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Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices

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Show simple item record Richardson, Scott Tuna, A. Irem Wysocki, Peter D. 2003-05-23T19:36:44Z 2003-05-23T19:36:44Z 2003-05-23T19:36:44Z
dc.description.abstract This paper explores whether firms that share common directors also pursue similar corporate policies. Using a sample of 885 U.S. firms with common directors, we find that director fixed effects strongly explain variation in firms' governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policy choices. Moreover, the director fixed effects provide incremental explanatory power over traditional economic determinants of firms' policies. consistent with our hypotheses, the director effects are less pronounced in large firms, in firms with more outside board members, and for directors with numerous outside board appointments. Our evidence is more consistent with directors and firms "matching" their policy preferences rather than directors "imposing" their policy preferences on firms en
dc.format.extent 266604 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4307-03
dc.subject Board of Directors en
dc.subject Corporate Governance en
dc.subject Corporate Policies en
dc.subject Disclosure en
dc.title Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices en
dc.type Working Paper en

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