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dc.contributor.authorCai, Yang
dc.contributor.authorCandogan, Ozan
dc.contributor.authorPapadimitriou, Christos
dc.contributor.authorDaskalakis, Konstantinos
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-25T15:42:18Z
dc.date.available2017-07-25T15:42:18Z
dc.date.issued2016-01
dc.date.submitted2012-10
dc.identifier.issn0364-765X
dc.identifier.issn1526-5471
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110830
dc.description.abstractWe show that in zero-sum polymatrix games, a multiplayer generalization of two-person zero-sum games, Nash equilibria can be found efficiently with linear programming. We also show that the set of coarse correlated equilibria collapses to the set of Nash equilibria. In contrast, other important properties of two-person zero-sum games are not preserved: Nash equilibrium payoffs need not be unique, and Nash equilibrium strategies need not be exchangeable or max-min.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (CCF-0953960)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (CCF-1101491)en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherInstitute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0745en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT Web Domainen_US
dc.titleZero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmaxen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationCai, Yang; Candogan, Ozan; Daskalakis, Constantinos, et al. “Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax.” Mathematics of Operations Research 41, 2 (May 2016): 648–655. © 2016 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorDaskalakis, Konstantinos
dc.relation.journalMathematics of Operations Researchen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsCai, Yang; Candogan, Ozan; Daskalakis, Constantinos; Papadimitriou, Christosen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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