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dc.contributor.authorDaskalakis, Konstantinos
dc.contributor.authorDeckelbaum, Alan
dc.contributor.authorTzamos, Christos
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T15:11:53Z
dc.date.available2015-11-24T15:11:53Z
dc.date.issued2013-06
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4503-1962-1
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/100026
dc.description.abstractOptimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive valuations with independent and/or continuous values for the items, these results do not apply, and it was recently shown that exact revenue optimization is intractable, even when there is only one bidder [Daskalakis et al. 2013]. Even for item distributions with special structure, optimal mechanisms have been surprisingly rare [Manelli and Vincent 2006] and the problem is challenging even in the two-item case [Hart and Nisan 2012]. In this paper, we provide a framework for designing optimal mechanisms using optimal transport theory and duality theory. We instantiate our framework to obtain conditions under which only pricing the grand bundle is optimal in multi-item settings (complementing the work of [Manelli and Vincent 2006]), as well as to characterize optimal two-item mechanisms. We use our results to derive closed-form descriptions of the optimal mechanism in several two-item settings, exhibiting also a setting where a continuum of lotteries is necessary for revenue optimization but a closed-form representation of the mechanism can still be found efficiently using our framework.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipAlfred P. Sloan Foundation (Fellowship)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMicrosoft Research (Faculty Fellowship)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (CAREER Award CCF-0953960)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CCF-1101491)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipHertz Foundation (Daniel Stroock Fellowship)en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482593en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourcearXiven_US
dc.titleMechanism Design via Optimal Transporten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationConstantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos. 2013. Mechanism design via optimal transport. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '13). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 269-286.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematicsen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorDaskalakis, Konstantinosen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorDeckelbaum, Alanen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorTzamos, Christosen_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerceen_US
dc.eprint.versionOriginal manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaperen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsDaskalakis, Constantinos; Deckelbaum, Alan; Tzamos, Christosen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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