Advanced Search
DSpace@MIT

Issues in objectivity and mind-dependence

Research and Teaching Output of the MIT Community

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Stephen Yablo and Sally Haslanger. en_US
dc.contributor.author Botchkina, Ekaterin en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2017-03-10T15:05:36Z
dc.date.available 2017-03-10T15:05:36Z
dc.date.copyright 2016 en_US
dc.date.issued 2016 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107329
dc.description Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2016. en_US
dc.description Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (pages 90-93). en_US
dc.description.abstract Reality and objectivity are often characterized in terms of independence from the mind: the first-pass idea is that what it takes for any particular subject matter to be real and objective is for facts about it to obtain independently of beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on. But if we take seriously the possibility that significant realms of reality, including social kinds, judgment-dependent properties, and mental phenomena themselves, stand in various dependence relations to the mental, then this first-pass characterization needs to be significantly revised. In this set of papers, I consider the special questions that metaphysically mind-dependent entities raise for issues of objectivity and realism. In Part 1, 1 substantiate the notion of metaphysical mind-dependence with a taxonomy of the various ways in which entities can stand in metaphysical relations of dependence to mental phenomena. In Part II, I address the question of realism and mind-dependence: I argue that while certain entities stand in relations of significant, direct, and essential dependence on mental activity, they are nevertheless fully real. In making the argument, I elaborate a distinction between enactive and essential dependence on mental phenomena, arguing that both kinds of dependence may obtain without impinging on an entity's reality. In Part III, I address the question of objectivity and mind-dependence: I argue that certain kinds of mind-dependence, in particular, dependence on judgments, have the effect of undermining the objectivity of the relevant domain. One consequence of the view I develop is that the objectivity of a subject matter can come apart from the reality of its associated entities; another is that objectivity is a feature that is relative, rather than absolute, and depends crucially on which perspectives are brought to bear for the purposes of evaluation. en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibility by Ekaterina Botchkina. en_US
dc.format.extent 93 pages en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology en_US
dc.rights MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. en_US
dc.rights.uri http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 en_US
dc.subject Linguistics and Philosophy. en_US
dc.title Issues in objectivity and mind-dependence en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.description.degree Ph. D. en_US
dc.contributor.department Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy. en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 972902407 en_US


Files in this item

Name Size Format Description
972902407-MIT.pdf 7.168Mb PDF Full printable version

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

MIT-Mirage