MIT Libraries homeMIT Libraries logoDSpace@MIT

MIT
View Item 
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab (CSAIL)
  • CSAIL Digital Archive
  • CSAIL Technical Reports (July 1, 2003 - present)
  • View Item
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab (CSAIL)
  • CSAIL Digital Archive
  • CSAIL Technical Reports (July 1, 2003 - present)
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions

Author(s)
Valiant, Paul; Micali, Silvio
Thumbnail
DownloadMIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-052.pdf (320.9Kb)
Additional downloads
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-052.ps (1.423Mb)
Other Contributors
Theory of Computation
Advisor
Silvio Micali
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the same propertiesin combinatorial auctions.
Date issued
2007-11-02
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/39420
Other identifiers
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-052
Keywords
Worst Rational Setting, Natural Solution Pairs, Player-Monotone Benchmarks, Revenue Guarantees, Guaranteed Revenue

Collections
  • CSAIL Technical Reports (July 1, 2003 - present)

Browse

All of DSpaceCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

My Account

Login

Statistics

OA StatisticsStatistics by CountryStatistics by Department
MIT Libraries homeMIT Libraries logo

Find us on

Twitter Facebook Instagram YouTube RSS

MIT Libraries navigation

SearchHours & locationsBorrow & requestResearch supportAbout us
PrivacyPermissionsAccessibility
MIT
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Content created by the MIT Libraries, CC BY-NC unless otherwise noted. Notify us about copyright concerns.