dc.contributor.author | Holmstrom, Bengt | |
dc.coverage.temporal | Spring 2003 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-09-25T05:54:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-09-25T05:54:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-06 | |
dc.identifier | 14.124-Spring2003 | |
dc.identifier.other | 14.124 | |
dc.identifier.other | IMSCP-MD5-067477270b245800e8db4a6d48024168 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/111631 | |
dc.description.abstract | The topic of the class is information economics. The purpose is to give an introduction to some of the main subjects in this field: risk sharing, moral hazard, adverse selection (signaling, screening), mechanism design, decision making under uncertainty. These subjects (and others) will be treated in more depth in the advanced theory courses on Contract Theory. | en |
dc.language.iso | en-US | |
dc.relation.hasversion | http://www.core.org.cn/OcwWeb/Economics/14-124Microeconomic-Theory-IVSpring2003/CourseHome/index.htm | |
dc.relation.hasversion | http://www2.myoops.org/twocw/mit/Economics/14-124Microeconomic-Theory-IVSpring2003/CourseHome/index.htm | |
dc.rights | This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2017. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
dc.subject | information | en |
dc.subject | economics | en |
dc.subject | microeconomic theory | en |
dc.subject | money | en |
dc.subject | risk sharing | en |
dc.subject | moral hazard | en |
dc.subject | adverse selection | en |
dc.subject | signaling | en |
dc.subject | screening | en |
dc.subject | mechanism design | en |
dc.subject | decision making | en |
dc.subject | uncertainty | en |
dc.subject | Decision-making | en |
dc.subject | information economics | en |
dc.subject | incentive theory | en |
dc.subject | contract theory | en |
dc.subject | choice | en |
dc.subject | choices | en |
dc.subject | microeconomic analysis | en |
dc.subject | risk | en |
dc.title | 14.124 Microeconomic Theory IV, Spring 2003 | en |
dc.title.alternative | Microeconomic Theory IV | en |
dc.audience.educationlevel | Graduate | |
dc.subject.cip | 450601 | en |
dc.subject.cip | Economics, General | en |
dc.date.updated | 2017-09-25T05:54:10Z | |