Tit for Tat? The Difficulty of Designing Two-Sided Reputation Systems
Name
Tit_for_Tat_The_Difficulty_of_Designing_Two-Sided_Reputation_Systems.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
365.73 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
4ee50b99a71faafcc35f6d3945ddf2b3
Author(s)
Holtz, David
Fradkin, Andrey
Date Issued
November 1, 2020
Journal
NIM Marketing Intelligence Review
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Citation
Holtz, David, and Andrey Fradkin. "Tit for Tat? The Difficulty of Designing Two-Sided Reputation Systems." NIM Marketing Intelligence Review, vol. 12, no. 2, Nuremberg Institute for Market Decisions, 2020, pp. 34-39.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
In a two-sided reputation system, it is in the interest of both buyers and sellers to be a good transaction partner. What sounds wonderful in theory is unfortunately not so easy to implement in reality. Reputation systems can have flaws due to factors such as reciprocity and retaliation, selective reviewing, and reputation inflation. These flaws cause the ratings collected on the platform to diverge from the actual experiences that marketplace participants are having. When reputation systems are not thoughtfully designed, it can be hard to distinguish between the “high quality” and “low quality” interactions. This makes it difficult to identify and remove bad actors and increases the chances of a “bad match”. Innovations in reputation system design, such as simultaneous reveal of information, review incentives, and greater reliance on private feedback, are making it easier to implement two-sided systems while avoiding the common pitfalls.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.2478/nimmir-2020-0015
