Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools
Author(s)AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila; Angrist, Joshua; Narita, Yusuke; Pathak, Parag; Zarate Vasquez, Roman Andres
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Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools.
American Economic Review
American Economic Association
AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila et al. “Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago’s Exam Schools.” American Economic Review 107, 5 (May 2017): 240–245
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