dc.contributor.author | Muslu, Volkan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2004-02-06T19:31:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2004-02-06T19:31:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-02-06T19:31:36Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4045 | |
dc.description.abstract | Using a broad sample of the largest European companies, I examine whether the two governance mechanisms, namely (i) independent monitoring by a board of directors and (ii) grants and disclosures of incentive-based executive pay, are substitutes for one another. I find that companies with proportionately more executives on their boards of directors grant greater incentive-based pay to their executives, and improve the transparency of their pay disclosure. The findings are consistent with the efficient contracting argument, which predicts that greater incentive-based pay and pay disclosure transparency mitigate agency problems generated by boards dependent upon management | en |
dc.format.extent | 282406 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4432-03 | |
dc.subject | Board Independence | en |
dc.subject | Compensation Structures | en |
dc.subject | Pay Disclosure | en |
dc.subject | International Corporate Governance | en |
dc.title | Board Independence, Executive Pay Structures, and Pay Disclosure: Evidence from Europe | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |