Advanced Search

Multi-Unit Auction Revenue with Possibilistic Beliefs

Research and Teaching Output of the MIT Community

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Silvio Micali Micali, Silvio en_US Vlachos, Georgios en_US
dc.contributor.other Theory of Computation en 2017-06-07T22:00:04Z 2017-06-07T22:00:04Z 2017-06-05
dc.description.abstract The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that the players are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann). en_US
dc.format.extent 20 p. en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries MIT-CSAIL-TR-2017-010
dc.subject Multi-unit auctions en_US
dc.subject Possibilistic beliefs en_US
dc.title Multi-Unit Auction Revenue with Possibilistic Beliefs en_US 2017-06-07T22:00:05Z

Files in this item

Name Size Format Description
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2017 ... 320.0Kb PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record