Essays on the Economics of Education
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kocks-gkocks-phd-econ-2026-thesis.pdf
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Author(s)
Kocks, Geoffrey
Advisor(s)
Pathak, Parag
Angrist, Joshua
Date Issued
May 2026
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
K-12 school systems frequently use school choice options such as selective programs and charter schools to promote student achievement. This thesis studies the effects of these models on student outcomes and access to desired schools, and how admissions policies shape these effects.
The first chapter, joint with Jimmy Chin, studies the impacts of New York City kindergarten gifted and talented (G&T) programs on achievement and access to elite secondary schools. We combine two research designs: a regression discontinuity at a qualifying exam cutoff and a lottery design arising from centralized assignment. The latter permits the
identification of effects for students scoring above the cutoff. While G&T markedly changes the classroom environment, there is no impact on achievement using either empirical strategy. In contrast, G&T boosts applications and enrollment in elite middle schools in the lottery
sample. Effects on school access are largest among low-income students and those with high baseline ability. We use our estimates to predict how a recent admissions reform that replaced the G&T entrance exam with teacher recommendations affects elite school access. The reform increased the share of low-income students in G&T from 22 to 28 percent. A structural model of G&T demand shows that it also decreased the mean baseline ability. The decline in baseline ability outweighs the gains in low-income enrollment, lowering the average treatment effect on elite school access for G&T students.
The second chapter, joint with Christopher Avery and Parag Pathak, studies common applications, where students can apply to multiple schools on a single form. We model three application systems: a common application, a decentralized system, and a ranked choice system. Our model shows that while a common application may expand access, it increases competition and may produce worse matches than a decentralized system where application costs encourage more selective applications. Ranked-choice systems combine reduced application costs with preference-based matching that reduces mismatches. We examine these predictions by analyzing how Boston’s charter school sector was affected when it adopted an online common application. Counterfactual simulations suggest the common application performs no better than alternatives on several metrics and did little to increase access for disadvantaged groups.
The third chapter estimates how the effects of attending Massachusetts charter schools evolved from 2002 to 2022. I use random variation from admissions lotteries to estimate causal effects on standardized test scores and college enrollment. Estimates from 2010 through 2014 confirm prior research showing that the state’s charters improve student outcomes. I show however, that the effects of charter enrollment plummeted for cohorts entering charters from 2015 to 2019, with effects on math and English scores dropping to zero. Effects partially rebounded for cohorts entering in 2020 and later. Declines in charter effects throughout the 2010s are concentrated in Boston-area charters, and coincide with leadership changes and fewer teachers with subject-area expertise. Changes in charter effects appear to be unrelated to charter school expansions, shifts in the composition of students, or the redesign of assessments. Finally, I briefly examine factors contributing to post-pandemic charter effectiveness.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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