dc.contributor.author | Eso, Peter | en_US |
dc.coverage.temporal | Spring 2009 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2009-06 | |
dc.identifier | 14.123-Spring2009 | |
dc.identifier | local: 14.123 | |
dc.identifier | local: IMSCP-MD5-89aa9823b7dbd13292491059a6f69d5c | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66920 | |
dc.description.abstract | This half-semester course discusses decision theory and topics in game theory. We present models of individual decision-making under certainty and uncertainty. Topics include preference orderings, expected utility, risk, stochastic dominance, supermodularity, monotone comparative statics, background risk, game theory, rationalizability, iterated strict dominance multi-stage games, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfection, stability, signaling games, theory of auctions, global games, repeated games, and correlation. | en_US |
dc.language | en-US | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | Usage Restrictions: This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en_US |
dc.subject | microeconomics | en_US |
dc.subject | microeconomic theory | en_US |
dc.subject | preference | en_US |
dc.subject | utility representation | en_US |
dc.subject | expected utility | en_US |
dc.subject | positive interpretation | en_US |
dc.subject | normative interpretation | en_US |
dc.subject | risk | en_US |
dc.subject | stochastic dominance | en_US |
dc.subject | insurance | en_US |
dc.subject | finance | en_US |
dc.subject | supermodularity | en_US |
dc.subject | comparative statics | en_US |
dc.subject | decision theory | en_US |
dc.subject | game theory | en_US |
dc.subject | rationalizability | en_US |
dc.subject | iterated strict dominance | en_US |
dc.subject | iterated conditional dominance | en_US |
dc.subject | bargaining | en_US |
dc.subject | equilibrium | en_US |
dc.subject | sequential equilibrium | en_US |
dc.subject | trembling-hand perfection | en_US |
dc.subject | signaling games | en_US |
dc.subject | auctions | en_US |
dc.subject | global games | en_US |
dc.subject | repeated games | en_US |
dc.subject | correlation | en_US |
dc.title | 14.123 Microeconomic Theory III, Spring 2009 | en_US |
dc.title.alternative | Microeconomic Theory III | en_US |
dc.type | Learning Object | |
dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics | |