Advanced Search
DSpace@MIT

Price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market

Research and Teaching Output of the MIT Community

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Georgia Perakis. en_US
dc.contributor.author Sun, Wei, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computation for Design and Optimization Program. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2007-10-19T20:31:44Z
dc.date.available 2007-10-19T20:31:44Z
dc.date.copyright 2006 en_US
dc.date.issued 2006 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/39211
dc.description Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Computation for Design and Optimization Program, 2006. en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-110). en_US
dc.description.abstract The price of anarchy quantifies the inefficiency that occurs in the total system objective in the user optimization as compared to the system optimization setting. It is well known that this inefficiency occurs due to lack of coordination among the competitors in the system. In this thesis, we study the price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market by comparing the total profits in the two settings. The main contribution of this thesis is a lower and an upper bound for the price of anarchy that only depends on the price sensitivity matrix characterizing the demand sellers face. We first derive these bounds for a symmetric affine demand model. Using the same approach, we also provide a lower bound for asymmetric affine demand as well as a lower and an upper bound for nonlinear demand. These bounds are easy to compute. In addition, we illustrate that the worst-case price of anarchy value occurs for a uniform demand model when quality differences do not exist among sellers. This implies that in many real-world instances where quality differences exist, the performance under the user optimization may in fact be close to what is achieved under system optimization. We illustrate several insights on the bounds we present through simulations. en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibility by Wei Sun. en_US
dc.format.extent 110 p. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology en_US
dc.rights M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. en_US
dc.rights.uri http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subject Computation for Design and Optimization Program. en_US
dc.title Price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.description.degree S.M. en_US
dc.contributor.department Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computation for Design and Optimization Program. en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 85843772 en_US


Files in this item

Name Size Format Description
85843772.pdf 2.942Mb PDF Preview, non-printable (open to all)
85843772-MIT.pdf 2.942Mb PDF Full printable version (MIT only)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

MIT-Mirage