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dc.contributor.authorKojima, Fuhito
dc.contributor.authorPathak, Parag
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-11T14:36:14Z
dc.date.available2011-03-11T14:36:14Z
dc.date.issued2009-06
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61663
dc.description.abstractA number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSpencer Foundationen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.608en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleIncentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Marketsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationKojima, Fuhito, and Parag A. Pathak. 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets." American Economic Review, 99(3): 608–27.© 2009 AEAen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.contributor.approverPathak, Parag
dc.contributor.mitauthorPathak, Parag
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Reviewen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsKojima, Fuhito; Pathak, Parag Aen
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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