Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorYablo, Stephen
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-18T16:41:47Z
dc.date.available2018-06-18T16:41:47Z
dc.date.issued2017-05
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.issn1573-0883
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116361
dc.description.abstractA reply to Fine’s critique of Aboutness. Fine contrasts two notions of truthmaker, and more generally two notions of “state.” One is algebraic; states are sui generis entities grasped primarily through the conditions they satisfy. The other uses set theory; states are sets of worlds, or, perhaps, collections of such sets. I try to defend the second notion and question some seeming advantages of the first.en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0922-5en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.subjectMeaning, Truth, Metaphysics, Intentionality, Propositionsen_US
dc.titleReply to Fine on Aboutnessen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationYablo, Stephen. “Reply to Fine on Aboutness.” Philosophical Studies 175, no. 6 (May 29, 2017): 1495–1512.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorYablo, Stephen
dc.relation.journalPhilosophical Studiesen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2018-05-11T04:01:41Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderSpringer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
dspace.orderedauthorsYablo, Stephenen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9486-8323
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record