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dc.contributorEllerman, A. Denny.en_US
dc.contributorSue Wing, Ian.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2003-10-24T14:56:29Z
dc.date.available2003-10-24T14:56:29Z
dc.date.issued2000-04en_US
dc.identifier.otherno. 59en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a59en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3587
dc.descriptionAbstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/)en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. 16).en_US
dc.description.abstractArticle 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B parties to meet their commitments by trading greenhouse gas emissions reductions "supplemental" to domestic emissions control. We demonstrate that implementing supplementarity by imposing concrete ceilings on imports of allowances in a market for tradable emissions rights gives rise to monopsonistic effects, even with price-taking behavior by both buyers and sellers. We assess the importance of this finding for Annex B emissions trading, in the context of the import and export provisions of the recent EU Proposal on supplementarity. Our results show that the proposal would reduce efficiency, and could significantly alter the distribution of the gains from trade in an Annex B tradable permits market.en_US
dc.format.extent21 p.en_US
dc.format.extent1386247 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Changeen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesReport no. 59en_US
dc.subject.lccQC981.8.C5.M58 no.59en_US
dc.titleSupplementarity : an invitation to monopsony?en_US
dc.title.alternativeInvitation to monopsony?en_US


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