



1 



Introduction to Game Theory [1 lecture] 








2 



Payoffs in Games: Rational Choice Under Uncertainty [1 lecture]
 Expected Utility theory; risk aversion. Kreps, Chapters 3.13.3
 Applications; risk sharing, insurance, option value









3 



A More Formal Introduction to Games [3 lectures]
 Extensive forms and normal forms. Gibbons, Chapters 1.1A and 2.1A
 Strategies, dominant strategies and iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Gibbons 1.1B
 Nash Equilibrium. Gibbons 1.1C
 Applications of Nash Equilibrium. Gibbons 1.2









4 



Backward Induction, Subgame Perfection, and Forward Induction [3 lectures]
 Analysis of extensiveform games. Gibbons 2.1A
 Backward induction
 Subgame perfection. Gibbons 2.2A
 Applications. Gibbons 2.2B, C, D and 2.1B, C
 Bargaining and negotiations. Gibbons 2.1D
 Forward induction
 Applications









5 



The First Midterm 








6 



Repeated Games and Cooperation [2 lectures]. Gibbons 2.3 








7 



Incomplete Information [2 lectures]
 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Gibbons 3.1A, C
 Auctions
 Applications. Gibbons 3.2









8 



Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information [2 lectures]
 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Gibbons 4.1
 Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information. Gibbons 4.3B









9 



The Second Midterm 








10 



Reputation [1 lecture]. Gibbons 4.3C 








11 



Problems of Asymmetric Information in Economics [3 lectures]
 Signaling and the Intuitive Criterion. Gibbons 4.2A and 4.4
 Applications of signaling. Gibbons 4.2B, C
 The principalagent problem. Kreps, Chapter 17
 Applications; lemons, efficiency wages, creditrationing, pricediscrimination









12 



Final Exam 








13 



Evolutionary foundations of equilibrium; evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics [2 lectures] 



