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dc.contributor.authorTsitsiklis, John N
dc.contributor.authorXu, Yunjian
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-07T15:45:45Z
dc.date.available2017-07-07T15:45:45Z
dc.date.issued2013-05
dc.date.submitted2013-04
dc.identifier.issn0167-6377
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110536
dc.description.abstractWe compare the aggregate profit achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, which would be obtained if the suppliers were to collude. We establish a lower bound on the profit of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter that captures qualitative properties of the inverse demand function and the number of suppliers (or the maximum of the suppliers’ market shares). The lower bounds are tight when the inverse demand function is affine.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.012en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs Licenseen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleProfit loss in Cournot oligopoliesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationTsitsiklis, John N. and Xu, Yunjian. “Profit Loss in Cournot Oligopolies.” Operations Research Letters 41, 4 (July 2013): 415–420 © 2013 Elsevier B.V.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systemsen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorTsitsiklis, John N
dc.contributor.mitauthorXu, Yunjian
dc.relation.journalOperations Research Lettersen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsTsitsiklis, John N.; Xu, Yunjianen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2658-8239
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CCen_US


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