14.126 Game Theory, Fall 2002

Izmalkov, Sergei; Yildiz, Muhamet

Author(s)

Izmalkov, Sergei; Yildiz, Muhamet

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Alternative title

Game Theory

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Abstract

How should economic agents act when their optimal decisions depend on what they expect other agents to do? We study various models of equilibrium, which correspond to different ways that the agents might make their decisions, and various kinds of games—static games, dynamic games, and games of incomplete information.

Date issued

2002-12

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/35856

Department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics

Other identifiers

14.126-Fall2002

local: 14.126

local: IMSCP-MD5-07e15fb34ed330bb00f573879c461e4f

Keywords

game theory, Nash Bargaining, Price Theory, Sequential Bargaining, Game theory

Collections

MIT OCW Archived Courses