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Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry

Author(s)
Schmalensee, Richard
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Abstract
US antitrust policy takes as its objective consumer welfare, not total economic welfare. With that objective, Joe Bain's definition of entry barriers is more useful than George Stigler's or definitions based on economic welfare. It follows that economies of scale that involve sunk costs may create antitrust barriers to entry. A simple model shows that sunk costs without scale economies may discourage entry without creating an antitrust entry barrier.
Date issued
2004-04-02
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/5060
Series/Report no.
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4457-04
Keywords
antitrust, U.S. antitrust policy, entry barriers

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