MIT Libraries logoDSpace@MIT

MIT
View Item 
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • MIT Libraries
  • MIT Theses
  • Doctoral Theses
  • View Item
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • MIT Libraries
  • MIT Theses
  • Doctoral Theses
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

What it means to want

Author(s)
Phillips-Brown, Milo.
Thumbnail
Download1142632800-MIT.pdf (6.064Mb)
Other Contributors
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy.
Advisor
Stephen Yablo.
Terms of use
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
Wanting is an easy concept to use. Talk to any three year-old and you'll know they've mastered it. Wanting is important, too. We understand one another in no small part through what they want, and wanting is a pillar in theories of mind and ethics. An account of wanting, then, must do dual duties: be powerful enough to carry this theoretical burden and simple enough to explain wanting's effortless use in daily life. The first two Chapters of this dissertation discharge these duties in part. The latter two Chapters complicate the task of discharging them further. Chapter 1. Folk psychology and decision theory both represent our belieflike and desire- and preference-like states. Both use these representations to explain and predict our actions. If we can't account for one in terms of the other, we'd have a dubious dualism-two competing systems of representation, prediction, and explanation. I give a decision-theoretic account of a key folk psychological notion-wanting.
 
Chapter 2. What we want depends on what we believe. Yet you can want to stay home (it would be nice to) despite believing it would ruin your career. This case confounds my theory from Chapter 1, as well as the orthodox semantics for 'want'. In Chapter 2, I develop a semantics based idea that you want to stay home considering its benefits, but ignoring the career consequences. Chapter 3. The meaning of anankastic conditionals-like 'if you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train'-is clear, yet how it arises compositionally has proven an enigma. Many had thought the enigma unraveled by Condoravdi and Lauer (2016). I argue not: anankastic conditionals are still a mystery. Chapter 4 (co-authored with Lyndal Grant).
 
The widely held Satisfactionis- Truth Principle-if A wants p, then A has a desire that is satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true-posits an appealingly straightforward link between what we want and the satisfaction conditions of our desires, and in turn, enables appealingly straightforward accounts linking what we want, the wanting relation, and the contents of desires. We argue that the principle is nonetheless false.
 
Description
Thesis: Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2019
 
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
 
Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-82).
 
Date issued
2019
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124093
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Keywords
Linguistics and Philosophy.

Collections
  • Doctoral Theses

Browse

All of DSpaceCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

My Account

Login

Statistics

OA StatisticsStatistics by CountryStatistics by Department
MIT Libraries
PrivacyPermissionsAccessibilityContact us
MIT
Content created by the MIT Libraries, CC BY-NC unless otherwise noted. Notify us about copyright concerns.