| dc.contributor.author | Hilbert, David R. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Byrne, Alexander | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-04-25T18:02:59Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-04-25T18:02:59Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017-01 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2016-11 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1756-8757 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1756-8765 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/114956 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper critically examines color relationalism and color relativism, two theories of color that are allegedly supported by variation in normal human color vision. We mostly discuss color relationalism, defended at length in Jonathan Cohen's The Red and the Real, and argue that the theory has insuperable problems. | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Wiley Blackwell | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/TOPS.12243 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | MIT Web Domain | en_US |
| dc.title | Color Relationalism and Relativism | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Byrne, Alex, and David R. Hilbert. “Color Relationalism and Relativism.” Topics in Cognitive Science 9, 1 (January 2017): 172–192 © 2017 Cognitive Science Society, Inc | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.contributor.mitauthor | Byrne, Alexander | |
| dc.relation.journal | Topics in Cognitive Science | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2018-04-23T15:19:57Z | |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Byrne, Alex; Hilbert, David R. | en_US |
| dspace.embargo.terms | N | en_US |
| dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 | |
| mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |
