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dc.contributor.authorToikka, Juuso T.
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-17T14:40:30Z
dc.date.available2016-08-17T14:40:30Z
dc.date.issued2011-11
dc.date.submitted2011-02
dc.identifier.issn00220531
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/103942
dc.description.abstractI extend Myersonʼs [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by incentive compatibility binds. It is applicable to quasilinear principal-agent models where the standard virtual surplus is weakly concave in the allocation or appropriately separable in the allocation and type. No assumptions on allocation rules are required beyond monotonicity.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipYrjö Jahnsson Foundationen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.003en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs Licenseen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceProf. Toikka via Kate McNeillen_US
dc.titleIroning without controlen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationToikka, Juuso. “Ironing Without Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 146, no. 6 (November 2011): 2510–2526.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.contributor.approverToikka, Juuso T.en_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorToikka, Juuso T.en_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Economic Theoryen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0400-5733
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CCen_US


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