Able to Do the Impossible
Author(s)
Spencer II, John Haven
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According to a widely held principle—the poss-ability principle—an agent, S, is able to Φ only if it is metaphysically possible for S to Φ. I argue against the poss-abilityprinciple by developing a novel class of counterexamples. I then argue that the consequences of rejecting the poss-ability principle are interesting and far-reaching.
Date issued
2016-09Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and PhilosophyJournal
Mind
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation
Spencer, Jack. “Able to Do the Impossible.” Mind 126, 502 (September 2016): 466–497 © 2016 Spencer
Version: Original manuscript
ISSN
0026-4423
1460-2113