dc.contributor.advisor | Elena Obukhova. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Murphy, Shannon A | en_US |
dc.contributor.other | Sloan School of Management. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-13T18:59:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-13T18:59:50Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 2012 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72891 | |
dc.description | Thesis (M.B.A.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2012. | en_US |
dc.description | Page 52 blank. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. | en_US |
dc.description | Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-51). | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Sovereign wealth accounts for a massive, and growing, source of global financial capital. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) hold about $5 trillion in assets, nearly double the aggregated assets of the global hedge fund community. Sovereign capital is markedly more concentrated among a relatively small number of sovereign funds (about 40) as opposed to the nearly 7,000 global hedge funds. The concentration and use of these resources has a considerable impact not just on the world's capital markets, but on foreign policy as well. This paper explores the extent to which sovereign funds are embodying a "double bottom line" investment approach that allows them to reap financial and strategic benefits simultaneously. Some SWFs are not only earning excess financial returns, but have accrued political influence ("intimidation by implication") and a greater ability to meet broader sovereign needs as a result of their size, positioning and investment patterns. Power theory helps to explain, in part, how and why a sovereign double bottom line occurs. Because SWF portfolios remain largely opaque, the paper relies on available public information about SWFs in China, Abu Dhabi and Qatar to examine the extent to which SWFs are benefitting from political and/or policy payoffs alongside their financial returns. Because some critics deem the use of SWFs to serve national strategic goals as potentially destabilizing to global financial markets, this is a controversial idea. Yet while state actors may merit a particularly watchful eye, their actions are in fact no more threatening than those of other market participants. SWFs are as legitimate a tool of statecraft as other financial foreign policy implements. Sovereign funds are shaping a new normal in geoeconomics, in which states lacking the financial resources to pursue this double bottom line may find themselves at a disadvantage in foreign policy circles, and ultimately in the ability to serve the long term needs of their citizens. It is possible that in the 2 1st Century, the market will not be guided by the "invisible hand," but instead by Leviathan's. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 52 p. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology | en_US |
dc.rights | M.I.T. theses are protected by
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but
reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written
permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 | en_US |
dc.subject | Sloan School of Management. | en_US |
dc.title | Leviathan's double bottom line : Sovereign wealth funds as tools of strategic statecraft by Shannon A. Murphy. | en_US |
dc.title.alternative | Leviathan's double bottom line : SWFs as tools of strategic statecraft | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.description.degree | M.B.A. | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Sloan School of Management | |
dc.identifier.oclc | 808385758 | en_US |