Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorJeffrey A. Hoffman and Roy E. Welsch.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchlegelmilch, Barret Williamen_US
dc.contributor.otherLeaders for Global Operations Program.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-17T15:52:42Z
dc.date.available2018-09-17T15:52:42Z
dc.date.copyright2018en_US
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117986
dc.descriptionThesis: M.B.A., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, in conjunction with the Leaders for Global Operations Program at MIT, 2018.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, in conjunction with the Leaders for Global Operations Program at MIT, 2018.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (page 65).en_US
dc.description.abstractA hazard analysis for the test firing of NASA's Space Launch System core stage is performed using a systems-based alternative to the traditional reliability-based method. The method used, Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), is shown to be a versatile and powerful tool in this application and by extension the development of future space launch vehicles. The Boeing Company has been selected by NASA as the prime contractor for the Space Launch System (SLS) cryogenic stages. As such, they are working with NASA to develop a comprehensive hazard analysis for core stage test firing and eventual launch operations. Developing, testing, and launching rockets is an inherently complex and high risk endeavor. Preceding the launch itself, one of the highest risk times in the operation of a rocket is the static fire testing, also called a hot fire. Hundreds of parameters need to be monitored in real time in order to ensure the system is operating nominally and equipment damage (and possible injury or death) will not occur. Depending on the point of the testing and the resultant speed at which events are occurring, different levels of automatic safing conditions and operator actions are required to protect the vehicle. Traditionally, the way these safing conditions are derived is through the evaluation of hazard reports, which are themselves based on a "reliability" model: hazards are seen to arise from the failure of individual components and are thus primarily mitigated through increasing component reliability or adding in redundancy. With the level of complexity and required safety of today's launch systems, it is beneficial to evaluate a new approach to identifying the underlying hazards in a system, including ones that arise from unsafe component interactions and not simply failuresen_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Barret William Schlegelmilch.en_US
dc.format.extent65 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectSloan School of Management.en_US
dc.subjectAeronautics and Astronautics.en_US
dc.subjectLeaders for Global Operations Program.en_US
dc.titleA framework for safe system design in space launch vehiclesen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeM.B.A.en_US
dc.description.degreeS.M.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentLeaders for Global Operations Program at MITen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Management
dc.identifier.oclc1051238542en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record