14.126 Game Theory, Spring 2010

Author(s)
Manea, Mihai; Yildiz, Muhamet
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Alternative title
Game Theory
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Abstract
This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.
Date issued
2010-06
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/106995
Other identifiers
14.126-Spring2010
local: 14.126
local: IMSCP-MD5-24fdcb65bcc6d17593cc3b9d6a3e3024
Keywords
extensive-form games, Nash equilibria, evolutionary equilibria, bargaining with incomplete information, rationalizability, non-cooperative games, 110401
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