Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources
Author(s)
Lim, Charles Ci Wen; Xu, Feihu; Siopsis, George; Chitambar, Eric; Evans, Philip G.; Qi, Bing; ... Show more Show less
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Quantum position verification (QPV) is the art of verifying the geographical location of an untrusted party. Recently, it has been shown that the widely studied Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QPV protocol is insecure after the 3 dB loss point assuming local operations and classical communication (LOCC) adversaries. Here, we propose a time-reversed entanglement swapping QPV protocol (based on measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography) that is highly robust against quantum channel loss. First, assuming ideal qubit sources, we show that the protocol is secure against LOCC adversaries for any quantum channel loss, thereby overcoming the 3 dB loss limit. Then, we analyze the security of the protocol in a more practical setting involving weak laser sources and linear optics. In this setting, we find that the security only degrades by an additive constant and the protocol is able to verify positions up to 47 dB channel loss.
Date issued
2016-09Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of ElectronicsJournal
Physical Review A
Publisher
American Physical Society
Citation
Lim, Charles Ci Wen et al. “Loss-Tolerant Quantum Secure Positioning with Weak Laser Sources.” Physical Review A 94.3 (2016): n. pag. © 2016 American Physical Society
Version: Final published version
ISSN
2469-9926
2469-9934