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dc.contributor.authorRichards, Whitman
dc.date.accessioned2005-12-22T02:36:19Z
dc.date.available2005-12-22T02:36:19Z
dc.date.issued2005-08-16
dc.identifier.otherMIT-CSAIL-TR-2005-054
dc.identifier.otherAIM-2005-024
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30565
dc.description.abstractWhen groups of individuals make choices among several alternatives, the most compelling social outcome is the Condorcet winner, namely the alternative beating all others in a pair-wise contest. Obviously the Condorcet winner cannot be overturned if one sub-group proposes another alternative it happens to favor. However, in some cases, and especially with haphazard voting, there will be no clear unique winner, with the outcome consisting of a triple of pair-wise winners that each beat different subsets of the alternatives (i.e. a “top-cycle”.) We explore the sensitivity of Condorcet winners to various perturbations in the voting process that lead to top-cycles. Surprisingly, variations in the number of votes for each alternative is much less important than consistency in a voter’s view of how alternatives are related. As more and more voter’s preference orderings on alternatives depart from a shared model of the domain, then unique Condorcet outcomes become increasingly unlikely.
dc.format.extent18 p.
dc.format.extent17793797 bytes
dc.format.extent614937 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/postscript
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMassachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
dc.subjectAI
dc.subjectcollective choice
dc.subjectuncertainty
dc.subjectvoting
dc.subjecttop-cycles
dc.titleCollective Choice with Uncertain Domain Moldels


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