Must . . . stay . . . strong!
Author(s)
von Fintel, Kai; Gillies, Anthony S.
Downloadshatner-postprint.pdf (570.9Kb)
OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY
Open Access Policy
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Terms of use
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
It is a recurring matra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must.
Description
This is the fourth installment in our trilogy of papers on epistemic modality.
Date issued
2010-05Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Humanities, Arts, and Social SciencesJournal
Natural Language Semantics
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
von Fintel, Kai, and Anthony S. Gillies. “Must . . . Stay . . . Strong!” Natural Language Semantics 18.4 (2010) : 351-383.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0925-854X
1572-865X