Multi-Unit Auction Revenue with Possibilistic Beliefs
Name
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2017-010.pdf
Size
320.08 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
ae79f97f7cb8ef296e1c2b7867b04ce0
Download all files submitted through automated deposit
Author(s)
Micali, Silvio
Vlachos, Georgios
Advisor(s)
Silvio Micali
Date Issued
June 5, 2017
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2017-010
Abstract
The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that the players are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann).
Subjects
Multi-unit auctions
Possibilistic beliefs
Persistent DSpace Link
