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dc.contributor.authorBasak, Suleyman
dc.contributor.authorPavlova, Anna
dc.date.accessioned2003-01-27T20:45:56Z
dc.date.available2003-01-27T20:45:56Z
dc.date.issued2003-01-27T20:45:56Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1808
dc.description.abstractThis article develops a multi-period production model to examine the optimal dynamic behaviour of a large monopolistic value-maximizing firm that manipulates its valuation as well as the price of its output. In the pre-commitment equilibrium the firm's output and labour demand are decreased, while the price of consumption is increased, as compared with its competitive counterpart. Profits and the firm's value can, however, be either increased or decreased. In the time-consistent equilibrium the firm's output and labour demand are increased, while the price of consumption is decreased. More strikingly, the profits in every period are decreased, and may even go negative, while the firm's value can be either lower or higher than in the competitive benchmark. In the continuous-time limit, while the pre-commitment equilibrium retains its basic discrete-time structure, the time-consistent equilibrium tends to the limit of zero profits and hence zero firm's valuen
dc.format.extent453900 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4234-01
dc.subjectMonopolyen
dc.subjectasset pricing theoryen
dc.subjectgeneral equilibriumen
dc.subjectshort-sighteden
dc.subjecttime-consistencyen
dc.titleMONOPOLY POWER AND THE FIRM'S VALUATION: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF SHORT VERSUS LONG-TERM POLICIESen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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