Generalization of the MV Mechanism
| dc.contributor.advisor | Silvio Micali | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Jing | en_US |
| dc.contributor.other | Theory of Computation | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-05T15:45:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-05-05T15:45:41Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-05-01 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-023 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41515 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Micali and Valiant proposed a mechanism for combinatorial auctions that is dominant-strategy truthful, guarantees reasonably high revenue, and is very resilient against collusions. Their mechanism, however, uses as a subroutine the VCG mechanism, that is not polynomial time.We propose a modification of their mechanism that is efficient, while retaining their collusion resilience and a good fraction of their revenue, if given as a subroutine an efficient approximation of the VCG mechanism. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 7 p. | en_US |
| dc.relation | Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory | en_US |
| dc.relation | en_US | |
| dc.title | Generalization of the MV Mechanism | en_US |
