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dc.contributor.authorFotakis, Dimitris
dc.contributor.authorTsipras, Dimitris
dc.contributor.authorTzamos, Christos
dc.contributor.authorZampetakis, Emmanouil
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-17T23:06:42Z
dc.date.available2017-09-03T05:00:05Z
dc.date.issued2016-11
dc.identifier.issn1432-4350
dc.identifier.issn1433-0490
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105350
dc.description.abstractWe study mechanism design where the objective is to maximize the residual surplus, i.e., the total value of the outcome minus the payments charged to the agents, by truthful mechanisms. The motivation comes from applications where the payments charged are not in the form of actual monetary transfers, but take the form of wasted resources. We consider a general mechanism design setting with m discrete outcomes and n multidimensional agents. We present two randomized truthful mechanisms that extract an O(logm) fraction of the maximum social surplus as residual surplus. The first mechanism achieves an O(logm)-approximation to the social surplus, which is improved to an O(1)-approximation by the second mechanism. An interesting feature of the second mechanism is that it optimizes over an appropriately restricted space of probability distributions, thus achieving an efficient tradeoff between social surplus and the total amount of payments charged to the agents.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipAlgoNowen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CCF-1101491)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSimons Foundation (Award for Graduate Students in Theoretical Computer Science)en_US
dc.publisherSpringer USen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00224-016-9720-2en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceSpringer USen_US
dc.titleEfficient Money Burning in General Domainsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationFotakis, Dimitris et al. “Efficient Money Burning in General Domains.” Theory of Computing Systems 59.4 (2016): 619–640.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratoryen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorTsipras, Dimitris
dc.contributor.mitauthorTzamos, Christos
dc.contributor.mitauthorZampetakis, Emmanouil
dc.relation.journalTheory of Computing Systemsen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2016-11-15T04:40:30Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderSpringer Science+Business Media New York
dspace.orderedauthorsFotakis, Dimitris; Tsipras, Dimitris; Tzamos, Christos; Zampetakis, Emmanouilen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-5727-5409
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6809-8268
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US


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