A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design
Author(s)
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
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We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing significant revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Our mechanism (1) succeeds in a new and very adversarial collusion model; (2) works in a new, equilibrium-less, and very strong solution concept; (3) benchmarks its performance against the knowledge that the players have about each other; (4) is computationally efficient and preserves the players' privacy to an unusual extent.
Date issued
2009-05Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceJournal
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). Proceedings ... 2009
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Citation
Chen, Jing, and Silvio Micali. “A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design.” Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing - STOC ’09. Bethesda, MD, USA, 2009. 503. Copyright 2009 ACM
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0737-8017