| dc.contributor.author | Rayo, Agustín | |
| dc.coverage.temporal | Spring 2009 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-13T13:52:51Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-13T13:52:51Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-06 | |
| dc.identifier | 24.729-Spring2009 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 24.729 | |
| dc.identifier.other | IMSCP-MD5-8cc4143f447b5530398fd27b23a8d01c | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/148505 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The seminar will be devoted to understanding what we're up to when we ascribe contents to a person's assertions and mental attitudes. We seek to make clear the rules of the game for the philosophy of language. We'll survey classic discussions of the issue by Field, Lewis and Stalnaker. But much of the emphasis of the class will be on getting clear about the limitations of our theoretical tools. I'd like to focus on places where our theorizing runs into trouble, or breaks down altogether. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en-US | |
| dc.rights | This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2023. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | radical interpretation | en |
| dc.subject | mathematical truth | en |
| dc.subject | self-location | en |
| dc.subject | degrees of belief | en |
| dc.subject | incoherent belief | en |
| dc.subject | language of thought | en |
| dc.subject | representation system | en |
| dc.subject | modeling representation | en |
| dc.subject | intentionality | en |
| dc.subject | philosophy of language | en |
| dc.subject | Putnam's paradox | en |
| dc.subject | semantics | en |
| dc.subject | logical omniscience | en |
| dc.subject | epistemology | en |
| dc.subject | knowledge argument | en |
| dc.title | 24.729 Topics in Philosophy of Language: Modeling Representation, Spring 2009 | en |
| dc.title.alternative | Topics in Philosophy of Language: Modeling Representation | en |
| dc.type | Learning Object | |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | |
| dc.audience.educationlevel | Graduate | |
| dc.subject.cip | 380101 | en |
| dc.subject.cip | Philosophy | en |
| dc.date.updated | 2023-03-13T13:52:56Z | |
