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dc.contributor.authorPerez Escudero, Alfonso
dc.contributor.authorFriedman, Jonathan
dc.contributor.authorGore, Jeff
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-13T19:23:00Z
dc.date.available2017-09-13T19:23:00Z
dc.date.issued2016-11
dc.date.submitted2016-05
dc.identifier.issn0027-8424
dc.identifier.issn1091-6490
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/111197
dc.description.abstractIt is common sense that costs and benefits should be carefully weighed before deciding on a course of action. However, we often disapprove of people who do so, even when their actual decision benefits us. For example, we prefer people who directly agree to do us a favor over those who agree only after securing enough information to ensure that the favor will not be too costly. Why should we care about how people make their decisions, rather than just focus on the decisions themselves? Current models show that punishment of information gathering can be beneficial because it forces blind decisions, which under some circumstances enhances cooperation. Here we show that aversion to information gathering can be beneficial even in the absence of punishment, due to a different mechanism: preferential interactions with reliable partners. In a diverse population where different people have different—and unknown—preferences, those who seek additional information before agreeing to cooperate reveal that their preferences are close to the point where they would choose not to cooperate. Blind cooperators are therefore more likely to keep cooperating even if conditions change, and aversion to information gathering helps to interact preferentially with them. Conversely, blind defectors are more likely to keep defecting in the future, leading to a preference for informed defectors over blind ones. Both mechanisms—punishment to force blind decisions and preferential interactions—give qualitatively different predictions, which may enable experimental tests to disentangle them in real-world situations.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherNational Academy of Sciences (U.S.)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1606456113en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourcePNASen_US
dc.titlePreferential interactions promote blind cooperation and informed defectionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationPérez-Escudero, Alfonso et al. “Preferential Interactions Promote Blind Cooperation and Informed Defection.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, 49 (November 2016): 13995–14000 © 2016 National Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Physicsen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorPerez Escudero, Alfonso
dc.contributor.mitauthorFriedman, Jonathan
dc.contributor.mitauthorGore, Jeff
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsPérez-Escudero, Alfonso; Friedman, Jonathan; Gore, Jeffen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4782-6139
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1801-1504
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-4583-8555
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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