Knowledge Flow Analysis for Security Protocols
dc.contributor.author | Torlak, Emina | |
dc.contributor.author | van Dijk, Marten | |
dc.contributor.author | Gassend, Blaise | |
dc.contributor.author | Jackson, Daniel | |
dc.contributor.author | Devadas, Srinivas | |
dc.contributor.other | Software Design | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2005-12-22T02:37:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2005-12-22T02:37:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005-10-19 | |
dc.identifier.other | MIT-CSAIL-TR-2005-066 | |
dc.identifier.other | MIT-LCS-TR-1007 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30576 | |
dc.description.abstract | Knowledge flow analysis offers a simple and flexible way to find flaws in security protocols. A protocol is described by a collection of rules constraining the propagation of knowledge amongst principals. Because this characterization corresponds closely to informal descriptions of protocols, it allows a succinct and natural formalization; because it abstracts away message ordering, and handles communications between principals and applications of cryptographic primitives uniformly, it is readily represented in a standard logic. A generic framework in the Alloy modelling language is presented, and instantiated for two standard protocols, and a new key management scheme. | |
dc.format.extent | 23 p. | |
dc.format.extent | 22738148 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 915258 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/postscript | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory | |
dc.title | Knowledge Flow Analysis for Security Protocols |