Course Meeting Times

Lectures: 2 sessions / week, 1.5 hours / session

Recitations: 1 session / week, 1 hour / session

Description

This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.

Textbooks

Readings are listed by session in the readings section of this course.

Osborne, and Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994. ISBN: 0262650401. (Primary)

Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 0262061414. (Primary)

Kreps, David M. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. ISBN: 0813375533.

Weibull, Jörgen W. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. ISBN: 0262231816. (Supplementary)

Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. ISBN: 0262061945.

Supplementary Readings

The supplementary readings in this course are drawn from the following journals.

Articles in Games and Economic Behavior 5 (1993).

Articles in Journal of Economic Theory 59 (1993).

Articles before 1997 in Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies or Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Grading