| dc.contributor.author | Snyder, James M. | en_US |
| dc.coverage.temporal | Fall 2005 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2005-12 | |
| dc.identifier | 17.884J-Fall2005 | |
| dc.identifier | local: 17.884J | |
| dc.identifier | local: 14.296J | |
| dc.identifier | local: IMSCP-MD5-aad5e9e756f4e207e30354e7f5156735 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/46344 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Examines political institutions from a rational choice perspective. The now burgeoning rational choice literature on legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, and elections constitutes the chief focus. Some focus on institutions from a comparative and/or international perspective. Graduate students are expected to pursue the subject in greater depth through reading and individual research. Advanced undergrads may take subject with faculty approval. From the course home page: Course Description This is an applied theory course covering topics in the political economy of democratic countries. This course examines political institutions from a rational choice perspective. The now burgeoning rational choice literature on legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, and elections constitutes the chief focus. Some focus will be placed on institutions from a comparative and/or international perspective. | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | Usage Restrictions: This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2003. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license"). The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Political science | en_US |
| dc.subject | economics | en_US |
| dc.subject | political economy | en_US |
| dc.subject | democratic | en_US |
| dc.subject | countries | en_US |
| dc.subject | collective | en_US |
| dc.subject | choice | en_US |
| dc.subject | electoral competiton | en_US |
| dc.subject | public goods | en_US |
| dc.subject | size | en_US |
| dc.subject | government | en_US |
| dc.subject | taxation | en_US |
| dc.subject | income redistribution | en_US |
| dc.subject | macroeconomic policy | en_US |
| dc.subject | voting models | en_US |
| dc.subject | equilibrium models | en_US |
| dc.subject | information | en_US |
| dc.subject | learning | en_US |
| dc.subject | agency models | en_US |
| dc.subject | political parties | en_US |
| dc.subject | vote-buying | en_US |
| dc.subject | vote-trading | en_US |
| dc.subject | resource allocation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Colonel Blotto | en_US |
| dc.subject | interest groups | en_US |
| dc.subject | lobbying | en_US |
| dc.subject | legislatures | en_US |
| dc.subject | bargaining | en_US |
| dc.subject | coalitions | en_US |
| dc.subject | government | en_US |
| dc.subject | stability | en_US |
| dc.subject | informational | en_US |
| dc.subject | distributive | en_US |
| dc.subject | theories | en_US |
| dc.subject | executive | en_US |
| dc.subject | relations | en_US |
| dc.subject | representative democracy | en_US |
| dc.title | 17.884J / 14.296J Collective Choice I, Fall 2005 | en_US |
| dc.title.alternative | Collective Choice I | en_US |
