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Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony?

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dc.contributor Ellerman, A. Denny. en_US
dc.contributor Sue Wing, Ian. en_US 2003-10-24T14:56:29Z 2003-10-24T14:56:29Z 2000-04 en_US
dc.identifier.other no. 59 en_US
dc.identifier.uri en_US
dc.description Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website ( en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (p. 16). en_US
dc.description.abstract Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B parties to meet their commitments by trading greenhouse gas emissions reductions "supplemental" to domestic emissions control. We demonstrate that implementing supplementarity by imposing concrete ceilings on imports of allowances in a market for tradable emissions rights gives rise to monopsonistic effects, even with price-taking behavior by both buyers and sellers. We assess the importance of this finding for Annex B emissions trading, in the context of the import and export provisions of the recent EU Proposal on supplementarity. Our results show that the proposal would reduce efficiency, and could significantly alter the distribution of the gains from trade in an Annex B tradable permits market. en_US
dc.format.extent 21 p. en_US
dc.format.extent 1386247 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Report no. 59 en_US
dc.subject.lcc QC981.8.C5.M58 no.59 en_US
dc.title Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony? en_US
dc.title.alternative Invitation to monopsony? en_US

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