14.129 Advanced Contract Theory, Spring 2005

Author(s)
Izmalkov, Sergei
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Alternative title
Advanced Contract Theory
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Abstract
This course focuses on recent developments in contract theory. Topics include: advanced models of moral hazard, adverse selection, mechanism design and incomplete contracts with applications to theory of the firm, organizational design, and financial structure.
Date issued
2005-06
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/152417
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Other identifiers
14.129-Spring2005
Other identifiers
14.129
IMSCP-MD5-c811ab043ee50a8910945d127b2401f1
Keywords
Games with Incomplete Information, Bayesian-Nash Games, Auctions and Mechanism Design, Static Models, Simple Models, Multiple Agents, Dynamic Models, Dynamic Adverse Selection, Dynamic Moral Hazard, Surplus Division
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