This is an archived course. A more recent version may be available at ocw.mit.edu.

Lecture Notes

Lec # Topics Lecture notes
1-2 Choice under Uncertainty (PDF 1) (PDF 2)
3-4

Introduction

Definitions (Nash, Perfect, Sequential Equilibrium, Rationalizability, Correlated Equilibrium, Backward Induction, Forward Induction, Sequential Rationality, Self Confirming Equilibria)

(PDF 1) (PDF 2) (PDF 3)
5-7 Classical Topics: Repeated Games  (PDF 1) (PDF 2)
8-9 Classical Topics: Cheap Talk, Signaling, and Reputation (PDF)
10 Classical Topics: Bargaining Theory (PDF)
11 Review  
12 Classical Topics: Supermodular Games  
13-16 Learning and Evolutionary Foundations (PDF 1) (PDF 2) (PDF 3)
17-19 Epistemic Foundations (PDF 1) (PDF 2) (PDF 3) (PDF 4)
20 Review  
21 New Topics: Global Games  
22 New Topics: Heterogeneous Beliefs  
23 New Topics: Psychological Games  
24-25 New Topics: Game Theory with Non-Expected Utility  
26 Final Exam