17.812J / 14.296J Collective Choice I, Fall 2008

Author(s)
Snyder, James
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Alternative title
Collective Choice I
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Abstract
This is an applied theory course covering topics in the political economy of democratic countries. This course examines political institutions from a rational choice perspective. The now burgeoning rational choice literature on legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, and elections constitutes the chief focus. Some focus will be placed on institutions from a comparative and/or international perspective.
Date issued
2008-12
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/145400
Other identifiers
17.812J-Fall2008
Other identifiers
17.812J
14.296J
IMSCP-MD5-31b4c51bebbb572d87727e6af7315f99
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Keywords
political economy, rational choice, legislature, bureaucracy, court, and elections, electoral competition, comparative, international, public goods, government, taxation, income redistribution, macroeconomic policy, multiparty competition, electoral system, voter, agency models, models of political parties, point-valued solution, set-valued solution, probabilistic voting models, structure-induced equilibrium models, vote-buying, vote-trading, Colonel Blotto, minorities, interest groups, lobbying, bargaining, coalitions, government stability, informational theory, distributive theory, legislative-executive relations, representative democracy, direct democracy
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