Open knowledge and changing the subject
Name
11098_2016_724_ReferencePDF.pdf
Size
248.44 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
ba8ae2ada95c79930a81868f6f243334
Author(s)
Yablo, Stephen
Date Issued
August 2016
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Yablo, Stephen. “Open Knowledge and Changing the Subject.” Philosophical Studies 174, no. 4 (August 18, 2016): 1047–1071.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs) which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness” (IONs)? This paper compares two styles of explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0724-1
