Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

dc.contributor.author	Fudenberg, Drew	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Levine, David K.	en_US
dc.contributor.other	Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2011-06-09T19:00:32Z
dc.date.available	2011-06-09T19:00:32Z
dc.date.issued	1991	en_US
dc.identifier	maintainingreput00fude	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63849
dc.publisher	Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 589	en_US
dc.title	Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US
dc.identifier.oclc	24884800	en_US
dc.identifier.aleph	000591149	en_US