Subcontracted Rational SFE
Author(s)
Lepinski, Matthew; Micali, Silvio
DownloadMIT-CSAIL-TR-2005-071.ps (7946.Kb)
Additional downloads
Other Contributors
Cryptography and Information Security
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
In their paper, "Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design," Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali show that any one-shot mediated game can be simulated by the players themselves, without the help of a trusted mediator, using physical envelopes and a ballot-box. We show that communication between the players is not essential to the ILM protocol. That is, we provide a protocol for rational secure function evaluation (Rational SFE) where the players just send a set of envelopes to a referee who simply performs a sequence of publicly verifiable actions. That is, the players can "subcontract" all of the computation to an untrusted referee. In addition to providing a communication structure that more closely matches the ideal game, our protocol also enables us to better simulate mediated games in which abort is not a dominated action.
Date issued
2005-11-02Other identifiers
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2005-071
MIT-LCS-TM-653
Series/Report no.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory