Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions

Author(s)
Valiant, Paul; Micali, Silvio
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Theory of Computation
Advisor
Silvio Micali
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Abstract
In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the same propertiesin combinatorial auctions.
Date issued
2007-11-02
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/39420
Other identifiers
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-052
Keywords
Worst Rational Setting, Natural Solution Pairs, Player-Monotone Benchmarks, Revenue Guarantees, Guaranteed Revenue
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