Reputation with stopping time decision
Name
1227097180-MIT.pdf
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543.96 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
268e2f6ede4cde25745c19b03eec36aa
Author(s)
Sun, Jian(Scientist in business management)Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Advisor(s)
Hui Chen.
Date Issued
2020
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
This paper studies a long run relationship between two players while one player has reputation concern and the other player's decision is a stopping time. The equilibrium structure depends on the value of the long run relationship: when the value of the relationship is low, a simple threshold equilibrium is the unique equilibrium; when the value becomes higher, a probationary period endogenously arises when reputation is in an intermediate region. Reputation concern also has discipline effect, moral hazard problem is mitigated when player's reputation becomes worse, and the discipline effect is dominating when reputation is sufficiently bad.
Description
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 27-28).
Subjects
Sloan School of Management.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided.
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