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Revenue in Truly Combinatorial Auctions and Adversarial Mechanism Design
(2007- 11-0)
Little is known about generating revenue in UNRESTRICTED combinatorial auctions. (In particular, the VCG mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) In this paper we determine how much revenue can be guaranteed in such auctions. ...
Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions
(2007-11-02)
In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent ...
Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions
(2008-11-13)
Dominant-strategy truthfulness is traditionally considered the best possible solution concept in mechanism design, as it enables one to predict with confidence which strategies INDEPENDENT players will actually choose. ...