other NGOs. By contrast, SPARC has achieved only 60% completion of construction work and their paperwork has severely lagged behind and they have only been able to receive completion certificates for 16% of their projects. Similarly, VRP has only achieved 49% construction completion and received completion certificates for 6% of their scope of work. While bureaucratic delays and procedural problems are the main reason for these delays, it has to be acknowledged that NGO capacity is also an issue. Further, inadequate funding for the project is also one of the issues that compromised the working of all members. While delays in payment caused intermittent suspension of construction work, procedural delays were also a result of lack of resources and inadequate funding to be able to put more resources on the project. This problem affected all agencies across the board. The most severely impacted are however the community members who had to bear the cost of the delays and uncertainty in real economic, social, physical and psychological terms through the duration of the project.

STATUS OF INSITU SLUM HOUSING PROJECT WITH PEOPLES PARTICIPATION FOR ALL NGOS FOR PMC UNDER BSUP(II) JN-NURM							Date: 20/02/2015
TOTAL HOUSES SANCTIONED BY THE CENTRAL GOVT. - 4000 HOUSES							
Sr.No.	PARTICULARS →	Progress of work of concerned NGOs (All figures are number of houses)					TOTAL
	Name of the NGO	MASHAL	SPARC	VRP	SUBHAS JAGTAP	SEWA	
1	No of houses allotted	2010 (50.25%)	1125 (28.13%)	466 (11.65%)	399 (9.98%)	Cancelled	4,000 (100%)
2	SD-PGD deposited with PMC (Rs.)	Rs. 2.18 Cr.	Rs. 0.88 Cr.	Rs. 0.18 Cr.	Rs. 0.00 Cr.	Rs. 0.06 Cr.	Rs. 3.24 Cr.
3	Work area	Yerwade / Sangamwadi	Yerwade	Yerwade	Tajjai	Yerwade	Yerwade / Sangamwadi: Tajjai
4	a) Works as per Old Resolution 2314	1819 (90.5%)	697 (61.9%)	151 (32.40%)	0 (00%)	-	2766 (70.9%)
	b) Works as per Resolution 420	191 (9.4%)	428 (38.04%)	315 (67.68%)	-	-	1107 (29.03%)
5	Building Permissions received	2010 (100%)	1093 (100%)	441 (100%)	212 (100%)	-	3783 (92.58%)
Progress of work on site							
1	Demolisation Completed	2010 (100.00%)	946 (84.08%)	421 (90.34%)	202 (50.62%)	-	3579 (89.47%)
2	Footings Completed	2007 (99.85%)	936 (83.02%)	419 (89.91%)	202 (50.62%)	-	3564 (89.01%)
3	Plinths Completed	2007 (99.85%)	936 (83.02%)	419 (89.91%)	202 (50.62%)	-	3564 (89.01%)
4	R.C.C Slabs Completed	1995 (99.25%)	787 (69.95%)	358 (76.82%)	200 (50.12%)	-	3340 (83.45%)
5	Brk Work/Plaster Completed	1952 (97.11%)	765 (68.00%)	306 (65.66%)	190 (47.61%)	-	3113 (80.32%)
6	Door/Windows Completed	1845 (91.79%)	687 (61.00%)	259 (55.57%)	187 (46.80%)	-	2978 (74.17%)
7	Houses Completed	1775 (88.30%)	684 (60.88%)	230 (49.35%)	187 (46.80%)	-	2876 (71.90%)
8	Completion Certificate Received	1633 (81.24%)	189 (16.88%)	29 (6.22%)	0	-	1850 (46.25%)
9	Amount Received from PMC	Rs. 46.94 Cr.	Rs. 17.18 Cr.	Rs. 9.28 Cr.	Rs. 3.22 Cr.	-	Rs. 76.62 Cr.
10	Amount Received from Beneficiaries	Rs. 6.07 Cr (90.88%)	2.25 Cr (22.82%)	1.65 Cr (15.75%)	-	-	Rs. 9.97 (100%)

Image courtesy Pune  
Municipal Corporation-  
Project status report-  
20/02/2015.


**Project Summary -SPARC and MASHAL**

While the two projects in the Yerwada case were implemented under the same overall framework, it is important to note that the implementers performed very differently. The case research on the two projects indicate that while the SPARC and Mahila Milan team focused on the planning and design innovations, the MASHAL team focused on governance innovation. The diagrams to the right show where the two projects had their strengths and how these processes fit in the overall structure of the project. MASHALs efforts at governance building were supported by key partners i.e, the local corporator and key Pune Municipal Corporation officials. The active collaboration between these agencies and groups enabled implementation of


the project. The coproduction of standards and processes were key to guiding the whole project forward.

The case study research however also indicates that the BSUP policy implementation faced a number of challenges. These challenges were mainly due to mismatched rules, varied site conditions, ill set

**IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS- SPARC & MAHILA MILAN**



**IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS- MASHAL**



processes, inadequate regulatory frameworks, lack of defined project documentation standards, lack of resources and lack of capacity at several levels to facilitate policy implementation. However, there were also some key structural changes that helped address these challenges in implementation. Perhaps the urban reforms promoting a horizontal governance structure, the local government capacity building, and the project level strategy adapted by implementing agencies all contributed to project implementation in some manner. Analysis of how these processes worked will be described and discussed in the next section, the case study analysis. This analysis will use the literature from policy implementation research and governance building to understand how institutional structure, decision making mechanisms, norm creating processes and strategy help address implementation challenges. The section will also understand how learning from the ground is incorporated and how this impacts policy outcomes.

## Chapter-6-Case analysis, key findings & further research

1. Case analysis- attempts to understand the governance of policy implementation at Yerwada through an analysis of five key aspects of implementation: Institutional structure, Institutional capacity, policy design, policy rules and implementation innovations.
2. Key findings and lessons:
  - i. Structure-Distributive management and implementation structures can create interdependencies that support spaces for negotiation, collaboration and cooperation.
  - ii. Capacity- Implementer's roles, motives, capacities and interests influence outcomes. Culture alone cannot support implementation organizations need to build institutional capacity
  - iii. Design- Clear definition of policy goals and objectives is essential to ensure policy success. Objectives need supportive strategies to be operationalized.
  - iv. Rules- Rules cannot control outcomes. Rigid rules need reconsideration; flexible frameworks might better support implementation.
  - v. Innovation- Local knowledge is essential to adapt implementation decisions and participatory strategies to specific contextual conditions.
3. Need for further research


**CASE ANALYSIS:** The slum housing policy literature from India (chapter 4) highlights two key governance challenges to slum housing policy implementation in Maharashtra namely “Institutional challenges” and “Policy Framing Challenges”. In this section the author analyzes the BSUP Yerwada case described in Chapter-5 for these two broad issues. These issues are analyzed under four broad segments of analysis- Institutional structure, Institutional capacity, Policy design and Policy rules and regulations, a fifth segment is included to enable analysis of all local innovations, policy deviations and adaptations during implementation that might not be captured in the other four segments:

- 1) INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES:
  - Institutional Structure
  - Institutional Capacity
- 2) POLICY FRAMING CHALLENGES
  - Policy Design
  - Policy Rules and Regulations
- 3) INNOVATIONS
  - Implementation Innovations.

### INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE


- **Structure and gaps-** The case research suggests that one of the strengths of the BSUP policy is that it created an inclusive planning agenda by mandating integration of pro-poor slum community up-gradation and infrastructure provision into the City Development Plan. It also created a governance structure which would sustain this reform by decentralizing planning from the state to the city, thus bringing it closer to the influence of local representatives and their constituents who are impacted by the program. The stakeholder analysis map below (figure 6.2a & 6.2b), however, shows some key gaps.

**BSUP POLICY - STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS** *Figure 6.2a*



The policy disenfranchises the renters from the policy benefits by promoting an ownership-only model of benefits and does not offer any protections like rental caps or substitute rental housing, thus leaving some of the most vulnerable community members unprotected. Second, while the policy supports 100% consent at an individual level it does not require the formation of a Community Building Organization (CBO), therefore encouraging focus on individual benefits and lacking a mechanism to negotiate public goods for the future benefit of the community. Third, the policy leaves undefined the role of local political representatives and, as the cases reveal, these exert significant positive and negative influence on the implementation


**BSUP POLICY - STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS** Figure 6.2b




- **Structural adjustment in response to financial models** - The BSUP project contract in Yerwada is structured as a low cost limited profit financial model with a cap on overall project cost at Rs 3 lakh per housing unit inclusive of hard and soft costs. Though the project bidding was open to private contractors and civil society agencies (NGOs), the private contractors showed no interest in bidding for the project due to low profits and high risks and only a few NGOs with social motivations bid. This led to the PMC adapting its expectation and actively soliciting other local NGO interest in the project to fulfill the bid requirements. This created a selection alignment between project goals (as a social housing model with limited profit) and implementer objectives (interest in social work) through the project. The figure 6.4a and 6.4b shows how the stake holder model changed as a result of this realignment. The NGOs became the primary implementers on the project and retained contractors

for the construction work while working with the local corporator to build community consensus for the project.

**BSUP POLICY - STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS** Figure 6.4a




**BSUP POLICY - STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS** Figure 6.4b




- Structure of distributive management & responsibility** - Urban Local Body (ULB) was required to take on joint responsibility as an implementing agency along with the NGO. All contracts with the beneficiaries were signed as tripartite agreements between the NGO, PMC and the beneficiary. This joint responsibility created a sense of shared responsibility between the private implementing agency and the local government agency. This encouraged a collaborative environment for decision making and joint problem solving throughout the project. The project team at MASHAL and SPARC had direct access to the Junior Engineers at the ward office level and the rest of the PIU team and could escalate any site problems and seek clarifications as required. Similarly, the beneficiaries had direct interaction with the NGOs and the NGOs architects to resolve planning and design issues. The corporator and NGO team interacted regularly to seek any clarifications regarding disputed claims between beneficiaries etc.

**SRA POLICY - STAKEHOLDER - POWER vs INTEREST ANALYSIS** *Figure 6.5a*



**BSUP POLICY - STAKEHOLDER - POWER vs INTEREST ANALYSIS** *Figure 6.5b*




The above charts for the power-interest analysis (figure 6.5a and 6.5b) show how this power dynamic between implementing agencies in the BSUP policy compares to the SRA policy. Figure 6.5b for the BSUP policy shows how the joint contractual responsibility blurred the lines between the state and non-state actors and created better alignments for collaborative work. The SRA policy (figure 6.5a) power analysis diagram shows all state actors clustered as enablers, and all community actors and NGO clustered as the beneficiary and support group and the developer/contractor/private equity provider clustered with their consultants in a high power space with high stakes and high interest isolating themselves from the rest of the stakeholders group to enable close protection of their interests. The stakeholders in this cluster with power and interest so skewed in their favor only sought selective monetized transaction based collaborations with local corporators thus colluding for community support rather than engaging with the community for consensus building. Many SRA developments have led to legal conflicts between the developer and the community because of the coercion, corruption and opaqueness in transactions.

- **Structural transitions and challenges** - Per an interview with a consultant at the JNNURM OSD office it is clear that the transition of power and responsibilities from state to local municipality wasn't devoid of its share of power struggles. The BSUP submission required the Pune Municipal Corporation as the key government implementing agency to appoint a team of 6 dedicated Project Implementation Unit (PIU) staff for the In-situ project. However, this team never got hired, as it appears that the state

agencies insisted on influencing this hiring and the PMC did not accept the hires made by the state agency. In the end, the project ended up being handled by a zonal ward office team from Yerwada. This was a significant early setback for the project that caused delays in approvals. The final staffing for the project was not determined until a year after the initial project start date (2009). Thus, the first set of commencement certificates for construction of the phase-1 houses were not obtained until a year of the progress of the project, in spite of beneficiary consent. See figure 6.3 below depicting the staffing diagram for the entire JNNURM program that highlights (in yellow) the 6 PIU unit staff which were never hired as mandated in the policy.

**JNNURM ULB STRUCTURE** *Figure 6.3*



- Structure of distributive investment& accountability** - The BSUP program brought back public investment in housing for the urban poor. The past slum redevelopment programs (SRD and SRS) relied primarily on private investment and were supported by public land subsidy and FSI incentives. This new program created a more distributive investment structure which helped balance the power structure in governing and administering the program. The federal, state, city and beneficiary contributions were to the order of 50%, 30%, 10% and 10% respectively. This co-investment by all levels of government created a general sense of joint ownership of the project and facilitated inter-institutional co-ordination, though there continued to be some power struggles as a result of the role changes with the granting of planning and implementation powers to the ULB.

- **Structure of Representation and political bias** - Local political representatives (ward level municipal corporators), though not assigned a role in the policy, played an active role in building community consensus for the project. These leaders saw the opportunity of gaining political mileage by fronting the project and playing an active role in advocating for the benefits of the program for their constituents. At the early stage of the project they collaborated with the NGOs and architects to host large community meetings termed as “Janata Janardhan”, to help raise awareness about the benefits of the BSUP program and the eligibility requirements. Through subsequent stages of implementation they stayed engaged in the project and helped mediate to resolve conflicts, discrepancies and claims and counter claims between community members and/or implementers. Through their intervention they provided important channels of communication with the community. This has had great advantages and some negative aspects. While the implementers were helped in their task of developing consensus by these politicians, some influence of political bias, corruption and favoritism cannot be ruled out. At least 3 such instances were recorded during community interviews conducted for this research; one in Sheila Salve Nagar; one in Gandhi Nagar; and one in Mother Teresa Nagar. In one community, the corporator successfully pressured for allocation of contracts to a contractor with business associations to his son; in another instance a potential beneficiary was denied benefits because he was a close associate of the opposition party; and in a third instance a beneficiary who already owned a large pucca (stable RCC house) house received another house through this BSUP program.
- **Agency transfers and implementation challenges**- Local government agencies transfer Junior Engineers every three years. These are administrative rules that go in to effect automatically and only on special request are engineers retained on a project to complete it. This has proved to be a setback for the BSUP project, there have been 5 different engineers on the project in the last 6 years. This both reduced efficiency of the project as they suffer loss of accumulated knowledge as well as reduced responsibility and allegiance to the project. If the agency is to shift its role from being an enabler (previous role, pre-JNNURM) to an active co-implementer under the JNNURM reforms, these administrative rules of staff transfer perhaps need to be structured around projects rather than fixed tenures. The impact of agency mandated short tenures is compounded for higher level administrative officers (commissioners) in India who suffer sporadic irregular transfers due to political influence (Transfer Raj, Banik, 2001). During the span of BSUP there have been 4 municipal commissioners in Pune. One of the early proponents of the project Commissioner, Praveen Pardesi, who was

instrumental in setting up the project, was transferred within a year of the project. This also impacted the momentum of the project, in terms of the agency leadership support and interest.


### INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

- Capacity mismatch and response** - Interviews with Junior Engineers (JE) from the Pune Municipal Corporation confirmed that even though the DPR recommended staffing allotment of JE should be based on a criteria of a maximum of 100 houses assigned to each JE, the project continued to be implemented by 4 JE, with each JE having to support the review and approval of 1000 houses. JEs report that this is a typical problem with the agency (PMC), which has sufficient clerical staff but very limited technical staff to take on projects. This is an issue in decentralization raised by scholars about the lack of financial resources and human resources to support decentralization and the new roles required to be taken up by local agencies in case studies from India (Milbert, 2014). As claimed by a JE from the BSUP project, “technical staff is always overloaded in the PMC unlike what popular public perception about government agencies in India might suggest”. JEs interviewed also reported that there is a mismatch of capabilities and roles in projects assigned in the agency. A qualified engineer who should mainly be working on site quality checks and technical approvals often spend a large amount of their time dealing with paperwork for approvals and accounting etc. In the Yerwada project the JEs reported that the decision to retain a project management consultant for the project was taken because of multiple requests by the JEs on the need for additional staffing to undertake site supervision work, one of the responsibilities of the ULB. The JE acknowledged that the hiring of the Project Management Consultant under the NGO contract represents a conflict of interest, as the project manager’s responsibility is to provide independent third party quality assessment and certification of the construction work done by the NGO. This outsourcing of ULB responsibility through the NGO contract is both a result of inadequate existing human resources and resistance to hire additional staff without long term financial means to support them beyond the project term.
- Tokenism versus professionalism**- SPARC engaged local Mahila Milan contractors for building and managing the development of the housing projects it was allotted. While SPARC actively supports women’s work through this initiative, the field interviews indicate widespread dissatisfaction with the work of the Mahila Milan contractors. Their lack of training in following project documentation procedures led to significant delays in allotment of housing and the completion of the project for the beneficiaries. The municipal corporation’s engineers as well SPARC’s own consultants have expressed these concerns in the interviews. MASHAL, on the other hand, engaged a team of local contractors

supervised by their team of professional architects/ engineers and was able to achieve faster and higher degree of completion in their work. Today MASHAL has completed 1775 houses whereas SPARC has been able to complete only 693 houses. This delay has caused significant hardship to beneficiaries who have had to spend additional money for rental accommodation over extended periods of time. Even if one were to acknowledge SPARC's effort to promote tacit learning through this system of organization, the inconsistency in outcomes suggest that the organization would benefit from building institutional capacity by incorporating formal mechanisms for explicit learning and professional capacity in its organizational structure.

- **Capacity gaps and coping mechanism:** A SPARC SSNS member interviewed for the research acknowledged that MM woman contractors can take up small projects but larger projects will need outside contractors. It was also accepted that setting up a working group of the woman contractors and professionals is difficult. Professionals need to understand how to work with woman contractors they should value the interdependencies. The interviewed employee also acknowledged that they often miss documentation issues and this further delays disbursement of funds. The organization has been using large revolving fund to oversee these delays and have applied for bridge funding to meet their funding needs when there are huge delays in payment. During BSUP construction implementers often did not wait for the city engineer to come for the inspection in order to continue progress of work to the next stage. This is an issue with the multi-stage inspection process that is instituted in the project, especially when there is a lack of adequate staff at the ULB to conduct regular inspections.
- **Comparative assessment capacity and performance-** As we look at a comparative assessment of the two projects at an early stage in the project it is indicative that SPARC's performance drops relative to MASHAL's as the project progresses. The primary reason for this that came out of the research is the lack of capacity on the part of the Mahila Milan team to provide adequate documentation and coordination. As a result they have had many delays in getting approvals at every stage of the project and this has added to the backlog as the project progresses. This comparison is even starker when one looks at phase-2 projects. The graph below shows the performance gaps for the Phase-1 projects between the two agencies.

**BSUP Project- Comparative Assessment- MASHAL & SPARC 10/01/2011**



The graph to the left shows a phase wise comparative assessment of project completion rates for MASHAL and SPARC. The graph for SPARC shows a significant drop in performance at project closure i.e. much lower performance in obtaining completion certificates (CC).

This as the case research suggests could be attributed to poor documentation standards of the agency and capacity and organizational issues in the organization.


s.no.	Phase	MASHAL	SPARC	MASHAL	SPARC
1	Total	2010	1125		
2	PH-0	2009	928	100.0%	82.5%
3	Ph-1-2	2002	888	99.6%	78.9%
4	Ph-3	1957	736	97.4%	65.4%
5	Ph-4	1911	725	95.1%	64.4%
6	PH-5	1613	625	80.2%	55.6%
7	CC	1416	191	70.4%	17.0%

#### POLICY DESIGN

- Inclusive planning & Equity-** With a view to initiate urban governance reform, the JNNURM mission requires Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) to develop planning capabilities. Under this reform agenda the Pune Municipal Corporation developed a City Development Plan (CDP) in 2006. This plan documented the urban infrastructure needs for the entire city of Pune along with a detailed assessment of shelter and infrastructure needs for the urban poor in the city. The goal was to integrate the governance of informal settlements into the formal planning processes of the city. The city wide planning approach marked a shift away from the individual project based redevelopment schemes promoted by the previous Slum Redevelopment Schemes (SRD, SRS), which relied on private developer investment and real estate interests for provision of infrastructure in the redeveloped slums.
- Focus on community rehabilitation not land development –** Previous slum redevelopment programs focused on a cost recovery model through using land as a resource. The dynamics of this financial structure were focused on land readjustment to create a for sale component on the existing slum community land. The profits from the sale were used to develop 100% cross subsidized (free) housing for the poor while redistributing the land and development resources. The BSUP In-situ model

eliminated this profit incentive from land development and focused on providing housing for the existing community, thus eliminating competing land interest. The redevelopment incentives in the SRS model created perverse incentives for developers to coerce and deceive community members to enter into contracts for land development that followed regressive planning models where least amount of land and amenity resources were developed for community rehabilitation and a majority of land and housing resources were reserved for the market rate component of development.

- **Reasonable expectation and project design-** Both the EOI and the DPR state the time limit for completion of the project as 15 months but do not give any guidelines on the schedule for different stages of the project. In doing so it is clear that it continues to misread the Yerwada project as a simple green field construction project. Even though in one section it states that work shall be carried out through social mobilization, participation and bio-metric consent of the beneficiary family. From the early stages of the implementation process of the project it is clear that developing an updated socio-economic survey to ascertain eligibility, surveying the individual houses and the getting individual project and design consent for at the group and individual level for 4000 houses was in itself a 15 month process at the minimum. This brings into the question the fact whether the designers of these documents had any realistic assessment of the project process. This had a huge impact on projects financial viability especially since it did not allow for escalation of costs.
- **Avoidable uncertainty and changes-** While the Yerwada case demonstrates great flexibility and responsiveness on the part of all stakeholders to adopt and collaborate to change policy design to accommodate on ground conditions. Some drastic changes in scope were a result of poor evaluation and study of the site conditions at the early stages of the project design in formulation of the DPR and the EOI and could have been avoided. The chart below shows how drastically the unit allocation changed between different settlements as the project progressed. These changes led to several rounds of amendments to the work orders and added to project costs, delays and uncertainty, all affecting the implementation of the project.



The graph on the left shows the net change in project scope from the start of the project to the end. It however doesn't capture the number and frequency of changes that led to this net change. As the case description shows these changes happened multiple times through the duration of the project.

S. No.	Corporator	Slum name	9/7/2009	12/1/2015
Cluster-1	Shri Karne Guruji	Gandhi Nagar, Jaiprakash Nagar	120	255
Cluster-2	Shri Rajendra Endel	Balaji Nagar, Jijamata Nagar, Janta Nagar, Yashwant Nagar, Subhash Nagar, Ganesh Nagar	348	301
Cluster-3	Dr Siddharth Dhende	Nagpur Chawl	254	477
Cluster-4	Shri Sanjay Bhosale	Jaijawan Nagar, Ram Nagar, Naik Nagar, Pandu Laman Wasti, Laxmi Nagar	221	200
	Total		943	1233


- Efficiency & Funding disbursal bottlenecks-** State and central government agencies primary role was to review phase-based project status reports prepared by the ULBs in order to release funds, with no direct involvement in project monitoring. This limited engagement of state and central agencies, while beneficial in streamlining the day-to-day project implementation work, created huge bottlenecks for bill approvals and payments. Delays in bill payment ranged from 3 to 6 months as reported by NGOs. While this issue was repeatedly raised in joint meetings by the NGO, it received only limited resolution. The ULB did not have enough authority to resolve payment transfer issues and protocols at the state and central level agencies. These disbursal bottlenecks were further complicated by protocols of inward-outward recording and the use of physical true copy filing of bills rather than electronic systems for filing and processing. Figure 6.6 shows how 3 separate processing locations with hard copy physical delivery systems and inward-outward Accounting processes, 3

levels of site verification for bill approval within the local PIU created a minimum 65 day cycle for bill processing at the local level itself.

This was a significant challenge for cash strapped NGOs, projects were delayed because contractors refused to work without payments as it was difficult for them to hold on to daily wage laborers without regular payments. NGO MASHAL had to raise bridge funding from Habitat for Humanity (Mumbai based NGO) to be able to continue work on the project. Habitat for Humanity extended a Rs 4 crore interest free loan to MASHAL to be able to sustain themselves until the plinth level construction of the phase-1 houses before the government funds rolled in. SPARC, on the other hand, had already received funding for community development work and design support through a Gates Foundation Grant through Global Communities (a Pune based international NGO) and was able to carry on work in spite of the delays in government payments. However this ability of influential NGOs like SPARC to draw funds from outside also poses a challenge for forceful policy advocacy. While small NGOs like MASHAL strongly advocated for reform in this inefficient financial system on the Yerwada project and managed to receive some concessions like a mandate for 14 day cycle for PMC approvals of bills, these reforms did not get enforced because of a lack of forceful advocacy from cash rich NGOs like SPARC, thus negatively impacting collective action for the betterment of the policy.

**Bill Processing (min. 65 business day cycle) Figure 6.6**


The diagram shows the complete bill processing cycle. D – Represents 1- business day. The red arrow denotes the starting point when the NGO submits the bill to the ward office.



- **Project allocation design and its impact-** The chart below illustrates how project scope allocation differed across agencies. MASHAL had the largest share of units but they were spread over lesser

number of settlements while SPARC had fewer units and were spread over a larger number of settlements. This differential allocation probably had some impact on performance of these agencies as the SPARC had to spread their resources and manpower to deal with a larger number of stakeholders from different communities compared to MASHAL. There is no indication from the research that scope allocation design took into account capacities of NGOs at such granular level of detail of allocation.

**BSUP- Project allocation comparison- Mashal & Sparc**



The graph on the left shows the scope allocation distribution between SPARC and MASHAL. SPARC's project allocation shows that it had lesser project scope ( total number of units) over a larger number of sites at an average of 141 units /site spread over 8 sites, while MASHAL's projects scope was at 335 units per site spread over 6 sites.

#### POLICY RULES & REGULATIONS

- Need for building regulations-** The initial stages of the project implementation caused considerable confusion in reviewing building standards for the BSUP project. The policy lacked the creation of alternate design standards for such in-situ redevelopment projects. The rehabilitation designs, since they were in-place constructions, had to fit in the existing site constraints and did not meet the standard new construction project planning standards set by the National Building Code and the Development Control Regulations as mentioned in the DPR. The JEs, not willing to take action with this uncertainty, refused to sign any approvals in the initial stages of the project. It was then directed by the zonal commissioner, Mr Molak, who headed the BSUP PIU team, that the ward engineers would be authorized to approve the plans based on their discretion to meet as closely to the NBC standards as possible within the limitation of the site conditions. Thus negotiated standards were


arrived at for the BSUP project through the implementation process based on discussions between the municipal engineers and the NGO's architect. Initially, this process was on a house to house basis but later on as the project progressed it was standardized for the whole project. This put the JEs under considerable work pressure and delayed the approval process. The policy should develop alternate building standards that clearly lay out minimum building design requirements to ensure better coordinated and efficient working of the planning process of such projects.

- **Need for transit (transitional) housing-** Both projects suffered long delays due to various issues like- the need for extended time to achieve individual consent, changes due to unanticipated site conditions and delays in disbursement of funds. These delays extended the projected schedule for completion from 18 months to an average of 3-4 years for most beneficiaries. Without transit housing provision and or rental support, this caused considerable hardships and costs to beneficiaries. Most home owners ended up spending Rs 100,000 in rental expenses during this period and many who couldn't afford rental housing squatted in nearby locations in worse conditions while awaiting completion of their up-graded housing. Most renters were displaced with very few returning, as the owners increased rents post up-gradation and these were often unaffordable to renters who originally lived in the neighborhood.
- **Rulemaking and rule breaking- negotiation and flexibility in policy implementation-** The entire process of implementation of the Yerwada project was marked by rule making and rule breaking. Several new ground conditions were successfully negotiated to allow progress of work. The DPR policy outline had set a height restriction of 14' on the redeveloped properties with a goal to manage overall development and limit buildings to G+ 1 structures. This rule was changed to accommodate site conditions. Plot sizes of individual lots were often as small as 100 sft and necessitated the development of G+2 story buildings to provide for a 270sft housing unit. The NGOs successfully petitioned for the change in the rule and with the support of the PIU, a decision was taken at a standing committee meeting by vote of the city council to change the rule to allow a 30' limit to the height restriction. Here the local political representatives of the BSUP -slums played an important part in getting approvals and propagating the case for change.
- **Rule Subversion-** In complete disregard of policy mandates that allowed a maximum of 270sft to be built, a majority of households built additional floors and extensions by entering into direct contracts with the local contractor with complete knowledge of the local corporator. Many beneficiaries interviewed spent on average an additional Rs100, 000 out of pocket for this construction. A number of interviewed beneficiaries suggest the reason for this decision is to make a onetime investment to

take care of future need for expansion while taking advantage of the current construction cycle. Many took loans from family members, others used savings and still others took loans from lending sharks to get these additional floors developed. While on one hand this seems like subversion, on the other it seems like a rational decision to fulfill their needs. Many existing pucca houses in the settlement are definitely already G+2 story tall and more than 270sft in size. So it appears that the policy would be discriminating between the existing pucca houses and the beneficiaries by restricting their use. The concern however is, that these additions have been constructed in the shadows without professional consultants being engaged in supervision as it was outside the purview of the policy. If there are any conditions of structural compromise in the future, the gains of improved security and protection due to good quality housing will be lost. In the interviews, the PMC had a non-committal response when asked about regulating this condition. Multiple engineers suggested that the project doesn't have set building standards and regulations which will allow enforcement or control of such uncertified construction. They seem to suggest that once the project is de-notified and comes under the purview of the Building Department it will then be able to create and enforce a new set of building regulations for these up-graded communities.

- **Cost savings on one hand and cost in-efficiencies on the other-** Resolution #420 passed by the standing committee allowed project billing to be done in the name of the beneficiary in order for the MASHAL and later all NGOs to save on deductions of Value Added Tax on the bill payments. However this led to creation of additional paperwork as all bills now had to be generated in the name of individual beneficiaries to avoid this deduction, this also led to delays in bill disbursal. If we examine the impact this had on projects. The graphs below indicate that Type-B projects (projects with payments made to individual beneficiary accounts to avoid VAT and other Tax burden on implementers) show a significant drop in performance as the billing cycles of the project pick up. It indicates to the inefficiencies in process that this change might have led to, therefore these kinds of indirect solutions should be considered carefully before implementation, shows a case of the solution turning out to be more costly than the problem itself. See figures below that illustrate the point.


### BSUP Project- MASHAL-Financial Restructuring Impacts



The graph to the left show a comparative assessment of Type A and Type B projects. The completion status of the different phases of work show that Type-B projects suffer from delays at the tail end of the project.

Proj_Typ	Tot_DU	App_DU	Phase-0	Phase-1	Phase-2	Phase-3	Phase-4	Phase-5	Allot_itr	CC_cert
A	1819	1819	1819	1819	1819	1810	1763	1685	1656	1594
B	191	191	191	188	188	170	145	126	119	38
A+B	2010	2010	2010	2007	2007	1980	1908	1810	1775	1632
%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	99.85%	99.85%	98.48%	94.94%	90.05%	88.31%	81.19%
A		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	99.51%	96.92%	92.61%	91.04%	87.63%
B		100.00%	100.00%	98.43%	98.43%	88.74%	76.09%	65.71%	62.30%	19.90%

### BSUP Project- MASHAL- Project outstandings



The graph to the left show a comparative assessment of outstanding's for Type A and Type B projects. Type B projects show a big jump in outstanding's during the stage of obtaining completion certificates due to individualized filing and documentation systems adopted for other cost savings.

s.no.	Proj_Typ	Proj_bal	Allot_bal	CC_bal	Benf_bal
1	A	9.95%	8.96%	12.37%	6.65%
2	B	7.39%	37.70%	80.10%	32.25%
3	A+B	9.71%	11.69%	18.81%	9.08%

### IMPLEMENTATION INNOVATIONS

- **Local knowledge and data collection** - Since the project DPR did not provide detailed assessment of households at the cluster level, the NGOs developed a new updated database for verifying beneficiary

lists at the first stage of the project. Both NGOs created plane table and socio-economic surveys at the household level for each cluster to allow an in depth assessment of the project scope. The experience that SPARC and MASHAL had from survey work in slum communities in the past (through their established participatory survey methodologies) helped in expediting the process. This local knowledge and contextual familiarity of these NGOs helped them make this decision in spite of lack of support for extra funding for this service. This updated data helped eliminate some of the concerns of claims and counter claims from usage of outdated data in the project in the future. Slum settlements change on an organic incremental basis over short periods of time and use of old data could have been counterproductive to the process of implementation and is something the NGO representatives' understood well and expressed in the interview. This efficacy of this action illustrates the importance of local knowledge in making key decisions in implementation.

- **Active governance processes-** Formats and templates of forms for documentation and approvals at various stages of the project were established through active collaboration between the PIU unit and the MASHAL team as the lead implementer during the implementation process. Since there were no precedents for this project type from the past and the DPR did not establish processes in advance, the process of active engagement in governance building was key. The project would have been impossible to implement without this proactive approach to developing implementation procedures. This included developing various documentation procedures like the format for a beneficiary consent document, a demolition slip document with beneficiaries taking responsibility for demolition and a Rs 100 stamp paper allotment document as an interim measure to allow for beneficiary occupancy of completed houses while waiting to receive a final building department issued occupation certificate. These project application, approval and documentation templates were then shared with the other implementers in Yerwada at the monthly joint meetings that were held by the Municipal commissioner for all the active projects in Yerwada.
- **Design innovation- customized housing and loss of public good-** Soon after the surveys had been concluded and a Kuccha (temporary unstable housing)/ pucca (stable RCC housing) house list was developed to establish potential beneficiaries, both NGOs understood that site conditions and plot constraints would require them to develop several hundred customized individual house plans for the 4000 eligible households. This was an enormous task but early acceptance of this design direction by the implementers played an important part in ensuring project success and acceptability to the beneficiaries. Many design innovations were made as plans were developed to match each redevelopment condition, SPARC's architect developed several cluster housing plans to encourage

efficient housing plans that also allowed opportunities for street widening and creation of open space by developing shared efficiencies between contiguous housing plots. However, since the policy did not provide incentives to individual owners to accommodate group housing initiatives and or include mandates for public improvements, very few cluster designs were approved by beneficiaries and the attempt to achieve public good and greater planning efficiency was lost. These inclusions would have given considerable legitimacy and support to the efforts of the architects in building consent on such initiatives.

- **Innovation in Consensus building, need for contextual fit-** SPARC followed an extensive process of community engagement with small groups and individual beneficiaries for consultations and consent on designs at the preconstruction stage. This somewhat traditional approach to consensus building had mixed results. Beneficiary understanding of plans was limited and they lacked prior familiarity with such processes, most beneficiaries demanded changes in layouts when they visited their houses under construction. On the other hand MASHAL followed a process of limited engagement during the design stage. In the end, both agencies allowed beneficiaries to change plans during construction based on their agreement with the contractor. The case outcomes suggest that MASHAL was able to achieve a higher level of efficiency in the community consensus process through a more contextually apt process.
- **Structural innovation- Local contractor selection-** While SPARC allocated building contracts to local Mahila Milan women contractors from their construction arm (a move rife with conflict of interest), MASHAL chose to allow community members to select their own contractors from a pool of local contractors who lived in the neighborhood. This proved to be a successful strategy as it helped build confidence about the project among beneficiaries and allowed for community engagement by creating interdependencies between people from the same community, thus promoting the idea of self-development. Many beneficiary interviews suggest that neighborhood contractors were easy to communicate with, helped them in terms of flexible payment schedules and in some cases gave loans for added construction. MASHAL & SPARC also restricted the number of housing units allocated per contractor to 10-20 units. This strategy proved helpful in balancing the power distribution among a group of small contractors who had strong local ties, entrenched interests in the neighborhood and matched their capacities to their scope of work and supported implementation efficiency.
- **Innovation and Responsiveness-** Several other innovative solutions were achieved through discussion and dialogues among different parties. When the issue about the inability of NGO MASHAL to pay 2% earnest money deposit to fulfill contract conditions came up in the early stages of the project, the

local corporator of Gandhinagar suggested an innovative solution that resolved the issue. The local building contractors for the project contributed Rs 6000 per house through a security deposit on their contracts to MASHAL, who then submitted the money to fulfill the earnest money requirement for the project on its contract with the PMC. The PIU accepted the solution to enable the project to proceed. Future projects perhaps need to acknowledge that contract conditions written for NGO contracts should accommodate this funding challenge that NGOs face and perhaps allow for contractors contracts to pay for the security deposit.

- **Inter-agency negotiations and collaboration-** Through the course of the implementation several other resolutions were passed to solve the issues that came to the fore. The initiative of the Officer on Special Duty for BSUP (OSD) and the accounts team and their collaboration was key to these solutions. As the project team realized the need for retaining a third party project management agency to ensure quality control, the OSD helped pass a resolution to approve Rs 15,000 /HH as additional funds for the implementing agencies to hire an external project management consultant for the project. This greatly benefited the project implementation as it allowed a third party review of all aspects of project quality and related documentation. These included structural stability certificates, certificate of supervision of work, site inspection reports and other required documents to ensure good construction standards. Further, when the NGOs requested additional funds to cover for escalation costs, the Standing Committee supported the cause and passed resolution #2314 allotting an additional 3% project consultant fee and 2.5% structural design certification fee to the NGOs towards this from the Pune Municipal Corporation budget. Resolution # 420 accepted a plea by the implementing agencies to extend the project completion date by 2 years, to March 2014, by seeking a change from the central government.

### **Summary of the case analysis**

The case study demonstrates that decentralization and distributed management initiated by the policy helps create horizontal structures of decision making that facilitate better inter-agency coordination. Making the local government a co-implementer helped removing the boundaries that often exist between the government and the agencies they employ for project implementation. This allowed for greater coordination and collaboration between the state and non-state actors and, as the case demonstrates, by exhibiting an active form of governance building described above. Further, by allowing discretion (on deciding the appropriate regulatory application and approvals for the project) at the level of the junior engineers and the implementing agency representative, the zonal officer promoted active

problem solving at the lowest rung of decision making where the problem is most immediate . The case, however, also points out that coordination and cooperation are not automatic processes. They need to be structured and enabled. The early collaborative environment created in the project by initiating regular meetings of all stakeholders created a space for exchange of information, collective decision making and problem solving. This suggests that policies should establish some procedures for decision making.

Co-investment by a broader group of agencies (center, state, local govt. and beneficiary) led to joint sense of ownership of the project and created a balanced power structure which encouraged inter-institutional cooperation. The case, however, illustrates that one of the challenges of the co-investment strategy in the context of government agencies is that it creates overly long bureaucratic funding disbursement processes. This can be remedied by reforming the government accounting practices by promoting transparency and the use of technology and allowing for a more practical fund phasing strategy supported by a larger mobilization advance. As the literature suggests, there is an inverse relation between the number of transactions required to implement a decision and the likelihood of that effect (Elmore, 1979).

The projects demonstrate that when ground conditions like plot sizes, street widths, house types vary to such a great degree in these self-developed settlements, to enable in-situ up-gradation, the policy will need to allow for negotiated incremental standardization. It demonstrates that standardized housing solutions propagated in the official policy documents were not appropriate and were abandoned to propose customized housing solutions. This shows that policy needs to allow for both flexibility in rules perhaps an allowance for a range of housing modules (single family house, two family, multi-family housing) rather than one size fits all. The policy will also require providing for unanticipated site conditions by clearly stipulating procedures for amending rules to adapt to the context. In the Yerwada case, most rule change decisions were taken by the city council through voting process, and this required the active support of the BSUP corporators, thus the engagement of corporators in the project is essential to leverage this administrative power they possess.

However, to allow standardization within the flexible framework, the policy should mandate the formation of housing cooperatives and allow incentives for individual owners to agree to cluster housing modules. This will allow for community level collective bargaining for public goods and be supported by

incentives for individual owners to partake in the creation of public goods like street widening and open space creation. This can be done partly by strategic use of funds to affect discretionary choices at an individual owner level but also by fund allocation by the policy to initiate public space improvements even if funds will only allow for demonstration projects. The notion that individuals in a group will act rationally without motivation, incentive or coercion to achieve a common good is against the idea that individuals as rational human being act in their own self-interest (Olson, 1971). There is obviously no incentive to organize or coalesce if the interests of the individuals are achieved by purely individual unorganized action. This is one of the drawbacks of the current policy.

One of the innovations of the Yerwada project is that it supported the power of “small group” alignment by preventing it from being skewed by the direct involvement of “large outside groups and their often roving interest” (Olson, 1971), thus maintaining a kind of power balance or democracy. The MASHAL project did this by encouraging participation of small neighborhood contractors and limiting their contract to 20 houses each. The local contractor also had substantial local knowledge which was helpful in the logistics of construction in such high density limited access environments. The one large contractor that SPARC employed abandoned the job due to their inability to deal with local logistics of construction staging. This emphasizes the significance of local knowledge and the importance of local ties at the neighborhood level. The local contractors had their interest entrenched in the neighborhood and the opportunity to develop the project helped them build social and economic capital simultaneously. The policy can incorporate this strategy to facilitate local capacity building and knowledge in all its projects.

One of the key points that rises from this case is the understanding that community engagement and consent building requires time and money. It took more than one year to get consent on the project and on the individual house designs from the beneficiaries. Today slum policy acknowledges and mandates community consensus building but does not account for it with reference to funding or time allocation in the project process, thus shortchanging the goal. SPARC was able to develop an extensive consultative design process with the community because it had outside funding from another NGO and this led to a number of design innovations in the project. Other implementing agencies were unable to do so, not because of lack of motive but because of lack of funding and process that allowed this. Policy making agencies that do not understand these on-the-ground realities try to fix behavior by mandating shorter project schedules or not mandating them in the project schedules, it may cause shortchanging of

processes and procedures required to achieve consensus. This is evident from the limited community engagement processes in slum redevelopment projects discussed earlier.

The policy does not assign or acknowledge the role of the local political representatives in policy implementation. However, the early adopters (i.e., supporting corporators) in Yerwada saw that their alignment with the BSUP policy and active engagement in the development of their constituency could achieve great political gain for them. The in-situ project development plan allowed them to strengthen and maintain their political constituency, unlike the relocation and redevelopment programs which, while allowing narrow monetary gains, often diminish their political strengths. The early adopter corporators saw this opportunity and actively aligned and supported the program. As the project progressed, many other corporators were jostling for more units to be allotted in their constituency. The redevelopment or relocation program dismantles this possibility for the local politician. Most corporators played a positive role in the project at Yerwada as detailed above. If their role is formalized as the local promoter or consensus building supporter then perhaps some of the negative impacts of their political influence can also be kept in check in future implementations.

While NGOs are evolving as a new non-profit construction sector in India, the case studies show that they are challenged by lack of professional capacity, construction experience and manpower issues. This can have a negative impact on the project schedules and project costs. In Yerwada the most negative impact of this capacity issue was that beneficiary house completions were delayed by more than 2 years, leading to hardships and extra cost. However, there seems to be a lack of interest from the established for-profit construction sector to diversify into non-profit construction work and NGO led construction might be the only recourse for now. This requires that the policy should at least facilitate joint ventures which allow NGO and private sector contractor collaborations on such projects to support social housing development on the merits of their individual strengths as social sector and construction sector leaders respectively. The BSUP contract terms could perhaps remove this joint venture restriction. Government policies that encourage the development of a non-profit housing construction sector should also be pursued with the larger aim of developing market capacity for the production of social housing.

### **Conclusion: Is Governance building key to Implementation?**

The Yerwada case study shows that governance building requires horizontal structures of decision making. Creating horizontal structures requires careful balancing of roles and responsibilities among

multiple agencies involved in the implementation process. Governance building also needs to carefully balance power structures to allow for cooperation and collaboration and prevent the project from being skewed towards outside interests, which might diminish the alignment of small local actors. It requires a form of distributive management where rights and responsibilities are balanced at all levels of the power structure. It requires flexibility in rules so they can be applicable over a wide range of conditions and allow for discretion in the application of these rules. Policy can also recognize that local actors might be in the best position to make decisions that are informed by local knowledge. Local actors might also be the most reliable implementers, as their interests are entrenched in the neighborhood, locality or region. This approach also allows support for local capacity building and creation of interdependencies which support collective good. However, this power given to the local actors also needs to be balanced in order to prevent abuse due to local politics, alliances and allegiances. While structural balance is necessary, alignments can be achieved if the policy focuses on setting up processes which support collective action and collaboration.

In implementation, “process” is as important as “structure” in supporting policy outcomes. Policy needs to support changes in its own constitution and set in place processes for appeal, amendment and rule changes to ensure that outcomes fit the context and not the policy. Governance building in marginal communities is especially relevant in this context as it allows for a process of incremental integration of these communities into the mainstreams of society, economics, politics and development, thus allowing legitimacy and inclusion. It also enables a process for repairing their trust in formal structures, building and supporting their capacity and knowledge by providing them pathways for co-governance and co-development which might not have been available before. More importantly, it builds local capacity at various institutional levels as well. Local governments are given the mandate to plan & implement; local businesses (contractors, suppliers) are encouraged to participate; and civil society is engaged in supporting social cause through public policy. And, also importantly, the Yewada case demonstrates that democratic governance building processes that allow transparency, efficiency, representation, responsiveness, accountability and equity in marginal communities can support successful policy implementation.

The thesis has attempted to link the literature on implementation research in public administration to the literature in governance building to understand how public administration can use co-governance/democratic governance as an implementation strategy for public policy administration. The

case study also highlights how the boundaries between the government and the governed are increasingly blurred today. The analysis demonstrates how government acting as enabler and relying on multi-party agents for administering public policy, can do so effectively. It expands the notion of governance from the community (the governed) and the government (the governing) binary to all the co-governance actors involved in implementation: the private for-profit agents, the civil society agencies, the local political actors, and the technical experts or technocrats. The research shows how 5 different mechanisms of decision making operate in such conditions: command (rule based); solidarity (community or organization based); persuasion (idea based); monetized exchange (commercial based); and non-monetized exchange (Levi-Faur, 2012). Each co-governing agent works on a decision making mechanism that aligns closest with their goals. The for-profit developer might work primarily through a monetized transaction mode; the civil society agent might work through a non-monetized mode; and yet also be a transaction oriented mode; the local politician might work on both a solidarity and the monetized mode; the beneficiary will work primarily in a monetized mode, the technical expert mainly works on a persuasion mode; and the public administrator might still work on a command mode though with increasing levels of transaction oriented dealings to incentivize compliance.

### **Key findings and Lessons**

To summarize the findings, 5 takeaways can be defined for how local governance building enables policy implementation-

- 1) **Structure-** Distributive management and investment strategies if carefully structured through a power interest analysis matrix can help prevent skewed power relations and engender co-governance, create inter-dependencies and propagate high degree of collaboration and cooperation among local stakeholders in a multi-agency implementation system. In consensus building large group and small group dynamics serve different purposes. Large groups can help raise awareness and small groups can take action and make decisions.
- 2) **Capacity-** Implementer's roles, motives, capacities and interests influence outcomes. Therefore there is a need to align roles and goals to effect implementation. Local capacity building is essential for efficient implementation and needs to be supported by appropriate funding, efficient structuring, quality procurement and expedient fund disbursement mechanisms. Organizations cannot rely on culture alone to support implementation; they need to build institutional capacity.
- 3) **Design –** Clear definition of policy goals and objectives is essential to ensure policy success. To operationalize policy objectives supportive strategies need to be clearly outlined. Evidence based

policy making is essential to ensure alignment with local context. A realistic assessment of local implementation conditions should inform policy design with reference to schedules, procedures, allocations and outcome.

- 4) **Rules-** Rules cannot control outcomes. Rigid rules need reconsideration; flexible frameworks might better support implementation. Rules need to balance between defining outcomes and defining guidelines and engagement processes, to ensure consistency in outcome through engagement in policy governance processes.
- 5) **Innovation-** Local knowledge is needed to adapt implementation decisions and participatory strategies to specific contextual conditions. Discretion and local partner engagement at the lowest rung of implementation is essential for this process and should be encouraged by laying out procedures for rule change and adaptation. Improved transparency, information sharing and responsiveness lead to innovative collaboration.

#### **Need for further research**

The Yerwada case study supports the claim that democratic governance building processes, which can be studied through a backward mapping approach to decision making, help in policy implementation, especially in conditions that require multi-party implementation and where the ground conditions might show significant heterogeneity and variations in needs and requirements. However, the case study also points to the fact that implementation is impacted by organizational capacity and culture. Thus the research implies that policy needs to consider all five key elements in governance building to effect implementation impact: structure, capacity, design, rules and innovation. The thesis acknowledges that research from two cases cannot claim generalizability. More research needs to be done in this area to develop the ideas proposed and enable effective ways to achieve governance building that supports successful policy implementation.

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
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## Summary of Findings

### A Cross-Comparison of 11 Cities: Physical Progress

Cities	Slum HHs	No. of Slums	No. of In-Situ Sites	No. of Relocation Sites	DUs Sanctioned	Status of DUs			
						Complete	Ongoing	Cancelled	Occupied
Asansol	57479	499	26	No Data	9219	1916	1321	0	1090
Bhopal	1,83,989	380	No Data	No Data	23609	4708	11743	0	1639
Bhubaneswar	69874	332	3	1	2153	660	1275	0	0
Jaipur	43718	231	No Data	5	5814	0	1320	0	0
Madurai	80352	208	131	1	24332	9019	9559	0	7396
Nagpur	1,13,345	427	3	0	16186	11	152	0	0
Patna	1,73,000	52	No Data	No Data	20372	352	48	32	0
Pune	2,04,601	564	27	5	12576	3356	4396	0	475
Puri	6759	63/46	9	0	355	15	53	70	0
Raipur	26899	192/282	44	17	30000	0	13090	16910	0
Vishakapatnam	1,89,287	741	No Data	No Data	24423	20992	3431	0	2150




Please note that all physical progress data was obtained from the progress tables provided to us by MoHUPA. The projects included in these calculations are only related to housing. Where possible, we have found out actual figures from the respective city municipalities which may vary from the 'official numbers' and mostly refers to specific projects than an overview of the city BSUP work. These and all sources for other data related to population statistics are detailed out in the individual city reports.

## Summary of Findings

### A Cross-Comparison of 11 Cities: Financial Progress

Cities	Amount Sanctioned (Cr.)					Funds Released	Expenses (Cr.)
	GOI	State	ULB	People	TOTAL		
Asansol	111.98	No Data	No Data	No Data	225.56	50.21	No Data
Bhopal	212.29	No Data	No Data	No Data	362.84	137.57	250.71
Bhubaneswar	46.1	10.9	3.1	3.4	63.5	21.8	17
Jaipur	88.1	37.4	42.1	14	181.5	22	2.67
Madurai	165.64	No Data	No Data	No Data	346.95	143.6	No Data
Nagpur	333.29	No Data	No Data	No Data	729.59	83.3	No Data
Patna	274.1	252.3	88.7	40.5	655.4	68.5	13
Pune	142.98	88.43	44.15	27.6	303.16	55.5	139.40
Puri	8	2.1	0.4	0.5	11	2	1.4
Raipur	365	52.4	12.1	32.9	462.5	169.3	120.7
Vishakapatnam	207.96	No Data	No Data	No Data	539.35	154.26	No Data



Please note that all financial progress data was obtained from the progress tables provided to us by MoHUPA. The projects included in these calculations are only related to housing. Where possible, we have found out actual figures from the respective city municipalities which may vary from the 'official numbers' and mostly refers to specific projects than an overview of the city BSUP work. These and all sources for other data related to population statistics are detailed out in the individual city reports.

## Appendix -1C

STATUS OF INSITU SLUM HOUSING PROJECT WITH PEOPLES PARTICIPATION FOR ALL NGOS FOR PMC UNDER BSUP(II) JN-NURM.							Date: 20/02/ 2015
TOTAL HOUSES SANCTIONED BY THE CENTRAL GOVT. - 4000 HOUSES							
Sr.No.	PARTICULARS →	Progress of work of concerned NGOs( All figures are number of houses)					
	Name of the NGO	MASHAL	SPARC	VRP	SUBHAS JAGTAP	SEWA	TOTAL
1	No of houses allotted	2010 (50.25%)	1125 (28.13%)	466(11.65%)	399 (9.98%)	Cancelled	4,000(100%)
2	SD/PGD deposited with PMC (Rs.)	Rs. 2.18 Cr.	Rs. 0.88 Cr.	Rs. 0.18 Cr.	Rs. 0.00 Cr.	Rs. 0.06 Cr.	Rs. 3.24 Cr.
3	Work area	Yerawada / Sangamwadi	Yerwada	Yerwada	Tajjai	Yeravada	Yerawada / Sangamwadi/ Tajjai
4	a) Works as per Old Resolution 2314	1819 (90.55%)	697 (61.95%)	151(32.40%)	0 (00%)	-	2706 (70.97%)
	b) Works as per Resolution 420	191 (9.45%)	428 (38.04%)	315(67.68%)		-	1107 (29.03%)
5	Building Permissions received	2010 (100%)	1093 (100%)	441 (100%)	212 (100%)	-	3783(92.58%)
Progress of work on site							
1	Demolisation Completed	2010 (100.00%)	946 (84.08%)	421 (90.34%)	202 (50.62%)	-	3579 (89.47%)
2	Footings Completed	2007 (99.85%)	936 (83.02%)	419 (89.91%)	202 (50.62%)	-	3564 (89.01%)
3	Plinths Completed	2007 (99.85%)	936 (83.02%)	419 (89.91%)	202 (50.62%)	-	3564 (89.01%)
4	R C C Slabs Completed	1995 (99.25%)	787 (69.95%)	358 (76.82%)	200 (50.12%)	-	3340 (83.45%)
5	Brik Work/Plaster Completed	1952 (97.11%)	765 (68.00%)	306 (65.66%)	190 (47.61%)	-	3113 (80.32%)
6	Door/Windows Completed	1845 (91.79%)	687 (61.06%)	259 (55.57%)	187 (46.86%)	-	2978 (74.17%)
7	Houses Completed	1775 (88.30%)	684 (60.08%)	230 (49.353%)	187 (46.86%)	-	2876 (71.04%)
8	Completion Certificate Received	1633 (81.24%)	189 (16.08%)	29 (6.22%)	0	-	1850 (49.25%)
9	Amount Received from PMC	Rs. 46.94 Cr	Rs.17.18 Cr	Rs.9.28 Cr	Rs. 3.22 Cr	-	Rs. 76.62 Cr
10	Amount Received from Beneficiaries	Rs. 6.07 Cr (90.88%)	2.25 Cr (22.82%)	1.65 Cr (15.75%)	-	-	Rs. 9.97 (100%)

Image courtesy Pune Municipal Corporation- Project status report- 20/02/2015.

## Appendix -2

### VERBAL CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW

Thank you for agreeing to speak with me. I am conducting this research in relation to my studies within the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). The results of this study will include my analysis of the implementation process of the Slum Up gradation Policy in Pune as my Master's Thesis. The purpose of the study is to explore how rules and processes outlined in the policy interact with on ground conditions and the challenges that face the implementing agencies, stakeholders and community members is achieving beneficial outcomes. This analysis seeks to inform and recommend a better slum up-gradation policy implementation protocol. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your involvement in the implementation efforts for the case study project.

I am going to read you a few statements. Please let me know if you have questions regarding any of them.

- This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any time or for any reason. I expect that the interview will take about one hour.
- You will not be compensated for this interview
- Unless you give us permission to use your name, title, and or quote you in any publications that may result from this research, the information you tell us will be confidential.
- I would like to record this interview so that I can use it for reference while proceeding with this study. I will not record this interview without your permission. If you do grant permission for this conversation to be recorded, you have the right to revoke recording permission and/or end the interview at any time.

This project will be completed by May, 2015. All interview recordings will be stored in a secure workspace until 3 years after that date. The tapes will then be destroyed. Do you have any questions?

- 1) Do you agree to participate in the interview?
- 2) Do I have permission to record this interview?
- 3) Please let me know what you are comfortable including in any publications:
  - a. Your name?
  - b. Your title?
  - c. Direct quotes from the interview?

## Appendix-3

### Questionnaire- An outline of questions for a semi-structured interview.

#### 1. Role of the participant/organization

- 1.1 Could you tell us about the role of your organization in this project?
  - 1.1.1 Has your organization worked with this community before?
    - 1.1.1.1 If yes, for how long and in what capacity?
  - 1.1.2 How familiar is your organization with this city and city agencies?
    - 1.1.2.1 Which city agencies did you interact with during this stage of the project?
    - 1.1.2.2 Was there intergovernmental coordination between the different agencies?
  - 1.1.3 Has your organization been involved in such up gradation projects before?
    - 1.1.3.1 If yes, where and in what capacity, could you give us an overview?
    - 1.1.3.2 What is your motivation to be part of this project?
- 1.2 Could you elaborate on your role in the organization?
- 1.3 What was your background prior to coming to this organization?
  - 1.3.1 Can you talk about your training and work experience in this sector?
  - 1.3.2 How has your experience been in implementing the project?
- 1.4 What is the internal decision making structure in your organization?
- 1.5 Was your organization and you able to assume your role in the process?
  - 1.5.1.1 What were the tasks you had to accomplish in this step of the project?
  - 1.5.1.2 Could you list the steps you took to accomplish the tasks?

#### 2. Rules and the Implementation process

- 2.1 What is the goal of this step of the implementation process?
  - 2.1.1 Are the goals clearly stated in the policy?
  - 2.1.2 Who was the main agency responsible for the implementation of this stage of the project?
- 2.2 What are the rules governing this stage of the project?
  - 2.2.1 Could you elaborate on your understanding of the rules governing this stage?
  - 2.2.2 Did the rules help achieve the goal/outcome?
- 2.3 Who established the rules?
  - 2.3.1 Were you consulted in the rule making process?
  - 2.3.2 Who enforces the rules? And how?

2.3.3 Who has the authority to change/adapt the rules?

2.3.4 Did you have access to the rule making agency to change/adapt rules?

2.4 Do the rules match the local context?

2.4.1 If not how don't they match where are the areas of concern?

2.4.2 What would you say is the level of compatibility? High? Low? Medium?

2.4.3 Do the rules allow flexibility?

2.4.4 Do the rules allow you discretion in implementation of the project?

2.4.4.1 Did you have the freedom to make decisions based on the ground conditions?

2.4.4.2 For the rules that did not fit with the policy framework?

2.4.4.2.1 How did you adapt the rule?

2.4.4.2.2 What was the process of changing and adapting rules to ground conditions?

2.4.4.2.3 Was it efficient? How much time and resources did it take? Did it delay the project? What was the impact/outcome?

### 3. Collaboration & Stake holder interactions

3.1 Which other stake holders were involved in this step?

3.2 What was the role of other stakeholders vis a vis your role?

3.3 Did the process support transparent exchange of information between stakeholders?

3.3.1 How was the information exchanged?

3.3.2 Were you given time to verify the information?

3.3.3 How was the information helpful to you?

3.4 Did you collaborate with other stakeholders?

3.4.1 How did you collaborate & communicate?

3.4.2 Did you have direct access to all stakeholders?

3.5 Were political representatives involved in the process?

3.5.1 What was their role?

3.5.2 How did they facilitate the process?

3.5.3 Was it helpful?

3.6 Were there any unexpected leaders that emerged from among the stakeholders?

3.6.1 What positive role did they play?

### 4. Accountability & Equity

4.1 Was there an approval/consent process for this stage of implementation?

- 4.1.1 Who approved?
- 4.1.2 What was the process?
- 4.1.3 Who all were involved?
- 4.2 What were you accountable for?
  - 4.2.1 Achieving the Deliverables?
  - 4.2.2 Following the rules?
- 4.3 Who were you accountable to?
  - 4.3.1 Your organization's goals?
  - 4.3.2 The community?
  - 4.3.3 The process?
  - 4.3.4 The rules?
  - 4.3.5 The policy goals?
  - 4.3.6 Other stakeholders?
- 4.4 Equity- Did the project distributes resources fairly among community?
  - 4.4.1 Were all members of the community represented in the participatory process?
  - 4.4.2 Were all members informed about the project?
  - 4.4.3 How did they receive the information?
  - 4.4.4 Did the process seek their input?
  - 4.4.5 Did their input impact decision making/outcome of the project?
  - 4.4.6 How was consensus achieved?
  - 4.4.7 Who represented the community?
    - 4.4.7.1 How were the representatives chosen? Was there voting?
    - 4.4.7.2 Did men/women, seniors, differently abled, minorities & the poorest get fair representation?
  - 4.4.8 Who signed off on the plans?
- 5. Efficiency**
  - 5.1 Did you have all the information you needed to accomplish your task in this step?
  - 5.2 How much time did you have to accomplish the task?
    - 5.2.1 Was the time sufficient for the task at hand?
  - 5.3 Did you have sufficient resources in house to implement the task?
  - 5.4 Did you face any obstacles?
    - 5.4.1 If yes, What were they? Time? Funding? Resources? Information? goals?

- 5.4.2 How did you overcome the obstacle?
- 5.4.3 Did you partner with other organizations to accomplish your role? Did the policy promote this?

## 6. Outcomes

- 6.1 What were the results of your work?
  - 6.2 Did what you hope, get accomplished?
  - 6.3 Were there any unexpected outcomes?
    - 6.3.1 Were they negative or positive?
    - 6.3.2 How did they happen?
  - 6.4 What are your learnings from the implementation?
    - 6.4.1 What would you do to achieve better process and outcomes?
    - 6.4.2 Are outcomes in the line with community needs and or policy or both?
    - 6.4.3 Can you think of any changes in the rule or the process of implementation that can help you better achieve the goals?
7. Would you like to receive a copy of this paper once completed for your records?
- Thank you very much for your time and support.