| dc.contributor.author | Izmalkov, Sergei | |
| dc.coverage.temporal | Spring 2005 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-10-11T19:58:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-10-11T19:58:26Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005-06 | |
| dc.identifier | 14.129-Spring2005 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 14.129 | |
| dc.identifier.other | IMSCP-MD5-c811ab043ee50a8910945d127b2401f1 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/152417 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This course focuses on recent developments in contract theory. Topics include: advanced models of moral hazard, adverse selection, mechanism design and incomplete contracts with applications to theory of the firm, organizational design, and financial structure. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en-US | |
| dc.rights | This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2023. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | Games with Incomplete Information | en |
| dc.subject | Bayesian-Nash Games | en |
| dc.subject | Auctions and Mechanism Design | en |
| dc.subject | Static Models | en |
| dc.subject | Simple Models | en |
| dc.subject | Multiple Agents | en |
| dc.subject | Dynamic Models | en |
| dc.subject | Dynamic Adverse Selection | en |
| dc.subject | Dynamic Moral Hazard | en |
| dc.subject | Surplus Division | en |
| dc.title | 14.129 Advanced Contract Theory, Spring 2005 | en |
| dc.title.alternative | Advanced Contract Theory | en |
| dc.type | Learning Object | |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics | |
| dc.audience.educationlevel | Graduate | |
| dc.subject.cip | 450601 | en |
| dc.subject.cip | Economics, General | en |
| dc.date.updated | 2023-10-11T19:58:32Z | |
