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Why Take Both Boxes?

dc.contributor.authorSpencer, Jack
dc.contributor.authorWells, Ian Thomas
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-14T14:31:39Z
dc.date.available2018-05-14T14:31:39Z
dc.date.issued2017-10
dc.identifier.issn00318205
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115358
dc.description.abstractThe crucial premise of the standard argument for two‐boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two‐boxing, one that eschews the causal dominance principle in favor of a principle linking rational choice to guidance and actual value maximization.en_US
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwellen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/PHPR.12466en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT Web Domainen_US
dc.titleWhy Take Both Boxes?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSpencer, Jack and Ian Wells. “Why Take Both Boxes?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (October 2017) © 2017 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLCen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorWells, Ian Thomas
dc.relation.journalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Researchen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2018-05-14T13:35:08Z
dspace.orderedauthorsSpencer, Jack; Wells, Ianen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1698-8346
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US


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